You know I can’t say for sure. My inclination is to say that if he did have access to the 21st century neurolinguistic that we do he would probably not find them to alter his belief that “the text” was all consuming. My biggest crisis of confidence in semiotic thinking came when reading a piece on people who don’t have an inner monologue, and yet experience no real difference in linguistic ability. I will say I don’t think it was a particularly thorough article, but I do believe it’s accepted that there are people who can’t “hear” words inside their head.

Now, I did hear something else very interesting, in the same vein as what you mention about the brain activity of the inner voice—this time from the researcher himself being interviewed on a podcast. He said that when we read we actually imperceptibly speak the words we are reading. I think this provides a very interesting clue to consciousness. It could be seen as an echo reproduced from the recorded electrical signals (memory) of our brain.

This kind of interestingly ties in the-goku-special’s comment, because the question seems to then become: is the text just the phenomenological experience of the hypothetical reader?

But for Derrida, I think this would all make sense. Our brains, networks of nodes, electricity bouncing amount them—the effect, what we choose to call meaning or consciousness, if one chooses to see it within the same fabric of existence, within “the text”—there’s no difference.

So, essentially, yes I think Derrida would view the interior thought and the actual verbal signifier as distinct but closely related signifiers, which will produce unknown signification in whatever either cerebral cortices they encounter.