Submitted by Skapanirxt t3_zswbmq in technology
9-11GaveMe5G t1_j1aprs6 wrote
> While no customer data was accessed during the August 2022 incident, some source code and technical information were stolen from our development environment and used to target another employee, obtaining credentials and keys which were used to access and decrypt some storage volumes within the cloud-based storage service.
> To date, we have determined that once the cloud storage access key and dual storage container decryption keys were obtained, the threat actor copied information from backup that contained basic customer account information and related metadata including company names, end-user names, billing addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, and the IP addresses from which customers were accessing the LastPass service.
> The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords , secure notes, and form-filled data.
So they didn't access customer data in August, just afterward while they were aware of the breach? Am I reading this correctly?
IAmTaka_VG t1_j1ayaed wrote
They have everyone's vaults, but they don't have their passwords. So unless they take the time to bruteforce the vaults open or social engineer the owners for the key. The data is safe.
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