Viewing a single comment thread. View all comments

Bookswinters t1_isokot3 wrote

I'm arguing the perception of inflicting harm has moral weight. I'm borrowing the term from Jonathan Haidt and others. If the arbitor of the morality of the action perceives the action as causing harm, then the action is more likely to judged as immoral relative to an action that does not.

Here's an example - which man has acted more morally?

Man A walks down the sidewalk to his home and steps over a sleeping dog in his path.

Man B walks down the sidewalk to his home and kicks a sleeping dog in his path.

Most will not consider the actions of man B to be morally equivalent to those of man A because most consider man B to have caused harm.

This pattern can also demonstrated in the animal kingdom, many social animals will go out of their way to perform actions that do not harm third parties, all other things being equal. For example, lever A delivers a treat while lever B delivers a treat and a painful electric shock to the animal in the next cage.

This does not mean the perception of harm cannot be subjective or absolute harm reduction is the ultimate goal.

Edited for spelling and clarity

3