Heidegger’s program of the destruction, and deconstruction, of metaphysics was critical of all past viewpoints. He addressed Kant's and Descartes’ notions of the subject-object relation: perception as being, being is perception, presence, perception of the given, existence is dasein is perception. Heidegger contrasts this view with his interpretation of Parmenides for whom thinking is being. Heidegger is on the phenomenological side, away from the empiricism of Kant's notion of perception encountering the given because he is critical of Kan't transcendental ego (so was Sartre for different reasons) which presumes a contentless consciousness that is filled by the actual. Heidegger does define phenomena as both being and intuition. The meaning of being is partly the correlation of the given and present with logos, with correct statements. For Heidegger, how the given is given constitutes the meaning of Being. For Heraclitus, the past is contrasted to the present, and Heidegger acknowledges this as relevant : facticity is our history. Heidegger however describes the historical facticity as thrownness and appropriation by death and/or forgetfulness and concealing. The event is the thrownness, the appropriation, i.e. lethe, therefore, alethiea is the unconcealing.
Heidegger's notion of phenomenology is 'to the issue itself' which is consciousness. The question is how time, the 3 ekstases, provide horizons of meaning. Although time itself, the temporal structure, is being, how does time affect the event and alethia? The main issue in Heidegger is the relation between Dasein and Being where Dasein interprets its own being in terms of other objects. Heidegger claims that Dasein has a mistaken or inauthentic self-conception; Dasein understands its own being in terms of the world. Heidegger is concerned to differentiate Dasein from the world - the attributes of Dasein are called existentialia and the properties of objects are categories. Existentialia, the ontological structural concepts of existence in the world, refers to the modes of being-in-the-world where Dasein is related to other Daseins by care, and related to objects which are either ready-to-hand (the mode of use) or present-at-hand (the mode of contemplation).
Being-in-the-world is always being with others - there is no isolated I. Being-with-others, or thrownness, may alienate Dasein from its true self. Care gives rise to the tendency to be like others and in subjection to others. The loss of autonomy is to the 'they' (das man) - defending one's independence is a heavy burden. Heidegger distinguishes the they-self from the authentic self; the latter 'falls' to the they-self and fails to stand by its own possibilities. The falling movement of becoming is the dominant state of being that belongs to man: falling into inauthenticity. Absorbed in a world is Dasein's not-Being. Fallenness has the appearance of a secure and genuine mode of existence. Anxiety, however, is the opposite of the tranquilization of the they; anxiety individualizes Dasein as the sense of not-being-at-home which Heidegger claims is Dasein's union with its own deepest selfhood.
Husserl’s conception of consciousness is: "Consciousness, considered in its ’purity,’ must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-temporal system; which cannot experience causality from anything nor exert causality upon anything ..." (Ideas, Collier Books, p. 139).
"Because consciousness is self-contained, the method for studying it must exclude all reference to the outside world. The method will reveal the essential, universal structures of consciousness which determine the universal meanings or appearances things have. In other words, this method will illuminate the universal life-world, the essential structures of absolute historicity, namely, those of a transcendental community of mankind." (Crisis, p. 259)
This method is transcendental phenomenology, the epoche; Husserl contrasts it to all other views which do not take consciousness by itself, in its absolute subjectivity, and which include reference to the external world when considering consciousness. Carl Ratner, 1974, Review "The Crisis Of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology."
For Heidegger, language is the true agent of history - the disclosure of truth is the work of language. Poetry is the essence of language. The essence of art is poetry. Heidegger, Basic Writing, "The Origin of the Work of Art."
Sheehan, 1997, writes, "For Husserl, Heidegger's analysis of preconceptual understanding of Being is not the product of true phenomenological investigation and description, and it creates rather than eliminates obscurity. So when Heidegger asserts, "We understand Being, but as yet we lack the concept," Husserl exclaims, "We lack it? When would we need it?" For Husserl, it was an irrelevant, unnecessary quest. The quest Heidegger so ardently pursued for the meaning of Being, a quest that dominated his philosophical life, leading him later into the philosophy of Nietzsche, into reflection on the "origin" of the work of art, into explicating the poetry of Hölderlin and down "forest paths" without end, (Adorno exclaimed to Horkheimer in the early 30’s, ‘Heidegger is on our side, he believe in ‘false paths’!’ Husserl would say, had he lived to see it, was a dead end, only a way of getting bogged down in subjective reflection instead of making a solid and positive contribution to philosophy."
FredW23 t1_iqyuc60 wrote
Reply to /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | October 03, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
Comparing Heidegger to Husserl
Heidegger’s program of the destruction, and deconstruction, of metaphysics was critical of all past viewpoints. He addressed Kant's and Descartes’ notions of the subject-object relation: perception as being, being is perception, presence, perception of the given, existence is dasein is perception. Heidegger contrasts this view with his interpretation of Parmenides for whom thinking is being. Heidegger is on the phenomenological side, away from the empiricism of Kant's notion of perception encountering the given because he is critical of Kan't transcendental ego (so was Sartre for different reasons) which presumes a contentless consciousness that is filled by the actual. Heidegger does define phenomena as both being and intuition. The meaning of being is partly the correlation of the given and present with logos, with correct statements. For Heidegger, how the given is given constitutes the meaning of Being. For Heraclitus, the past is contrasted to the present, and Heidegger acknowledges this as relevant : facticity is our history. Heidegger however describes the historical facticity as thrownness and appropriation by death and/or forgetfulness and concealing. The event is the thrownness, the appropriation, i.e. lethe, therefore, alethiea is the unconcealing.
Heidegger's notion of phenomenology is 'to the issue itself' which is consciousness. The question is how time, the 3 ekstases, provide horizons of meaning. Although time itself, the temporal structure, is being, how does time affect the event and alethia? The main issue in Heidegger is the relation between Dasein and Being where Dasein interprets its own being in terms of other objects. Heidegger claims that Dasein has a mistaken or inauthentic self-conception; Dasein understands its own being in terms of the world. Heidegger is concerned to differentiate Dasein from the world - the attributes of Dasein are called existentialia and the properties of objects are categories. Existentialia, the ontological structural concepts of existence in the world, refers to the modes of being-in-the-world where Dasein is related to other Daseins by care, and related to objects which are either ready-to-hand (the mode of use) or present-at-hand (the mode of contemplation). Being-in-the-world is always being with others - there is no isolated I. Being-with-others, or thrownness, may alienate Dasein from its true self. Care gives rise to the tendency to be like others and in subjection to others. The loss of autonomy is to the 'they' (das man) - defending one's independence is a heavy burden. Heidegger distinguishes the they-self from the authentic self; the latter 'falls' to the they-self and fails to stand by its own possibilities. The falling movement of becoming is the dominant state of being that belongs to man: falling into inauthenticity. Absorbed in a world is Dasein's not-Being. Fallenness has the appearance of a secure and genuine mode of existence. Anxiety, however, is the opposite of the tranquilization of the they; anxiety individualizes Dasein as the sense of not-being-at-home which Heidegger claims is Dasein's union with its own deepest selfhood.
Husserl’s conception of consciousness is: "Consciousness, considered in its ’purity,’ must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-temporal system; which cannot experience causality from anything nor exert causality upon anything ..." (Ideas, Collier Books, p. 139).
"Because consciousness is self-contained, the method for studying it must exclude all reference to the outside world. The method will reveal the essential, universal structures of consciousness which determine the universal meanings or appearances things have. In other words, this method will illuminate the universal life-world, the essential structures of absolute historicity, namely, those of a transcendental community of mankind." (Crisis, p. 259)
This method is transcendental phenomenology, the epoche; Husserl contrasts it to all other views which do not take consciousness by itself, in its absolute subjectivity, and which include reference to the external world when considering consciousness. Carl Ratner, 1974, Review "The Crisis Of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology."
For Heidegger, language is the true agent of history - the disclosure of truth is the work of language. Poetry is the essence of language. The essence of art is poetry. Heidegger, Basic Writing, "The Origin of the Work of Art." Sheehan, 1997, writes, "For Husserl, Heidegger's analysis of preconceptual understanding of Being is not the product of true phenomenological investigation and description, and it creates rather than eliminates obscurity. So when Heidegger asserts, "We understand Being, but as yet we lack the concept," Husserl exclaims, "We lack it? When would we need it?" For Husserl, it was an irrelevant, unnecessary quest. The quest Heidegger so ardently pursued for the meaning of Being, a quest that dominated his philosophical life, leading him later into the philosophy of Nietzsche, into reflection on the "origin" of the work of art, into explicating the poetry of Hölderlin and down "forest paths" without end, (Adorno exclaimed to Horkheimer in the early 30’s, ‘Heidegger is on our side, he believe in ‘false paths’!’ Husserl would say, had he lived to see it, was a dead end, only a way of getting bogged down in subjective reflection instead of making a solid and positive contribution to philosophy."