Submitted by contractualist t3_115h6a0 in philosophy
contractualist OP t1_j91ix51 wrote
Hello all, I'm looking for feedback on the definition of morality that I defend in the article. Any questions, comments, or criticisms would be highly appreciated.
Summary: Morality exists as "should" statements resulting from the values of freedom and reason. We can assess the truth of morality claims by determining whether they properly derive from these moral values. Moral principles are therefore those principles that free agents cannot reasonably reject based on public reasons. Under this theory of morality, there are no true moral dilemmas. If a principle can be reasonably rejected by a free party, then it is not a moral principle. Yet if it cannot be, then it is morally binding to agents that value freedom and reason.
Von_Kessel t1_j9212sy wrote
Probably not what you want to hear but there are a lot of spooks in your definitions. Freedom and reason are both spooks that I would aver don’t have good definitions in principle and thus cannot form a basis for a derived morality.
contractualist OP t1_j924ssq wrote
Von_Kessel t1_j929gja wrote
Helpful for sure but if you have read some Stirner you know what I mean. Fundamentally freedom as a concept is something that’s been endowed to you to mean something from how others constructed and defined it (or in a contradistinction) . That does not mean it’s a salient term to abide by in a super construct called morality. The corollary cannot be supposed if the prior supposition is nonsense
JunkoBig t1_j92twcj wrote
I think such abstract conceptions of morality should either be based on or connect to an anthropological theory of how and why morality changes. To simply claim "slavery and exism" were morally "simple" dilemmas to solve strikes me as ahistorical.
ScoutingForAdventure t1_j96ahok wrote
I would say that the human's ontology is not free as it is biologically constricted and so one would need an ontological system in which a person can become free of this constraint to be able to then have a moral system in which freedom is a predicate. Otherwise, there is no morality at all, only force.
Most importantly, your concept of public reason is a form of ontology by role or relationship, given by association with a certain public body, which completely obliterates the concept of freedom.
contractualist OP t1_j96brg6 wrote
I discuss what I mean by freedom here Freedom is being able to act in accordance with higher level principles, not being free from all biological and social forces. To the extent that these higher level principles includes reason and morality, the concept of freedom is coherent.
ScoutingForAdventure t1_j96hm7x wrote
So a person who is lacking in the ability to reason, such as youth and those with neurological and functional limitations at the highest cognitive level, would be unable to be free persons in your framework? The social force of public reason would constrain and bind them to a group morality based on its implementation of geniocracy?
Such a freedom has zero coherence. As others have mentioned, the disconnect between 1) what is socially prioritized as human needs, and 2) the disconnection individuals can have to those human needs and values would make such freedom conditional and therefore non-binding.
contractualist OP t1_j96iv85 wrote
Being a part to the moral community doesn’t rely on reasoning ability, but the laws of the moral community would be reason-based. They would have to be justifiable to others. Membership in the community relies on consciousness and free will.
If you read the article I sent, I argue that ascent to the social contract would be based on agreement to principles that are in accordance with higher-order values. Morality asks what principles of conduct would free reasonable people accept. It doesn’t say morality is reserved for the reasonable.
I’m not sure what freedom you’re talking about but if you have a specific question I’m happy to address it.
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