My post and a whole body of work covers why it's worthy of consideration. Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it. That's pretty interesting. I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn't.

You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.

There are variations on the zombie that are a bit more clever. The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.

Cojoined twins exist. See Krista and Tatiana Hogan. So not knowing is an interfacing issue.

Explanation about our beliefs about consciousness rhat is independent if it...that's something else.

And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience. So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.

An observer who doesn't know pain or subjective experience can just note you are making a lot of noise. You can tell them you're in pain - how could they ever understand what thst is?

I don't follow what you're getting at or asking. Yes, consciousness evolved. What do you mean by applying it out of context? The point is simply that significant phenomena may exist like that which in principle we couldn't detect any less than we can infer what taste, eyesight or hearing is like without experiencing them. These significant phenomena may just as well evolve or be constructed, they needn't be states of matter...

I find it brain-tickling and profound based on how profound and significant cosciousness is. But to each their own. :)

Nothing you said takes any real issue with my central point. We take your "observance system to process input" and we ask ourselves are there other cool phenomena in the universe that would require a specific process like an observsnce system to process input? Since by simply observing the universe it doesn't seem like we can infer this input feels like anything.

It has little to do with Ockham's razor also. And it also has nothing to do with the mysterianism position in philosophy of mind that you seem to imply it does.

Have you read the post? Here is what chatGPT said based on the summary:

It is an interesting idea that there may be other significant phenomena in our universe that we are not currently aware of. This idea is based on the idea that consciousness is a unique phenomenon that is only knowable through our own subjective experience of it. If this is the case, then it is possible that there are other phenomena in the universe that are only knowable through some other unique process.

One way to explore this idea conceptually would be to consider the ways in which we currently know about the universe and the phenomena within it. We know about the universe through our senses and through scientific instruments that allow us to observe and measure it. However, our senses and instruments are limited in their ability to perceive and measure everything that exists in the universe. It is possible that there are phenomena that exist outside of the range of our senses and instruments, and therefore outside of our current knowledge.

Another way to explore this idea would be to consider the ways in which we might be able to detect these other, potentially obscured phenomena. One possibility is that we might be able to find hints of their existence in the behavior of known phenomena. For example, if there is a phenomenon that influences the behavior of particles in some way, we might be able to detect its presence by looking for patterns in the behavior of those particles that cannot be explained by known physical laws.

There are several objections to this idea that are worth considering. One objection is that our current scientific understanding of the universe is comprehensive and that there is no room for additional, unknown phenomena. However, this objection is not necessarily true. Our scientific understanding of the universe is always evolving, and there is always the possibility that we will discover new phenomena or new aspects of known phenomena that were previously unknown.

Another objection is that if there are additional, unknown phenomena in the universe, we have no way of knowing what they are or how they would behave. This is a valid concern, but it is also true of many other aspects of our scientific understanding. We do not always have a complete understanding of the phenomena we do know about, and we often have to make predictions and develop theories based on incomplete information.

Overall, the idea that there may be significant phenomena in our universe that are currently unknown is an interesting one, and it is worth considering further. Further exploration of this idea could involve looking for patterns in the behavior of known phenomena that cannot be explained by current scientific theories, and developing new theories and experiments to test those patterns. This could potentially lead to the discovery of new phenomena and a deeper understanding of the universe

It's highly speculative and one can attack many issues wrt to epistemology. For this post I opted to focus on the idea as presented. As far as I know there is no way to infer phenomenal consciousness/qualia without the actual experience. If there is, I'd love to know. Until then, it suggests something pretty fascinating about our universe.

And yes there is an if... so if 1 falls then the rest falls although not entirely as I explain in my post. Either p-consc can not be inferred without experiencing it or it's super hard to figure out how to ever infer it without the experience. Both cases - interesting wrt to our universe and may suggests other phenomena that are interesting in this manner wrt to how they manifest or their detectibility.

As I said in another thread:

Again, I would invoke Chalmers' argumentation here:

One can make a debunking argument about beliefs about phenomenal consciousness in general, perhaps with some variety of non-reductionism operating as a background assumption. There are various ways to lay out such an argument, but perhaps the most straight forward is as follows: 1.There is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness 2. If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious- ness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified 3. Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.

Basically, I am claiming 1 and in my post list 2 as a partial knockdown argument. I personally find this a brain-breaking and fascinating idea wrt to the properties of our universe.

So we can bicker about knowing or belief, but in the end I don't see how the basic idea that whatever consciousness is bears a particular relation to us so that we can even bicker about it as an explicandum, is not compelling basis to ponder the search for other phenomena that might not be easily or at all detectable without a particular relation we'd have to bear to them.

Okay, I struggle to see how you're engaging with the actual central point. Do you know of any way subjective experience could be inferred to exist, illusion/seeming or whatever label you want to slap on it?

Again, I would invoke Chalmers' argumentation here:

One can also make a debunking argument about beliefs about phenomenal consciousness in general, perhaps with some variety of non-reductionism operating as a background assumption. There are various ways to lay out such an argument, but perhaps the most straight forward is as follows: 1.There is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness 2. If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious- ness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified 3. Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.

Basically, I am claiming 1 and in my post list 2 as a partial knockdown argument. I personally find this a brain-breaking and fascinating idea wrt to the properties of our universe.

So we can bicker about knowing or belief, but in the end I don't see how the basic idea that whatever consciousness is bears a particular relation to us so that we can even bicker about it as an explicandum, is not compelling basis to ponder the search for other phenomena that might not be easily or at all detectable without a particular relation we'd have to bear to them.

Certaintity, knowing and belief are rabbit holes in themselves, but that doesn't quite have bearing on my post does it?

The central point being that without subjective experience, you can't from its description infer it even exists. That it can feel like something.

So here I mean knowing of consciosuness not fully or ideally, but simply having access to it so that we can even consider it in any shape or form.

It seems to a feature of our universe. Which is why Chalmers invokes it in his meta-problem paper as the debunking argument for illusionism. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwj9naKTzeP7AhVRAxAIHQxnBTsQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1dBPho_aISdjlJadD9LpMq

The point is simply that so far we have not been able to find what-its-likeness in the description of the universe. And I fact I think it's not there. Neural correlates - sure. Or course. But just like I would never ever infer that food tastes like something if it were tasteless to me until I actually would acquire the ability to taste..so too we would never infer phenomenal consciousness or subjective experience without actually experiencing it. That seems quite a significant point and I argue on my point why. Neither a language game nor useless.

You can of course argue that you need to have consciousness to know anything at all, but that's definitely not a given nor obvious. There could be a nonsentient entity processing things without any inner experience, and even with an exhaustive description of the universe it would still remain clueless that there is something like subjective experience. That seems rather significant.

It's why Chalmers also invented the p-zombie... to highlight this gap. However I'd prefer not to get into argumentd about that and conceivability as that's another rabbit hole.

Right, that does pose an additional issue for the non-sentient hypothetical being. However, it doesn't really break the argument. We can reduce it for example to people who are born without certain senses - for example no eyesight. These people just can't know what it is like to see (even though some scientific evidence shows the visual cortex does engage in some ways for these people) - so in general we know that without being acquainted with what-its-likeness.. you simply can't know of it.

>These aren't separate things. They are just different ways to describe the same thing. Pain is neural activity.

That doesn't have any bearing on my point, though. Neural activity doesn't inform the observer that it feels like anything at all.

Okay, but I am not sure I follow what your argument is. That we can in principle detect consciousness without invoking consciousness? As in, Chalmers' debunking argument in his meta-problem paper?