The essay illustrates the ambiguousness of the relationship between "control" and consciousness (self-determination). The argument is premised on the idea of free will as the foundation of self-determination. That idea (and therefore the premise) is as inexplicable as it is impossible. And so modernists and postmodernists (not to mention also neopostmodernists, which is to say the author and reader alike) are afflicted with both the cognitive dissonance and moral uncertainty (not to say they aren't one and the same, at least in this instance) of the desire for "control" and the unachievable nature of it.

The problem (dissonance/uncertainty) is that the only way to logically prove control is power. And the only way to be morally certain is to have power and not use it unjustly. But injustice is itself a moral perspective.

Morality is not about control, nor is self-determination. It doesn't rely on, relate to, or require control OR power. It cannot. Nevertheless the logical modern position or neopostmodern position demands control, over not just external events but our own thoughts and desires. True morality, and self-determination whether cause or effect of morality, is entirely premised on honesty, both about our desires and the justification for our actions. We are told we should have, or try to have, control, and we don't, even if we have power, and this results in cognitive dissonance.

So by "desire for moral impotence" the author is essentially, though possibly unknowingly, advocating (not merely observing) immorality. (The Trolly Problem illustrates that inaction is as morally hazardous as action, so impotence doesn't really provide the freedom the author suggests.) This amplifies the dissonance and uncertainty, and further it demands that uncertainty is morality and morality must be uncertain. There is a comprehensible "logic" to this, as being uncertain about whether we are being honest or moral is a necessary prerequisite to moral analysis. But it is still ultimately worthless, because impotence is just a poor excuse for lack of control, a semantic game rather than a coherent teleology.

The cognitive dissonance and uncertainty there can be any true morality both (?) disappear, without leaving the immorality or intellectual arrogance the neopostmodernist fears/believes/insists must remain (or be caused by abandoning free will as an explanation of human behavior) simply by properly understanding self-determination. It is not about having control, it is about accurately (and honestly) explaining the reasons for our actions. Assuming brain neuro/psychology explanations are accurate is as immoral as assuming mind social/intention desires are all that ever justify or result in our behavior: a more accurate and exact appraisal/confession is necessary than either binary extreme can support. It is this choosing/deciding whether the past or the future (our neural impulses or our desire impulses) better explain or justify our behavior, in each individual instance rather than as a categorical truth/necessity/morality, which is the cause/reason, the mechanism/logic, and the purpose/result of self-determination.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.