By focusing more-or-less exclusively on "freedom" as a psychological (philosophy related to contemplation of personal consciousness) matter while ignoring the more important and perilous sociological (philosophy related to laws and government) issue, the author has succeeded in saying precisely nothing. Even still, the essay is meaningful, but primarily as a counter-example to useful discourse on the subject.

>Morality exists only within the boundaries of freedom.

This stands as a reasonable premise, but not an informative one, since any useful discussion of freedom can only be considered within the bounds of morality. To ignore morality is to reduce freedom to "do what thou wilst", which does not merely epitomize immorality, or does not provide a reasonable, or even a logical, basis for any particular or even specific course of action. There are, after all, many things outside of the bounds of freedom or morality which limit our actions, in the real world.

>First, the experience of freedom is a certainty.

If only that were so, we wouldn't need the word "freedom" at all, we could simply say "existence". The belief one is acting freely is easier to experience than freedom itself is, unless of course the inverse is true. The essay does little to untangle this Gordian Knot of "experience", aka consciousness, aka the hard problem. But refocusing on the sociological nature of freedom, freedom from interference by corporeal authority, whether justified by morality or not, makes it plain that the experience (which is to say, for clarity, in this context, the existence) of freedom is not at all a certainty, either in the abstract or in practice.

>Second, freedom is the standard for judging moral claims.

Here is where we have a choice to either consider the premise of the essay to be entirely incorrect or merely incoherent. It is this claim which makes clear the intersection between the psychological and sociological perspectives on freedom. If only the freedom of the judge, or only the freedom of the claimant, is to be considered, then the dictate is merely incorrect; freedom is only one of an indeterminate number of standards that must be utilized in assessing the accuracy of a moral claim. But a useful consideration of freedom, and perhaps even a moral consideration of morality, must (not merely "should", but must) consider not just the freedom of the judge and the claimant, but the freedom of everyone else, as well. So although the statement is not incorrect in saying that freedom "is the standard", an analysis which addresses only the personal/psychological perspective and forgoes focusing (nearly entirely) on the legal/sociological perspective of freedom is incoherent, incapable of producing any reasonable conjectures from its premises.

>Conscious experience also sets the inherent boundaries of our moral community.

Again, if only this were so, no discussion would be necessary on the matter of either freedom or morality, or for that matter, consciousness or experience.

I surmise, after reading the full essay, that the author's intent is to state that a comprehensible and useful morality must take into account the foundational (zeroth order) nature of self-determination (née "free will"), and on that I agree entirely. But rather than subvert any real consideration of morality by making it subservient to consciousness, a philosophically sound approach must presume that morality itself is not secondary and subsequent, even a first order let alone second order phenomena, but an integral aspect of consciousness/self-determination itself, merely a different perspective on the zeroth order existential reality of conscious being. To do anything else leaves us mired in "do what thou wilt" as the preeminent dictate, an immoral premise.

IMHO. Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.