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aecorbie t1_j9hm7hb wrote

Reply to comment by ShieldOnTheWall in Often mischaracterized as a rather debaucherous, hedonistic philosophy, Epicureanism actually focuses on the removal of pain and anxiety from our lives, and champions a calm ‘philosophy as therapy’ approach in pursuit of life’s highest pleasure: mental tranquility. by philosophybreak

Ah, but procreating is inherently immoral. I wanted to discuss one of my favourite arguments in favour of antinatalism, but the person defending natalism deleted their comments shortly before I had a chance to respond. Guess I’ll just leave my reply here.

For starters: you cannot possibly prevent suffering in anyone’s life, really. You can only attempt at reducing it. No matter how much love, affection and protection you provide for your child in an attempt to ensure they live their best life, there will be always a possibility of them getting kidnapped, raped, murdered, otherwise violently harmed, or inevitably dying of either chronic illness or senescence if they somehow avoid all of the above. Therefore, you are to blame for imposing the capacity to suffer on your child (that would otherwise not exist and accordingly not suffer).

Now, bringing someone into existence generates both good and bad experiences, suffering and pleasure, whereas not doing so generates neither suffering nor pleasure. We both agree that the absence of suffering is good. The happiness they experience throughout life is also good; however, a lack thereof is only a negative factor for the already existing, because only they can have the negative experience of deprivation. Therefore, a lack of pleasure for the unborn child is not bad in a moral sense.

To simplify and, hopefully, systematise this for the experiencing individual:

  1. The presence of pain (suffering) is bad.
  2. The presence of pleasure (happiness) is good.
  3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
  4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

And an additional dichotomy that necessarily follows from these conclusions, if I may:

  1. There is no moral obligation to produce a child even if we could be sure that it will be very happy throughout its life.
  2. There is a moral obligation not to produce a child if it can be foreseen that it will be unhappy.

We can clearly see that even with the grossly unrealistic assumption that the amount of happiness in one’s life quantitatively outweighs the amount of suffering, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.

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fibsequ t1_j9hrpuw wrote

Your argument rests on four premises, which are not universally agreed upon as stipulation or truth. In your worldview, and perhaps the worldview of most people (although neither are relevant without being universal), the premises you numbered 1-4 may be accepted as truth.

That does not mean everyone accepts those premises, and believes suffering to be bad or pleasure to be good. Hedonism, epicureanism, and other pleasure-seeking and suffering-avoiding ideologies are exalted by some and condemned by others. With words as nebulous as “good” and “bad” I’m not sure how you can definitively claim “pleasure to be good” and “suffering to be bad,” let alone expect everyone to subscribe to those notions.

Your other two premises also suffer from the vagueness of words such as “good” and “bad,” but even without those deficiencies your argument holds no water. Assuming everyone believes your premises numbered 1-4, or that said premises are somehow a universal truth regardless of the beliefs or individuals is not substantiated by any evidence. Your feelings that “suffering is bad, pleasure is good” may be relevant to your beliefs, but are far from objective truth.

Note: this is not a defense of having children or choosing not to. I think there are legitimate arguments for both sides; I do not think this is an example.

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aecorbie t1_j9huntx wrote

Could you please elaborate on how the argument “holds no water” other than stating that there are some who might disagree with it? I would appreciate it if you addressed the premises it’s build upon rather than broadly rejecting them.

Regarding vagueness of the words “good” and “bad”, you might have a point here, but I’d rather we got to the underlying virtue ethics after addressing more general problems one might have with those premises. As for the argument itself, however, I think even an approach as simplistic as negative utilitarianism (which I myself am not overly fond of, but I digress) would suffice to demonstrate the validity of my dichotomy in relation to the morality of having children.

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Dripdry42 t1_j9hrwsu wrote

This brought some more tranquility... I think you've got something there. Thanks for the clarity.

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ilolvu t1_j9qverg wrote

>3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
>
>4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

For an Epicurean, these statements would be false. Pleasure and pain are experiences of living beings, not abstract Platonic Ideas. The absence of pain is always enjoyed by someone, and the absence of pleasure is always a deprivation on someone.

>2. There is a moral obligation not to produce a child if it can be foreseen that it will be unhappy.

This statement is falsified, for an Epicurean, because such foresight is impossible... especially for a human.

>We can clearly see that even with the grossly unrealistic assumption that the amount of happiness in one’s life quantitatively outweighs the amount of suffering, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.

Epicurus didn't think that procreation was bad because we can't guarantee that the offspring will be happy... but because the raising of children is a painful burden on the parent.

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