Determinism (or absolute causality) is not directly observable in the world around us.

Causality is directly observable to some degree, but we don't empirically observe absolute causality everywhere all the time.

We experience (phenomenologically and empirically) choiche/free will (which can be an illusion, but still, an empirical illusion). More in general, we don't have any empirical experience beyond our limited subjective experience.

In terms of empirical evidence, it is very difficult to argue that it can be demonstrate conclusively that any given agent has not the ability to do otherways than he does in any given situation.

So determinsm is mainly a logic deduction/generalization based on the assumption that all the universe operates according to natural laws that govern the behavior of all matter and energy. Which is kind of circular but anyway.

We experience limited causality, and we find somehow reasonable to extentend causality to all things.

So determinism is a philosophical position that should be challenged or confirmed based on its logical correctness.

1. one could argue that jumpinig from personal experience of limited causality to the existence of universal laws of determinism can be considered an example of the ontological leap fallacy.

While it is true that we may experience causality, it does not necessarily follow, from a logical point of view, that these concepts are absolute or universally applicable.

2. epistemologically speaking, if determinism is true, then every statement, including "determinism is true" and "determinism is false," would be determined by prior causes. Both statements would be determined by prior causes in a deterministic universe: whether a person affirms "determinism is true" or "determinism is false" would entirely depend on their "personal", specific set of prior causes.

Which "set of prior causes" guarantees the most correct statements? In a deterministic universe, there is no objective way to determine which set of prior causes is "more true" or has higher epistemological value, as both would be ultimately determined by prior causes themselves. An epistemological inherent and non-eliminable uncertainty is not particulary desiderable for a philosophical theory.

3. The epistemological uncertainty above could be seen as a self-defeating position. If is true that all our beliefs, true of false, are causally determined, we are bound to hold them no matter what, whether they objectively true or false, irrespective for any validating criteria (all validating criteria are also, whether true or false, causally determined).

All our beliefs are therefore suspect, "undecidable" and non-assessable, including the belief in the truth of determinism.

So... determinism seems to be phenomenologically counterintuitive, empirically doubtful and logically precarious (at best).

It raises more problem than it solves in many areas (e.g. law, morals, human relations).

Why should I "embrace" it?