No, I meant what isubjective experience even is. If you have zero first person access to any experience, then it's impossible to comprehend what it even is based on any description thereof. This is not a linguistic issue.

The whole conundrum is that concluding processing goes on doesn't give you an inkling of an idea subjective experience even exists or understand anything even if one were to tell you.

Without access to subjective experience all you have left is dry processes you can have a fully exhaustive account of without ever knowing what subjective experience even is.

Already in your first paragraph you make a strsnge point. Varistions in sensations don't somehow support subjectigity doesn't have anything to do with consciousness. The same goes for a lot of other examples.

Weirdly, you mention outliers when there is worldeide consensus on a massive majority of experiences...i.e. sugsr being sweet... mint tasting "cold"... variation in subjectivity doesnt detach it from consciousness.

Finally.. phenomenal consciousness or subjective experience is simply a huge part of what consciousnes is. I don't even know how to begin understanding what you are trying to argue by mentioning variations in experience to then ask whether it has anything to do with with conscious experience.

Write your own posts arguing that and get feedback. But in all the literature this is one of the main conundrums Koch et all with integrated information theory tried to quantify it to mention an example. Unity, awareness and experience.

Yes, it wouldn't. There's the rub and the basis for my post and issue in our universe. And in your reply "conveying what they are like" is doing a lot of heavy lifting. If someone never had the sense of taste, you can ralk to them till your blue in the face, but they wouldn't know what it's like. And that's the way you know what it even is. To experience it.

So in total what-its-likeness cannot be inferred in principle from any description from the universe. If it can, I'd love to hear how.

Handwaving with a word like processing is meaningless. I personally am looking to engineer not just AI but synthetic minds. Properties of the materials and the physics matter.

It's silly because it assumes subjective experience as some sort of magic that happens regardless of the design.

I have worked on free will quite a bit and we have it, only in degrees. Kevin Mitchell is working on a great (goingnby his tweets andnpeevious work) book on it right now. Check also George Ellis out wrt top-down causation.

Illusionism as held by Dennett, Graziano, Frankish.. has akl the issues Chalmers lists in his meta-problem. It's barely coherent, doesn't provide explanatory value.. and if beliefs about consciousness can be debunked, that without experience we can't theorize about it (you need "access") then maybebthere is more to it.

You lost me a bit with the first paragraph. Illusionism wants to negate phenomenal consciousness. Don't think many people can get on that page.

How something is built and what sort of input it receives, how it's processed is of course relevant to the discussion. Making random claims that anything that receives input has subj. experience is silly.

I do. What makes you think I don't? I was talking about the philosophical position illusionism. I have no issues with the idea that some of the thinks we believe introspectively are mistaken. But we don't need an -ism for that.

without subjective experience...

It's not in any description of it or science we know where you can point to subjective experience. I am well aware of the science. It's simply saying that if I didn't have taste for example, I wouldn't be able to even guess others do until they tood me and then I wouldn't be able to imagine it either. That goes for all of subjective experience.

I can't be a 100% sure, but we have our own experience and evidence from convergence in evolution in our cases, verbak reports and the whole rest. In the case of simple calculators that did not evoove to think and feel like us, we don't. And it's a rather specious suggestion. The positive feedback loops in the CNS, receptors and signalling, etc., are a whooe different machine than simple electronic devices or even any Von Neumann architecture. Our brain is an analog piece wetware.

It's not about us detected neural correlates about consciousness.

You're talking about correlates of consciousness and associated physical processes. I don't disagree any of tbat, but the processes don't "prove" anything in themselves.

And your calculator also takes input. It doesn't automatically have experience.

It doesn't prove anything and again hss no bearing on my point. You seem to think this is about some ghost in the machine. It's not.

Okay, wow. Bold claim. Evolution seemed to work hsrd to develop a CNS and such if all "input" is subjective experience.

I am not making any claims. We don't know of any way, in principle, how to infer subjective experience. Don't think there are absurdities there either.

Okay. I find illusionism a useless position with zero explanatory value. It tries to claim phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and leaves us with the same stuff to explain, only now they're called illusions.

Okay, the onus is on you how. Sounds like magic. If I had no taste at all, all my life. And you would tell me the stuff we put in your mouth "tastes liie something".. I wouldn't even be able to comprehend what this taste sense is you speak of.

So how you'd conclude from looking at a physical process "Oh, gee that must feel like someting from the inside" without knowing about what it's like sounds like magic to me.

There'd be a lot of interesting things to conclude if a non-sentient intelligent entity would observe biological life. Complex self-dissipating systems, negentropy...etc., but subjective experience? How? On what basis?

Ever read Bisson's "They're Made out of Meat"? That, only waaaay weirder it'd be for that entity to listen to this "inner feel" we have.

Thank you!

It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....

From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input. I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.

Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point. You are projecting magical views onto people and tilting at windmills. So we're talking past each other.

Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative. Sorry, can't help you further since he bores you and your convinxed of some caricarure of him.

And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it. I don't think there is one. That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.

People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.

Yes, the relation between intelligence and consciousness is an open problem. Input sure. Input is not experience. That is nonsense. I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism. I don't that flies.