Submitted by ClownfishSoup t3_10mrjak in todayilearned
And Allied soldiers. It would have been a blood bath
I remember reading a post on the subreddit that said that the current supply of Purple Hearts goes back to WWII, in preparation for a potential land invasion of Japan.
The following may be of interest:
During World War II, 1,506,000 Purple Heart medals were manufactured, many in anticipation of the estimated casualties resulting from the planned Allied invasion of Japan. By the end of the war, even accounting for medals lost, stolen, or wasted, nearly 500,000 remained. To the present date, the total combined American military casualties of the seventy years following the end of World War II—including the Korean and Vietnam Wars—have not exceeded that number. In 2000, there remained 120,000 Purple Heart medals in stock. The existing surplus allowed combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan to keep Purple Hearts on hand for immediate award to soldiers wounded in the field.[11]
Ex:
People forget we were out of atomic bombs after the first two.
They were planning to drop another on Aug. 19th. It just wasn't assembled yet.
The "demon core" that was to be used in 3rd bomb killed 2 scientists in separate incidents. It's alarming how poor safety precautions were in their experiments.
On May 21, 1946,[11] physicist Louis Slotin and seven other personnel were in a Los Alamos laboratory conducting another experiment to verify the closeness of the core to criticality by the positioning of neutron reflectors. Slotin, who was leaving Los Alamos, was showing the technique to Alvin C. Graves, who would use it in a final test before the Operation Crossroads nuclear tests scheduled a month later at Bikini Atoll. It required the operator to place two half-spheres of beryllium (a neutron reflector) around the core to be tested and manually lower the top reflector over the core using a thumb hole on the top. As the reflectors were manually moved closer and farther away from each other, scintillation counters measured the relative activity from the core. The experimenter needed to maintain a slight separation between the reflector halves in order to stay below criticality. The standard protocol was to use shims between the halves, as allowing them to close completely could result in the instantaneous formation of a critical mass and a lethal power excursion.
Under Slotin's own unapproved protocol, the shims were not used and the only thing preventing the closure was the blade of a standard flat-tipped screwdriver manipulated in Slotin's other hand. Slotin, who was given to bravado,[12] became the local expert, performing the test on almost a dozen occasions, often in his trademark blue jeans and cowboy boots, in front of a roomful of observers. Enrico Fermi reportedly told Slotin and others they would be "dead within a year" if they continued performing the test in that manner.[13] Scientists referred to this flirting with the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction as "tickling the dragon's tail", based on a remark by physicist Richard Feynman, who compared the experiments to "tickling the tail of a sleeping dragon".[14][15]
On the day of the accident, Slotin's screwdriver slipped outward a fraction of an inch while he was lowering the top reflector, allowing the reflector to fall into place around the core. Instantly, there was a flash of blue light and a wave of heat across Slotin's skin; the core had become supercritical, releasing an intense burst of neutron radiation estimated to have lasted about a half second.[6] Slotin quickly twisted his wrist, flipping the top shell to the floor. The heating of the core and shells stopped the criticality within seconds of its initiation,[16] while Slotin's reaction prevented a recurrence and ended the accident. The position of Slotin's body over the apparatus also shielded the others from much of the neutron radiation, but he received a lethal dose of 1,000 rad (10 Gy) neutron and 114 rad (1.14 Gy) gamma radiation in under a second and died nine days later from acute radiation poisoning.
But we knew how to make them and we would have just made more and kept nuking them.
It would have taken time though. We didn't have the raw materials for more than a third
Production was estimated at three bombs per month, and was expected to accelerate.
Kept nuking them.
The callous way this is being said can only come from a person who has never seen war at their doorsteps.
I'm a veteran get fucked.
you certainly paint a flattering picture of servicemen, there...
again, war has never graced your shores you fucking tit.
Eventually. We couldn't exactly order them from Amazon with prime delivery.
Two tests happened less than a year after Nagasaki. Considering the logistical delays of decomming/moving/mooring test articles (surplus ships), setting up observation equipment/personal in the Marshall islands, and inviting VIPs to witness, it's a distinction without substantive difference that the US "were out" of nuclear bombs after Fat Boy was dropped.
It's possible the bombs weren't even the reason Japan surrendered.
Japan waited almost a week after the second bomb before surrendering.
This also happened to be just 4 days after Russia invaded South Sakhalin. Japan had pulled forces away from the Russian front to help in the Pacific and were effectively caught off guard when Russia launched its attack on August 9th.
They captured Mongolia and Sakhalin (except for regions in the south of the island, where Japan was outnumbered 3 to 1), the Kuril Islands, and parts of Korea.
This was compounded by the fact that Japan had been relying on Russia to help negotiate their surrender with the allies.
It's at least plausible the bombs did little or nothing to effect the outcome of the war.
This is an argument that's super popular with tankies, but it's not really supported by many serious historians. The loss of the troops on the Asian mainland was almost completely irrelevant by the time of the nuclear bombings. The IJN no longer existed by that point, and it was completely impossible to relocate for defense of the home islands. They could have had a billion troops in China, and all they could have done was watched as their home burned.
On a more basic level though, we don't really need to speculate on the driving causes of the surrender. We can just look at what the Japanese actually said about it. The most succinct explanation probably comes during the Emperor's surrender broadcast, where he explicitly states that the nuclear bombs are the primary cause.
>Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
If anything, the entrance of the Soviets might have prompted the Americans to be more willing to just accept a Japanese surrender with terms rather than an unconditional surrender. But the Japanese themselves were most certainly throwing in the towel either way.
I mean, the Japanese wanted to throw in the towel long before the bombs dropped. It was mostly the Soviets delaying things (so they could invade).
The US had been willing to accept surrender with conditions long before the first bomb dropped, but the Soviets wouldn't allow it because of the agreement under the Potsdam Declaration. So the Soviets were effectively sabotaging the negotiation while acting as a middle man (no doubt to buy time for an invasion).
You're absolutely correct about the Emperor's speech - but I wouldn't exactly say that speech defines everything that was happening. It ignores the fact that Japan - even after the drop of the 1st bomb - was still largely confident that they could broker peace via the Soviet negotiations:
>Japan’s leaders felt little urgency. The imperial military had amassed an astonishing number of troops for a desperate homeland defense, while politicians fantasized about a Soviet-brokered peace. Lacking a guarantee of his safety, the emperor supported the effort to reach out to Moscow and busied himself with protecting sacred relics. Even after the first A-bomb incinerated Hiroshima, he asked the government to seek Allied concessions, underscoring Gallicchio’s claim that Japanese officials “seemed uncertain of what they were doing.”
>
>With the Red Army suddenly deep into Manchuria, Japanese leaders were weighing evaporating options when the second bomb incinerated Nagasaki. What had been chimeric was now clearly delusional.
>
>The emperor finally intervened.
(Emphasis added)
https://cis.mit.edu/publications/analysis-opinion/2020/unconditional-japanese-surrender-world-war-ii
I think ignoring the declaration of war by the Soviets, and the rapid losses that were incurred by the Japanese to the Soviets over the period of less than 2 weeks overestimates the relevance of the bombings.
The Japanese were more concerned about the Soviet invasion than the 1st A-bomb, that's not really in doubt. It's a question of whether we think the 2nd A-bomb played a larger role than the Soviet betrayal.
It's at least possible that it didn't.
Garbage.
I'm happy to hear and discuss your criticisms.
But telling me that an article published on MIT is "garbage" with no further explanation isn't going to convince me of anything except that you have a bias and refuse to read anything that doesn't confirm your bias.
Care to try again?
Ok, where in that does it say the US was willing to accept conditions other then keep the emperor? Because Downfall by Frank says nearly the exact opposite of you.
Japan's "Conditions" were No trials, no occupation, and keeping captured territory. In other words, letting Japan win.
>Ok, where in that does it say the US was willing to accept conditions other then keep the emperor?
...[Conservatives] argued that giving Japan a respectable way out of the conflict would save lives and, at the same time, block Soviet ambitions in Asia.
This line follows statements specifically about unconditional surrender:
President Harry Truman believed unconditional surrender would keep the Soviet Union involved while reassuring American voters and soldiers that their sacrifices in a total war...
>Because Downfall by Frank says nearly the exact opposite of you.
Okay?
I'm not saying that this is the ONLY opinion that exists. I'm not arguing that this MUST be true and all other statements are false.
Read what I wrote:
"It's at least possible that it didn't."
Where does this even suggest that it could not be wrong?
>Japan's "Conditions" were No trials, no occupation, and keeping captured territory. In other words, letting Japan win.
I don't see the relevance of this statement. Even if it's agreed that this is 100% true, how does this refute my statement that it's possible the Soviet invasion had more to do with the surrender than the A-bombs?
I mean, let's be clear here, between August 9th and August 15th, there was no negotiation. The only thing Japan did during that time was agree to surrender unconditionally according to the Potsdam declaration.
It's tough to say that it was the A-bomb that made them change their mind, when we know that they didn't consider the first A-bomb sufficient to warrant unconditional surrender and were still exploring options to negotiate terms.
Did you seriously just ask why Japan's conditions matter when talking about the US not accept Japan's conditions?
No.
I don’t see anything in that post that shows any evidence that America was willing to accept a conditional surrender
Ah yes because I’m sure they were expecting the war to stop after those two and weren’t manufacturing more already just in case. Plus even if they weren’t at war, they were the first atomic bombs that worked and were the deadliest weapons in history, of course the government is going to build more until they get regulated
No the point is the US probably would have had to invade by land which would have lead to huge casualties. I was responding to the bloodbath comment from above.
It would have. Getting an army big enough to invade by land that close to mainland Japan would take months, possibly a year or more. They’d easily make more atomic bombs in that time too and would drop them on the other critical targets. The Japanese would inflict some damage but the damage the Japanese would have taken would have been much worse. The damage done by the bombs was terrifying. Japan was ready to fight an invasion force before they saw the damage from the bombs. They knew more would be on their way eventually if the fighting kept going. It also takes about 2-3 months to create the bombs so there is no way we’d be “out” of atomic bombs for long
The organizers of the coup attempt were mid-level officers who experienced ridged rejection of their plan at basically all levels of the army and the imperial palace they tried. In short, it was never going to work and never came close to working.
The whole story of how Japan came to surrender is really fascinating, partly because it’s been heavily distorted by the American government in particular. It’s not hard to see why: the whole justification for using atomic weapons on Japanese civilians is dependent on the “Japan is too stubborn to surrender” narrative.
And while it’s true that the decision makers in Japan exhibited incredible resilience to the pressure being applied by the US, if you care about understanding their own internal justification for that stubbornness, you will see that using the nuclear bombs was ineffective, unnecessary and largely the result of institutional inertia set in motion before Roosevelt’s death.
Highly recommend this if you want to know the whole story: https://youtu.be/RCRTgtpC-Go
The bombs were totally necessary
Nuclear bombs are ineffective has got to be a first.
It seems their culture make suicide ok in certain circumstances. Kamikaze pilots and these guys. When all else fails, harakiri.
That era of Japan, and still prevalent less so today there was a huge focus on family and honor. Many Japanese thought the empower to be godlike and him surrendering was seen by some to show that the entire empire of Japan was weak and there was no honor in surrender.
Honor in Japanese culture is HUGE! Although they don't seem as extreme in this regard today as history shows you can still see it in Japanese culture today. I.E. the pride they take in the things they produce and their craftsmanship.
Seppuku is the official term. Harakiri is actually considered the vulgar almost derogatory version of the concept.
They killed themselves after a failed coup. Works for me.
Reminds me of Yukio Mishima, though his group only took their own lives.
Highly recommend "Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters". Details the life of Yukio using three of his popular works. One of the greatest films I've seen with my favorite music score of all time.
I wonder how they would have reacted to a chance to see how post war Japan would eventually thrive.
Lol, probably commit sepukku when they find out Japan is known for hentai and tentacle porn.
Japan would not be a country today if they had been defeated in the war by a foreign enemy on their island.
The only reason they remain a country today is they attributed their defeat to a weapon created by witchcraft.
Our plan failed... better give up via suicide!
Hardly news, considering how common assassination was in imperial Japan.
Pity they didn’t wipe out the Royal family first.
What was their end game. Who was to rule next?
Their end game was to fucking die. That’s it.
They were expecting the Allies to invade Japan, and they would try to take out as many of them as possible before every Japanese person died.
That was the plan from the begging if things went south. Japan never intended to surrender. It was only under the threat of a Soviet invasion and two nuclear bombings of Japanese cities that led to them surrendering. And even then, the decision was 4-3 in favor of surrender.
UnrecoveredSatellite t1_j64qf2a wrote
Imagine how many more Japanese citizens would've died had they succeeded.