In this article I compare and contrast two theories of morality: Morality as Cooperation (MAC) (Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse, 2019) and the Goals-Methods model (GM) (Perry, 2022).

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Description of morality-as-cooperation (MAC)

MAC argues that morality is a set of behavioural and psychological devices for overcoming challenges to cooperation and for promoting cooperation.

>Morality-as-cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morals are solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. There are many such problems, hence many different solutions, including helping one’s family, helping one’s group, returning favors, displaying hawkish and dovish traits, sharing equitably, and respecting prior ownership. In the present paper we test the most straightforward prediction of the theory—that “if morals are what we call solutions to problems of cooperation, then these solutions will be called moral”—using ethnographic accounts of the ethics of 60 societies. And we find that, as predicted, these cooperative traits are indeed considered morally good all around the world.
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>"Is It Good to Cooperate? - Testing the Theory of Morality-as-Cooperation in 60 Countries" (Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse, 2019)
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>However, social dilemmas are not the only type of cooperative problem, and reciprocity is not the only solution. There are other types of cooperation (kin altruism, mutualism, conflict resolution), that explain other types of morality (family values, solidarity, heroism, deference, fairness, and property rights) (Curry, 2016; Curry et al., 2019). These other types of cooperation may explain other aspects of ‘purity’ that are not explained by Fitouchi et al.’s self-control theory.
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>"A broader theory of cooperation can better explain ‘purity’" (Curry and Sznycer, 2022)

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Description of the Goals-Methods model of morality (GM)

GM argues that morality is the normative structure that arises when humans collaborate towards a joint goal. A morality is defined by a goal and a method of achieving it. Evolutionary moralities have evolutionary goals (thriving, surviving, reproducing). Normativity is the evolved pressure to achieve goals and is shaped and directed in any morality by interdependence.

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Verdict

MAC is basically correct (i.e., "agrees with GM") as far as it goes, but needs to be made more general and flexible in order to describe morality more completely. Specifically, while MAC fails to convincingly account for sexual morality, GM can do so. However, the two theories are so similar that they can be integrated, and each makes sense of the other.

Both theories are a consequence of collaboration or cooperation. MAC focuses on generating moral principles using cooperative games and mathematical game theory; while GM focuses on the structure of evolved morality and the standard features (sources of normativity) of moral domains.

However, GM (and presumably MAC) is compatible with the moral attitudes, you > me, you = me, and we > me, and these can also generate moral principles. This "moral compass" is constructed from these ethical attitudes and, by symmetry, their "dark" mirror images. The four quadrants correspond to caring, sharing, bullying, cheating. https://orangebud.co.uk/moral_compass.html

The motivational factor missing from MAC is "ultimate goals" and "ultimate motivation" or "ultimate normativity". Why should "individuals ... value and pursue specific mutually beneficial outcomes" - mutual or otherwise? Why pursue beneficial outcomes? What is "beneficial"?

By "ultimate", I mean both "fundamental" and "evolved by natural selection".

GM argues that we have an evolved pressure to achieve goals. Goals can be of reproducing, surviving, and/or thriving. Each is pursued for its own sake. To achieve, or move towards achieving, a goal means to gain a benefit. However, goals are not always adaptive or fitness-enhancing; for example, taking hard drugs; or committing a crime for which one is sent to prison. In other words, behaviour may be skillful (beneficial in the long term for the self and/or others) or unskillful (harmful in the long term for the self and/or others).

Humans desire mutual benefits because we are interdependent as a species: I need my cooperative partners to be in good shape for future collaborations, and therefore, helping them is helping myself (Tomasello et al., 2012).

MAC specifies three types of cooperation: mutualism, conflict forestalling/resolution, and kin-selected. GM would frame mutualism as collaboration towards the (joint) goal of mutual thriving and surviving. In this framework, conflict forestalling/resolution boils down to maintaining mutual fitness - in this sense it is, again, win-win mutualism.

The normal everyday version of cooperation, that we all do all the time, is a matter of humans collaborating, coordinating, and communicating towards the joint goal of mutual thriving and surviving (i.e., of win-win mutualism). Conflict is a challenge to this goal because it is potentially costly to both sides, especially the loser. Conflict forestalling or resolution maintains or restores win-win mutualism. Hence, conflict is another challenge to win-win mutualism, and forestalling or resolving it are the moral solutions of the peacemaker.

Suffering or need are challenges to the goal of win-win mutualism, and altruism is the remedy. Altruism is not currently accounted for by MAC (Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse, 2019). Tomasello (2016) characterises altruism with the moral formula, "you > me" ; i.e., “in this altruistic act, I temporarily place your interests above my own”.  

Fairness, as a way to divide up resources obtained through collaboration, is a problem in win-win mutualism (i.e., how to maximise benefits for each collaborative partner, while respecting them as equals) and is also a potential source of conflict. Hence, fairness is both a solution to a problem of win-win mutualism and a way to resolve or forestall conflict. Three basic modes of distributive justice are charity (respecting each person's needs equally); equality (giving each an equal share); and proportionality (equal reward per unit of input) (Perry, 2021).

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>The evolution of cooperation requires that its benefits reach all contributing parties in roughly similar amounts. Natural selection works on every individual’s relative advantage compared with others; hence, gaining an absolute benefit is insufficient. If individuals were satisfied with any absolute benefit, they might still face negative fitness consequences if they were doing less well than competing others. It makes sense, therefore, to compare one's gains with those of others.
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>Sarah F Brosnan and Frans B M de Waal – "Evolution of responses to (un)fairness"

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GM would say that the goal of cooperative morality is win-win mutualism, and the method of achieving it is collaboration, coordination and communication (i.e., cooperation). So, in essence, GM translates directly to MAC. This means that GM and MAC complement each other, and so, if they are put together, the result is more powerful than either. MAC frames moral principles as solutions to challenges to win-win mutualism; GM is compatible with the view of Michael Tomasello (2016) that moral principles are ideal ways to be cooperative, and that social norms are ideal ways to be cooperative in otherwise competitive situations.

GM would frame kin-selected cooperation as family morality, collaborating towards the goal of inclusive fitness, and, presumably, employing mutualism and conflict forestalling/resolution along the way. Family morality comprises family duties like family loyalty, preference for kin over non-kin, family solidarity, upholding the family reputation, etc.

We may see the in-group interdependence of the cooperative unit as another form of inclusive fitness, in that my in-group members are helping me to preserve/increase my fitness, by collaborating with me towards the joint goal of thriving and surviving (through win-win mutualism and conflict forestalling/resolution). Group loyalty is similar to family loyalty, in that I am loyal to those who help to increase my fitness (by interdependence and mutualism rather than shared reproductive success).

However, alternatively, we expect reciprocity from non-kin, while we do not necessarily expect to be repaid by family.

MAC describes seven families of moral values derived from game theory. Details of citations are in the original paper.

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>Allocation of Resources to Kin (Family Values)
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>Genes that benefit replicas of themselves in other individuals—that is, genetic relatives—will be favored by natural selection if the cost of helping is outweighed by the benefit to the recipient gene(s) (Dawkins 1979; Hamilton 1964). So, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that under some conditions organisms will possess adaptations for detecting and delivering benefits (or avoiding doing harm) to kin. This theory of kin selection explains many instances of altruism, in many species (Gardner and West 2014), including humans (Kurland and Gaulin 2005; Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides 2007).Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—caring for offspring, helping family members, and avoiding inbreeding—will be regarded as morally good.
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>Curry et al., 2019

Family (kin-selected) morality in GM is outlined above and compared with group loyalty.

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>Coordination to Mutual Advantage (Group Loyalty)
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>Game theory models situations in which individuals are uncertain about how to behave to bring about a mutual benefit as coordination problems (Lewis 1969). Humans and other animals use a variety of strategies—such as focal points, traditions, leadership, signaling, badges of membership, and “theory of mind”—to solve these problems (Alvard 2001; Boos et al. 2011; McElreath, Boyd, and Richerson 2003) and form stable coalitions and alliances (Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu 2014; Bissonnette et al. 2015; Harcourt and de Waal 1992). Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—forming friendships, participating in collaborative endeavors, favoring your own group, and adopting local conventions—will be regarded as morally good.
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>Curry et al., 2019

It is true that a challenge to coordination is a challenge to cooperation, the method of achieving win-win mutualism, since cooperation consists of collaboration, coordination and communication. Group loyalty is only necessary in an environment of large groups competing for resources. Before around 12,000 years ago, there is no evidence of warfare (Ferguson, 2013). Coordination is achieved through similarity of behaviour, dress, speech, markings, etc., in order that strangers from the same large group may recognise each other and work together without difficulty (Tomasello, 2016). GM predicts that the reason we form cooperative units (alliances and groups) is to cooperate interdependently towards win-win mutualism. Because win-win mutualism is a matter of survival, and because we pursue the goal jointly: group-oriented, team-player behaviour is seen as morally good. The limits of my interdependent group represent the limits of my inclusive fitness.

Loyalty arguably consists of gratitude for benefits given, and for a commitment to future benefits to be given, together with a corresponding commitment to help, in return (reciprocally). The group benefits me and is committed to helping me: I am loyal to my group in return.

Similarity is a group marker that group loyalty can focus on. According to the French social scientist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), there are two ways that people can feel solidarity with each other: 1) on the basis of collaborating together ("organic" solidarity); or 2) on the basis of similarity of some kind ("mechanical" solidarity) (Tomasello, 2016). Tomasello (2016) characterises group loyalty with the moral formula of something close to “you > me” (see: altruism, above: “I can place your interests above my own”.)  

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>Social Exchange (Reciprocity)
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>In game theory, social dilemmas—prisoners’ dilemmas, public goods games, tragedies of the commons—arise when the fruits of cooperation are vulnerable to exploitation by “free riders,” who accept the benefit of cooperation without paying the cost (Ostrom and Walker 2002). This problem can be overcome by a strategy of “conditional cooperation” or “reciprocal altruism,” such as tit-for-tat (Axelrod 1984; Trivers 1971). Evidence for various aspects of conditional cooperation have been found in numerous animal species (Carter 2014), including humans (Cosmides and Tooby 2005; Henrich et al. 2005; Jaeggi and Gurven 2013). Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—trusting others, reciprocating favors, seeking revenge, expressing gratitude, and making amends—will be regarded as morally good.
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>Curry et al., 2019

If you give me something expecting something in return, but I cheat you: I win and you lose, and this challenges win-win mutualism. As MAC predicts, reciprocity and all that goes with it is a solution to the problem of potentially being cheated. The win-win mutualism is not required because of interdependence; but rather so that each side is not cheated, so it is a self-centred rather than other-centred motive.

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>Contests between Hawks (Bravery) and Doves (Respect)
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>Conflict over resources—food, territory, and mates (Huntingdon and Turner 1987)—presents organisms with an opportunity to cooperate by competing in less mutually destructive ways (Maynard Smith and Price 1973). There are three ways of achieving this: contests (featuring the display of hawkish and dovish traits), division, and possession. Game theory has shown that conflicts can be settled through “contests,” in which individuals display reliable indicators of their “fighting ability,” and defer to the stronger party (Gintis, Smith, and Bowles 2001; Maynard Smith and Price 1973). Such contests are widespread in nature (Hardy and Briffa 2013; Riechert 1998), and often form the basis of dominance hierarchies where resources are allocated by “rank” (Preuschoft and van Schaik 2000). Humans have a similar repertoire of status related behaviors (Fiddick et al. 2013; Mazur 2005; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009), and culturally elaborated hierarchies (Boone 1992; Rubin 2000). Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that these types of cooperative behavior—hawkish displays of dominance (the “heroic virtues” of bravery, fortitude, skill, and wit) and dovish displays of submission (the “monkish virtues” of humility, deference, obedience, and respect)—will be regarded as morally good (Curry 2007).
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>Curry et al., 2019

It is true that authority ranking is one of Fiske's four modes of social life (1991), and respect for authority and tradition is one of Haidt's (2013) moral foundations.

Why is bravery seen as morally good? Is it because it allows my "superiors" to retain their positions? As a low-ranking individual, I am as likely to resent this as to applaud it as a part of the sacred natural order of things, no matter what I am encouraged to believe. The type of bravery we see as morally good is that done on someone else's behalf, rather than for selfish reasons of dominance. The reason is that when someone risks their own safety for the sake of another person, this is effectively a supreme act of altruism rather than dominance.

Similarly, bowing dovishly to our superiors is making a virtue of a necessity, that also may be resented by the low-ranking. The other kind of respect is that between equals. Humans were probably fiercely egalitarian for the best part of 2 million years (Perry, 2021:134). There is mutual respect because of things like: 1) the bargaining power of potential partners; 2) self-other equivalence, a consequence of collaborating in roles (Tomasello, 2016). Again, this kind of respect is a way of levelling up benefits on both sides: win-win mutualism, together with conflict forestalling/resolution. Humans tend to expect to be treated as equals and get resentful when they are not.

Bravery, fortitude, skill and wit are all valuable qualities in a collaborative partner that will facilitate them doing their duty and putting in a good performance.

Humans willingly defer to those above them in a hierarchy - because “inferiors” think that “superiors” deserve or have earned higher status, not because the “inferiors” are bullied into it.  So, a hierarchy can be seen as "fair".

While we believe that the members of the human family tree lived a strictly egalitarian lifestyle for much of its history, authority ranking is a feature of modern life. In the "classical" model of this moral foundation (Fiske, 1991), the political hierarchy is governed by consent rather than coercion or force or the threat of harm. A hierarchy that is perceived by subordinates to be legitimate, such as a state and police force that are perceived to be legitimate, may use "reasonable" force and coercion in its governance. To this end, those illegitimately in power may seek to artificially legitimise themselves in the minds of subordinates.

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Division (Fairness)

>When the contested resource is divisible, game theory models the situation as a “bargaining problem” (Nash 1950). Here, one solution is to divide the resource in proportion to the relative (bargaining) power of the protagonists (Skyrms 1996). In the case of equally powerful individuals, this results in equal shares (Maynard Smith 1982). Evidence for a “sense of fairness” comes from nonhuman primates’ adverse reactions to unequal treatment in economic games (Brosnan 2013). With regard to humans, rules such as “I cut, you choose,” “meet in the middle,” “split the difference,” and “take turns” are ancient and widespread means of resolving disputes (Brams and Taylor 1996). And “equal shares” is a spontaneous and cross-culturally prevalent decision rule in economic games (Henrich et al. 2005) and similar situations (Messick 1993). Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—dividing disputed resources, reaching a compromise, being fair—will be regarded as morally good.
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>Curry et al., 2019

Fairness as distributive justice is discussed above.

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>Possession (Property Rights)
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>Finally, game theory shows that conflicts over resources can be resolved by recognition of prior possession (Gintis 2007; Hare, Reeve, and Blossey 2016; Maynard Smith 1982). The recognition of prior possession is widespread in nature (Strassmann and Queller 2014). Humans also defer to prior possession in vignette studies (DeScioli and Karpoff 2015; Friedman and Neary 2008), experimental games (the “endowment effect”; Kahneman and Tversky 1979), the law (Rose 1985), and international relations (Johnson and Toft 2014). Private property, in some form or other, appears to be a cross-cultural universal (Herskovits 1952). Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—deferring to prior possession—will be regarded as morally good.
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>Curry et al., 2019

Respecting prior possession seems to be a very fine conflict avoidance strategy that GM has nothing to say about.

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MAC on sexual morality

>We agree that it remains to be seen whether MAC can explain all moral phenomena. And we agree that sexual morality in particular is at present undertheorized, and hence poorly understood. However, we hypothesize that, on closer inspection, many aspects of sexual morality will turn out to be the products (or by-products) of cooperative mechanisms. If morals are solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life, then perhaps sexual morals are solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human sexual life, and we should view sexual morality as cooperation about sex. As such, MAC predicts that cooperative sexual behavior will be regarded as morally good, and uncooperative sexual behavior will be regarded as morally bad. Candidate examples can be found across all seven of the cooperative domains we have identified. First, kinship. Inbreeding has deleterious effects on the reproductive success of close kin; this could explain why incest is regarded as morally wrong (Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides 2003). Second, mutualism. Men and women often “team up” to raise offspring, to the mutual benefit of all involved; this could explain why long-term committed relationships such as marriage are seen as morally good, and why short-term uncommitted relationships—involving premarital, or promiscuous sex—which threaten the stability of long-term relationships are seen as morally bad (Kurzban, Dukes, and Weeden 2010; Pinsof and Haselton 2017; Price, Pound, and Scott 2014). Third, reciprocity. Long-term relationships such as marriage often involve an exchange of sexual exclusivity for resources (Baumeister and Vohs 2004); this could explain why violating this sexual contract—through infidelity, adultery, cheating—is considered morally bad, and why “dads” who do not invest are seen as “cads” (Kruger, Fisher, and Jobling 2003). Fourth, hawkish traits. Humans can resolve conflicts over mates by displaying sexually selected mate-winning traits, rather than coming to blows (Curry 2007). This could explain why cues of high mate value among men (virility, bravery, generosity) and women (fertility, chastity, beauty) are considered virtues, and why cues of low mate value—such as masturbation and bestiality for men (suggesting an inability to attract a mate), and masturbation for women (a correlate of “unrestricted sociosexuality”; Penke and Asendorpf 2008)—are considered shameful vices. Fifth, dovish traits. In traditional societies, parents, elders, and other authority figures often arrange marriages; this could explain why defying their wishes (e.g., by eloping) is considered morally bad, and why punishing this defiance is considered by some to be “honorable.” Sixth, fairness. Conflict over mates is also reduced by “sharing them out equally” (Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson 2012); this could explain why monogamy is regarded as morally superior to polygamy, and why divorce (serial monogamy) has been regarded as morally bad. Seventh, property rights. Conflict over mates is also reduced by respecting prior possession (“Hands off, he’s mine!”); such “sexual proprietariness” could explain why “attracting someone who is already in a relationship” is referred to as “poaching” (i.e., “stealing”; Schmitt and Buss 2001), and why some types of sexual crimes (e.g., rape) have been treated as a form of theft (Wilson and Daly 1992). Thus MAC suggests that there is more to sexual morality than the “misappraisal of disgust,” and instead derives from first principles testable predictions about moral attitudes to incest, marriage, infidelity, the sexual virtues, honor killings, monogamy, and mate poaching. MAC also predicts that individual and cultural variation in sexual morals will reflect the value of different types of sexual cooperation for different people under different conditions. Far from being a “nonstarter,” MAC could mark the beginning of a productive new research program on sexual morality.
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>Reply to comments, "Is It Good to Cooperate? - Testing the Theory of Morality-as-Cooperation in 60 Countries" (Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse, 2019)

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GM on sexual morality

The goal of reproduction is very different from the goal of win-win mutualism. Win-win mutualism is something we expect from almost every interaction with others - while we are not very likely to expect a baby. Win-win mutualism is a continuous goal of daily life.

A type of goal - win-win mutualism, reproduction - requires methods of achieving it (cooperation, patriarchy, pair-bonding, parenting, family). Challenges to the goal require solutions, which are moral principles (Curry, 2019), and moral principles are ideal ways of carrying out the method (Tomasello, 2016). Each method naturally has a goal associated with it, while a goal can have any number of methods associated with it. Each pair - goal and method - generates a particular type of morality.

So, for example, this theory states that a challenge to the goal of, say, cooperation (win-win mutualism) is solved by ideal cooperation. If patriarchy is a method of achieving reproduction - we do not see challenges to proximate patriarchal values of male domination and superiority and female chastity and modesty as challenges to reproduction. Instead, the challenge is to mate acquisition and retention rather than their ultimate goal of reproduction. I suggest that the difference is that the goals of cooperation (win-win mutualism) are proximate and everyday, while actual reproduction is a rare event. The goal of patriarchy is far off and so distant that we have long ago lost sight of what it is really all about.

The challenges of mate acquisition and retention are challenges to the goal of reproduction (Kordsmeyer, 2022). One method of achieving these is control and coercion; the other method is to make oneself into as ideal a mate as possible. When carried out by males, the first method generates patriarchy; the second is egalitarian. We predict that challenges to mate acquisition and (exclusive) retention that can be overcome by ideal patriarchy are solved by moral rules that represent ideal ways to be patriarchal.

Mate retention, in itself, is a problem in reproduction that is usually solved by the commitment of the sexual pair-bond. Pair-bonding is a method of reproduction via mate retention. Potential challenges to reproduction (e.g., instability of relationship) can be overcome with ideal pair-bonding; for example, fidelity, that is, we propose, seen as morally good (Curry et al., 2019). Because reproduction is so genetically vital, the sexual pair-bond is sacralised personally and culturally, and protecting it is seen as morally good. Because pair-bonding tackles the same challenge as patriarchy (mate retention), it can overlap in some ways with patriarchy (for example, sexual exclusivity by females).

The challenge of raising children is another challenge to reproduction, and raising children can be achieved with parenting. Moral principles in this domain are ideal ways to be a parent and are, MAC would hypothesise, ultimately solutions to problems of reproduction via raising children.

Patriarchal morality incorporates conflict resolution as part of its structure. The roots of human patriarchy (the suppression of women and girls by individuals and society) lie in the competition between great ape males to dominate and control as many females as possible (Smuts, 1997). This competition is cooperativised in human beings as a system of social norms, whereby each man's female "possession" is cooperatively respected and society does the job of dominating and controlling females, on behalf of the individual. This "harem" mentality towards females explains the attribution of rape as a crime against property (of a man) (Curry et al., 2019). Monogamy is an egalitarian state of affairs that has its roots in humankind's long egalitarian past (Perry, 2021:106).

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MAC on sexual moral purity

>According to their account (Fitouchi et al., 2022), many aspects of ‘purity’ can be understood as cues of self-control, and self-control is moralised because it predicts a person’s likelihood of reciprocating in a social dilemma (whereas impurity can be understood as a cue of a lack of self-control, which predicts a person’s likelihood of cheating in a social dilemma). We agree. ...
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>This conflict resolution theory predicts that these superior and inferior traits will be moralised because they help to solve a cooperative problem – they help to minimise or forestall conflict – quite apart from any other function they might perform (Curry, 2007). This theory predicts that superior traits will be considered morally good – honourable virtues, worthy of respect. And inferior traits will be considered morally bad – dishonourable vices that degrade those who possess them by lowering their social value in the eyes of others.
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>This theory can explain why, for example, cues of high and low mate value have been considered morally good and bad, ‘pure’ and ‘impure’. People compete for mates by signalling cues of high mate value that are attractive to the opposite sex (such as fertility, fidelity, chastity, beauty, industry), and concealing cues of low mate value that are unattractive (such as infertility, infidelity, promiscuity, poor health, a history of failed relationships). Sexually attractive traits will be considered morally good, sexually unattractive traits will be considered morally bad.
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>(Curry and Sznycer, 2022)

It may also be the case that we value sexual attractiveness because it feels like an indicator of genetic fitness in a potential mate, and is therefore desirable and a "good". Someone who threatens to spread their bad genes around willy-nilly is offensive and morally bad. It does not seem realistic that we value sexual attractiveness because it forestalls or resolves dominance contests. On the contrary, sexual attractiveness may attract conflict as potential mates fight between themselves and competitors are jealous.

The link is not so straightforward between sexual attractiveness, cooperation, self control and moral purity. Rather, it is compatible with the GM model to say that sexual purity is moralised because it targets sexual / reproductive morality: patriarchy, pair-bonding, and parenting. Each of these is sacralised because their goal is reproduction and reproduction is sacred. Things that are sacred - of infinite value - are open to being polluted by things of finite value (Perry, 2021:225), such as enjoying the pleasure of the present moment while forgetting one's patriarchal, pair-bonded, or parental duties. Arguably, cooperative and family moralities are polluted by self-seeking selfishness, the antithesis of inclusive, win-win cooperative behaviour.

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Summary of details (as a table)

https://orangebud.co.uk/morality_as_cooperation.html#summary

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See also:

Moral purity https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/zkwg0d/moral_purity/

Goal-methods model of morality https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/yuv3c5/the_structure_of_moral_normativity/

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References

Brosnan, Sarah F and Frans B M de Waal – “Evolution of responses to (un)fairness”: Science vol 346, issue 6207, 17 October 2014

Curry, Oliver Scott; Daniel Austin Mullins; and Harvey Whitehouse - "Is It Good to Cooperate? Testing the Theory of Morality-as-Cooperation in 60 Societies"; Current Anthropology Volume 60, Number 1, February 2019

Curry, Oliver Scott; and Daniel Sznycer - "A broader theory of cooperation can better explain ‘purity’" (2022)

Ferguson, R B - "Pinker's List – exaggerating prehistoric war mortality" in Fry, Douglas P (editor) – “War, Peace and Human Nature – the convergence of evolutionary and cultural views”; Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK 2013

Fiske, Alan – “Structures of Social Life: the four elementary forms of human relations"; Free Press, New York 1991

Haidt, Jonathan – “The Righteous Mind – why good people are divided by politics and religion”; Penguin Books, London 2013

Kordsmeyer, Tobias L - “Capital as an Integrative Conceptualisation of Human Characteristics, Behaviour, and Outcomes Predicting Reproductive Success and Evolutionary Fitness”; Evolutionary Psychological Science  8:208–227 (2022); https://doi.org/10.1007/s40806-021-00293-x

Perry, Simon - "Understanding morality and ethics" https://orangebud.co.uk/Understanding%20morality%20and%20ethics.pdf 2021

Perry, Simon - "The structure of moral normativity" https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/yuv3c5/the_structure_of_moral_normativity/ 2022

Tomasello, Michael; Alicia P Melis; Claudio Tennie; Emily Wyman; Esther Herrmann – “Two Key Steps in the Evolution of Human Cooperation – The Interdependence Hypothesis” – Current Anthropology, vol. 53, no. 6, Dec 2012

Tomasello, Michael – “A Natural History of Human Morality”; Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2016