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NotAnotherEmpire t1_j4j05fe wrote

The forms of legitimacy broadly are:

  1. I have a lot of popular support
  2. I have a lot of thugs with weapons and fear factor
  3. I have divine authority.

2 is extremely flimsy and 3, once no longer taken seriously, is just 2. And 3 is no longer taken seriously today, worldwide.

So if popular legitimacy is needed, counting votes is a good way to do it.

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contractualist OP t1_j4j3a7a wrote

I argue that not even 1 has political authority. Popular support can't make an unjust law just.

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zhibr t1_j4kr15c wrote

Aren't you conflating moral authority and political authority?

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contractualist OP t1_j4krvf1 wrote

Good pick up and I should clarify. The argument I make in my substack argues that political authority requires moral authority.

Basically it’s: reason>moral principles of social contract> constitution> formal legal rules.

If you have any questions regarding this argument, I’d be happy to address them here and in future posts.

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zhibr t1_j4lth5n wrote

So I assume political authority and legitimacy are somewhat equivalent here.

You are talking about legitimacy as a philosophical term (some kind of objective legitimacy, similar to universal morality), rather than empirical (i.e. whether people factually behave in a way that makes ruling/governing possible)? If so, what is the difference between moral and political authority?

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kyajgevo t1_j4kfrqw wrote

Yes but don’t people often disagree on what is a just law and what isn’t? So at that point you have to figure out whose opinion to go by. And going by the one with the most support seems like the most “just” way of choosing. Even if I’m in the minority and believe that a law is unjust, I’ll still believe that the process through which it was chosen was just. And crucially, democracy contains an internal mechanism for those who want to change unjust laws (convince enough people of my position).

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Eric1491625 t1_j4js5zw wrote

There is an elephant in the room with (1) - I have a lot of popular support - that people don't talk about. It is a problem that is the cause of most violent conflicts today.

And the problem is this: Yes, let's say we accept that popular support is the source of legitimacy. But popular support among who? What should the divisional unit even be?

The Alabamans don't want to have their policies dictated by a Californian's vote. A deep Red community within California may even want their government to "get their hands off" interfering with their life.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish minorities in Turkey and Iraq demand autonomy from Turks' and Arabs' votes. Catalonia and Hong Kong want autonomy. Who gets to separate, and why? Yes, more votes within the voting arena wins - but what are the boundaries of that voting arena, and what is the basis for it?

The world has never arrived at a satisfactory answer for this. In the 20th century, the international community applied a strongly racial logic, separating nations post-WW2 and post-colonialism on the basis of race (and sometimes, religion). But this was always deeply flawed because of multiculturalism. So what is the rightful divisional unit? There is no solid answer.

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BobQuixote t1_j4l7pxv wrote

2 also devolves to 1 in enough cases that democracy tends to be more stable, producing more of the aforementioned "inherently good" benefits.

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