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Nickesponja t1_jdvfd6y wrote

Reply to comment by DrPlatypus1 in A Proof of Free Will by philosopher Michael Huemer (University of Colorado, Boulder) by thenousman

No, the premise of the argument isn't "we should try to believe what's true", it's "we should only believe what's true". A determinist can maintain the former while rejecting the latter. In fact, I don't see why anyone would accept the latter. There are situations where it's impossible to believe only the truth (say, if you're being tricked or lied to in a convincing manner), so saying we have a moral obligation to believe only the truth is absurd (at least, if you accept that ought implies can).

But of course, more generally, a determinist won't accept that ought implies can if by "can" you mean that we have free will to do one thing or the other. But again, that's just obvious.

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Kangewalter t1_je7ecgi wrote

Why would you think Huemer interprets P1 in that way when he explicitly has the ought implies can principle as P2? Obviously, if you can't believe the truth about something (because you don't have access to information, for example), you can't be obliged to believe it. In the comments, Huemer is explicit that P1 is meant in the sense of "if P is false, then you should refrain from believing it."

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Nickesponja t1_je94cjb wrote

> if P is false, then you should refrain from believing it

But this is just false if ought implies can, because there are plenty of situations where you can't help but believe falsehoods (say, when you're being convincingly tricked).

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