Yeah agreed--I kind of slid over this one. To be fair, I did say "apparent" incompatibility :)

> The circuitry of intelligence and the circuitry of feelings are not the same.

I'm pretty sure this is true, but a lot of the scientifically-minded folks I talk to don't seem to agree. They especially don't think you can have feeling without a certain level of intelligence (e.g. a concept of selfhood).

A lot of emergentists I've debated with speak of feeling as something that arises in sufficiently sophisticated information processing systems. I suppose you could treat this as a necessary, but not sufficient condition--but that begs the question, what else is necessary? Any extra requirement seems to break the emergentist approach to consciousness.

I think you're right though--there are other ways of describing emergentism (e.g. a description that isn't based entirely on information processing) which are not in direct conflict with "intelligence that doesn't feel"