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Shield_Lyger t1_jdrwfgy wrote

> If determinism is true, then if S can do A, S does A. (premise)

This does not follow. As I understand it, the definition of hard determinism says "If determinism is true, then if S does A, S did so because of the interaction of physical laws on the prior state of the universe."

This renders Premise 5 ("So if determinism is true, then we believe only the truth. (from 1, 4)") nonsensical, because, from the reformulated #3: "If determinism is true, then we believe what the interaction of physical laws on the prior state of the universe result in us believing."

Therefore "I believe I have free will. (empirical premise)" is meaningless, as while the state of the universe creates that belief, there is no mechanism that allows belief to influence the past state of the universe.

So I'm not sure I understand where this is supposed to lead.

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Kangewalter t1_je7hdlm wrote

The original premise 3 doesn't include an explanation of why S does A. Your reformulation of 3 doesn't just explicate the meaning of determinism, it changes the premise entirely. Huemer doesn't provide a definition of determinism in the text. But whatever determinism is, by his stipulation, if it's true, then at any given time you only ever have one thing that you can do (if S can do A, S does A).

You can define determinism through physical laws and prior states of the universe if you like, but that doesn't really impact the argument. How does the ability of beliefs to influence past states of the universe come into this at all? Huemer reasons that the premises entail that if determinism is true, then free will is true. This isn't meaningless, it's just taken to be a contradiction. Through reductio ad absurdum, he concludes that determism must therefore be false.

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