Submitted by Available_Hamster_44 t3_10pu3dg in worldnews
Ramboxious t1_j6nhtbo wrote
Reply to comment by frostygrin in Brazil's Lula cold-shoulders Germany's Scholz on Ukraine support by Available_Hamster_44
>You could say the same about Zelensky's preconditions - give us what we want, then we'll have peace talks.
But Zelensky's preconditions are reasonable, to respect the sovereignty of their country, while Russia's aren't.
>Ukraine did intend to join NATO, specific plans don't take much time to make, and MAD surely never prevented tensions between countries. See: Cuban missile crisis.
Ukraine did want to join NATO, but their membership action plan was declined in 2008 in Bucharest. Joining NATO is a long process and is not guaranteed, look at Sweden and Finland.
Cuban missile crisis is not analogous, since Russia sent nukes to US borders. There were no plans to do this in Ukraine, if NATO wanted to put nukes at Russia's borders, they could do it already in the Baltic countries.
frostygrin t1_j6njc6v wrote
> But Zelensky's preconditions are reasonable, to respect the sovereignty of their country, while Russia's aren't.
They're not especially reasonable when that's the point of contention. Especially, like I said, there is a history of talks and agreements going nowhere. So Putin leaves Ukraine - what would they talk about, and why wouldn't Zelensky just say no to everything?
> Ukraine did want to join NATO, but their membership action plan was declined in 2008 in Bucharest. Joining NATO is a long process and is not guaranteed, look at Sweden and Finland.
After the Iraq war, I don't think Putin wanted to take chances. Especially as the US was getting increasingly hostile towards him. And Ukraine's action plan being declined doesn't necessarily constitute principled objections.
> Cuban missile crisis is not analogous, since Russia sent nukes to US borders. There were no plans to do this in Ukraine, if NATO wanted to put nukes at Russia's borders, they could do it already in the Baltic countries.
They could have done the opposite. Ramp up conventional warfare, then what exactly is Russia going to do? Nuke Crimea, at a great cost to itself? Nuke the US and actually trigger MAD?
Ramboxious t1_j6nkjqx wrote
>So Putin leaves Ukraine - what would they talk about, and why wouldn't Zelensky just say no to everything?
What is there even to talk about? Russia doesn't have any right to Ukrainian land, you're making it seem like Russia had a reasonable justification for invading Ukraine.
>After the Iraq war, I don't think Putin wanted to take chances.
Take chances from what? The US wasn't going to attack Russia because of MAD.
>They could have done the opposite. Ramp up conventional warfare, then what exactly is Russia going to do? Nuke Crimea, at a great cost to itself? Nuke the US and actually trigger MAD?
Wait, you're talking about conventional warfare after Ukraine joined NATO? That would trigger MAD, no?
frostygrin t1_j6nmav8 wrote
> What is there even to talk about? Russia doesn't have any right to Ukrainian land, you're making it seem like Russia had a reasonable justification for invading Ukraine.
Well, this line of thinking is exactly why it's ridiculous for you to pretend that Zelensky's "preconditions" are actually preconditions to anything. And even more ridiculous for him to pretend that.
> Wait, you're talking about conventional warfare after Ukraine joined NATO? That would trigger MAD, no?
Who knows? Like, I said, if Russia is suddenly getting attacked by the US from Ukraine, is Russia going to nuke its own border? Or the US - and trigger MAD for itself too? I don't know - this is brinkmanship. Maybe we'd see some other tactic - like economic sanctions intended to make Russia give up the nukes. Or attempts at political regime change.
Ramboxious t1_j6nn3yw wrote
>Well, this line of thinking is exactly why it's ridiculous for you to pretend that Zelensky's "preconditions" are actually preconditions to anything. And even more ridiculous for him to pretend that.
They are preconditions for diplomatic negotiations to take place. They can discuss a whole bunch of different things once Russian troops leave Ukraine. But Russia's preconditions that annexed territories, which is what this conflict is about, be recognized as Russian is preventing negotiations.
>Who knows? Like, I said, if Russia is suddenly getting attacked by the US from Ukraine, is Russia going to nuke its own border? Or the US - and trigger MAD for itself too?
The answer is obviously yes, an attack from Ukraine would trigger MAD. Why do you think NATO is not sending troops to Ukraine right now?
frostygrin t1_j6ntj3k wrote
> They can discuss a whole bunch of different things once Russian troops leave Ukraine.
Again, what would they be, and why wouldn't Zelensky just say no to everything? Why would Putin willingly give up his leverage for nothing?
> The answer is obviously yes, an attack from Ukraine would trigger MAD. Why do you think NATO is not sending troops to Ukraine right now?
I don't think there's just one reason. It can quickly become an unpopular quagmire, for example. And it's not actually clear that Russia would use nukes at the first sight of NATO troops in Ukraine. Fundamentally that was my point about Cuban missile crisis. The point wasn't that the situation is exactly the same. The point was that MAD doesn't give you peace of mind. Or any kind of certainty.
Ramboxious t1_j6nvmof wrote
>Again, what would they be, and why wouldn't Zelensky just say no to everything? Why would Putin willingly give up his leverage for nothing?
The point is that both parties set up pre-conditions for diplomatic negotiations, which the other party is not willing to meet, hence the military conflict. However, Russia, as the aggressor, is the only party that wants to continue the conflict, and has no justifiable reason to be in the conflict, so it is their responsibility to end the war if they want to negotiate.
Ukraine can't do that if they want to maintain their sovereignty, Russia can do that while maintaining their sovereignty.
>It can quickly become an unpopular quagmire, for example.
How would it be an unpopular quagmire? Support for Ukraine is at an all time high, and vice versa for Russia, especially in Europe. NATO troops in Ukraine would help out a great deal in kicking out Russians out of Ukraine, judging by the pace that Ukrainians were able to retrieve territory.
The reason that NATO troops aren't in Ukraine is that they don't want to potentially trigger MAD, that's it.
>The point was that MAD doesn't give you peace of mind. Or any kind of certainty.
Exactly, that's why NATO doesn't want to attack Russia, because they don't want to risk the chance of triggering MAD.
frostygrin t1_j6o0s1l wrote
> Ukraine can't do that if they want to maintain their sovereignty, Russia can do that while maintaining their sovereignty.
Well, they aren't equally situated in the situation that you're trying to resolve. Apples and oranges. You're mixing up what's happening and what you find justifiable. If your plan is to keep telling Putin to end the war - it doesn't seem very productive.
> How would it be an unpopular quagmire?
The way it is now, Ukraine is getting support without Americans and allies suffering casualties or spending too much. Ukraine is basically getting surplus equipment. Escalating that can make things less popular, and make the war seem more necessary from the Russian perspective.
> The reason that NATO troops aren't in Ukraine is that they don't want to potentially trigger MAD, that's it.
So why are they supporting Ukraine at all then? Did anyone told them that there's zero risk of triggering MAD? They probably made a calculation that the risk is low enough. So they can keep escalating things little by little.
Ramboxious t1_j6oivkz wrote
>You're mixing up what's happening and what you find justifiable.
The issue is that you are the one mixing things up. Your presenting Ukraine and Russia as equally being able to stop the war. But stopping the war for Ukraine would mean losing their sovereignty, while stopping the war for Russia would have no impact on their sovereignty.
>If your plan is to keep telling Putin to end the war - it doesn't seem very productive.
We can keep telling Putin that while we send military aid to Ukraine and sanctioning Russia, if Ukraine keeps being successful then Putin is more likely to listen.
>Escalating that can make things less popular, and make the war seem more necessary from the Russian perspective.
Support for sending troops to Ukraine was around 35-40% at the start of the war. It seems pretty obvious that main reason NATO troops aren't in Ukraine are due to Russia's nuclear weapons (as noted here and here).
Doesn't this also show Putin that NATO doesn't want to attack Russia, since this would be the perfect opportunity to perform such an attack?
>They probably made a calculation that the risk is low enough.
You hit the nail on the head. The risk of conflict escalation is low when sending aid, because NATO is not directly involved. Sending troops to Ukraine would massively escalate the conflict, as pointed out by the Biden admin.
Viewing a single comment thread. View all comments