Yeah thump your book harder maybe you can silence everyone to agree with you. The ontological issue, “what is true” simply cannot be seperated from the verificational or the semantic issue, “how do we accept the truth of a proposition”. You strategy to establish this is simply book thumping, thumpf, I said so, no interpretation of an actual historical truths say in mathematics or sciences, nothing, just the claim that it might be the case that those 2 issues are independent. Which it maybe.

The worst part of this strategy when employed by “realist” philosophers is how disingenuous it is. There is very good reason why you are so sparse in your comments.

Suppose you decided to elucidate more on the notion of we and I which you use, the very next step would put you in realms of biology or cognitive science. Presumably our coming to know something etc are biological or sociological activities. When you do that then these questions become empirical scientific working hypothesis.

> It may simply be that there are things which I cannot know.

Precisely why we reject a correspondence view. If you do think it is plausible that there are truths we would never know, then why it is implausible for to hold that whatever statements one attaches the predicate is true() to, requires for it is very construction the same bounded/deficient/pre determined concepts/precepts.

Ipso facto reject the correspondence view.