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frnzprf t1_j99wrs5 wrote

Reply to comment by mixile in Compatibilism is supported by deep intuitions about responsibility and control. It can also feel "obviously" wrong and absurd. Slavoj Žižek's commentary can help us navigate the intuitive standoff. by matthewharlow

Let's say there is a human string puppet. It's wants to move a certain way, but the strings (or an exoskelleton) forces it to move another way.

It feels intuitive that a human that isn't tied to strings is freeer than a human that is.

The will may still be determined, so I wouldn't call it free will, but the untied human is free to act according to his will.

A short while ago someone argued that the term "free will" is also used in juristic contexts. I'd say at least they are talking about something, whether you should call it "free will" or not.

I suggest "free to act according to your own will".

People think of string-puppets when they feel uncomfortable with entertaining that they don't have free will.
On the other hand people also would say that a hypnotized person is not acting on free will, although they are free to act according to their will - which happens to be manipulated. Not all types of manipulation are considered as taking away free will. If you ask nicely or buy a service, that is also manipulating will.

What I'm saying is: There might be something what people call "free will" that exists and something different, that other people call "free will", that doesn't exist.

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mixile t1_j9aenee wrote

If I psychologically prime a child to make the choice I prefer them to make such as give them two insignificant variants of the same choice (would you like to go to school now or in a few minutes?) they can feel free, no? Are they not compelled?

When the tiger starts running towards me, I feel a surge of adrenaline that allows me to climb a tree to safety. That may not feel free and yet every day I make choices with less urgency that are still ultimately about survival. I am not choosing to survive I am compelled.

Underneath whatever desire we think we have, how do we know there are no strings? Isn’t the point of a determined universe that there must be strings even if our intuition cannot see them? These desires are not an uncaused cause.

My intuition tells me all desire is manifest from the substrate and is not free ever, though I cannot define free so I have to go with some process of elimination to make that statement. My intuition tells me that we are always on strings due to our inability to fly or teleport but that other people feel free despite these constraints due to their acceptance of the constraints. My intuition tells me that constraints long applied get ignored. If I place a human being in the confines of a cell they will eventually stop testing the limits of that cell and perhaps then they will think they have free will again, intuitively, after some time.

If you want to define free will as any time you can make a decision that aligns with your expectations of what is possible without having to reflect on enfetterment you have not accepted as natural… then ok you have free will at times but it’s a rather absurd distinction to make. It does not seem to give rise to the moral premise the author wants.

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frnzprf t1_j9b35id wrote

I was talking about literal strings. (When people say they aren't monkeys or machines, they are also thinking about literal monkeys and machines with metal cogs.)

Some constraints are felt as restricting, for example literal strings attached to your limbs and other constraints, like scratching your head, because it's itching or listening to music you like, don't feel restricting. They are both 100% determined, but they make a pragmatic difference in life. (That was phrased weirdly...)

Your home can never be 100% clean, but it still makes sense to say that a home is clean. "Clean" means that you can stop cleaning.

Maybe you could say that "free will" in a juristic sense is defined by it's consequences. Whenever it makes sense to punish someone, you say they acted on "free will". Whenever a condition should be medically treated, you call it a "sickness".

Then you can't say that someone should be punished because they acted on free will, or that a condition should be treated because it is a sickness, because that would be circular reasoning.

I absolutely agree that you could very well define "free" as "not determined" and as it is determined, it's not free. There is just an alternative definition of free will, that makes sense.

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