Ma3Ke4Li3

Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_jdsk9cp wrote

Reply to Vivek Venkataraman argues that political equality and proto-democracy were the most common form of political organisation in the "state of nature". These ideals preceded modern liberalism & statehood, and are arguably how humans have lived the majority of our evolution. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Abstract

How did humans live before the origin of the state? Such questions about the “state of nature” are used in social contract theories as a backdrop to political philosophy.

While some philosophers, like David Hume, regard this such questions about the “state of nature” as mere thought experiments, most of the original theorists on the state of nature - such as Rousseau and Locke - showed significant interest in information about indigenous people. Therefore, many philosophers have taken interest in the question of what modern archaeology and anthropology suggest about life before organised states.

Anthropologist Vivek V Venkataraman argues that we have a pretty good idea about the political organisation in this “state of nature”: humans were largely living as political equals, with proto-democratic practices. This suggests that democracy is older than the state: communal decision-making precedes organised statehood.

In this episode, Venkataraman explains the relevant research and responds to critics of the relevant methodology.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_ja46zdo wrote

Reply to Neuroscientist Gregory Berns argues that Thomas Nagel was wrong: neuroscience can give us knowledge about what it is like to be an animal. For example, his own fMRI studies on dogs have shown that they can feel genuine affection for their owners. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Abstract: Thomas Nagel famously argued that no amount of knowledge about physiology could, even in principle, tell us what it is like to be a bat. Gregory Berns is an animal neuroscientist who argues that Nagel’s thesis is demonstrably wrong. For example, his own work with dog cognition and emotion has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that dogs' relationship to their owners is not simply linked to food rewards.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_j3gvlhc wrote

Reply to Anna Alexandrova, a philosopher of science at Cambridge, argues that a “science of happiness” is possible but requires a new approach. Measures such as “life satisfaction” or “positive emotions” can be studied rigorously. An underlying variable of “happiness” cannot. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Abstract:
Many social scientists have become interested in the possibility of studying happiness (i.e. subjective well-being) scientifically. This has motivated many individual studies but also the large and much-reported World Happiness Report. This movement has been criticised by two strands of philosophers. On the one hand, there are those who criticise underlying welfarism. On the other hand, others have criticised the field for studying a topic (“happiness”) that is impossible to study rigorously.
Anna Alexandrova argues that the latter concern is justifiable, but only partially so. There is no clear reason why the kinds of measures used by “happiness scientists” could not be used rigorously (e.g. asking people about their life satisfaction). However, happiness and well-being have many meanings in different contexts, and it is problematic to collapse all these pluralistic measures under one overarching “happiness” variable. Therefore, one can support the general project of the “science of happiness” but remain sceptical about single-variable such as “world’s happiest country” or the WELBY metrics adopted by the UK government.
However, most “science of happiness” reports make the questionable assumption that all of these metrics can be used to gauge a single underlying “happiness” (e.g. “what is the happiest country in the world?”) Instead, we need a pluralistic approach, where scientists tackle more specific questions around topics that fall under the concepts of happiness and wellbeing.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_ivaj7c7 wrote

Reply to Michael Shermer argues that science can determine many of our moral values. Morality is aimed at protecting certain human desires, like avoidance of harm (e.g. torture, slavery). Science helps us determine what these desires are and how to best achieve them. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Abstract: Philosophers customarily claim that moral questions are out of the reach of science. Michael Shermer argues that this is not the case. Moral claims are intimately related to two facts: what humans want and don’t want (e.g. avoiding slavery), and methods by which to satisfy these values (e.g. by institutions aimed at securing human rights). Both of these aspects have factual claims baked into them, and so, can be studied empirically. For example, social sciences have (or at least could) established that democracies are better than autocracies in protecting people against various forms of harm. To the extent that our fundamental values are out of reach from science, we can treat morality as a set of hypothetical imperatives (i.e. a set of if-then statements).

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_itc9d28 wrote

Reply to comment by mytwocentsshowmanyss in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3

A reasonable question.

Short answer: many people think that morals are either relativistic (different cultures, different moralities) or absolutist (everyone should have the same morals). Both positions lead people to be very confused.

The relativistic position seems to say that there is nothing that people from outside a culture can say to disagree about a cultural practice. Slavery is right if the culture thinks its right. Imperialism is right if the culture thinks its right. And so on.

On the other hand, absolutism seems to be problematic, too. Where are these moral truths written? Who has the moral truth?

This confusion bothers many. If it does not bother you, that's fine. But it has bothered me. Some are so puzzled that they conclude that morality and ethics must be groundless fictions, and so, they end up nihilistic. Nothing matters, and all that.

Kitcher tris to offer a middle ground. His position tries to make sense of ethics in a way that does not presume some realm of absolute moral truths. It is not as mysterious as absolutism. It also assumes that what a good life looks life will differ based on the cultural situation you find yourself in. But nevertheless, morals are not just fashions of the culture. They are tools. And like any tool, they can be evaluated based on how well they do their job.

Not saying that you should find this interesting. But hopefully, this can illuminate why some of us do find it so.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_iskmxlp wrote

Reply to comment by odiouscontemplater in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Well that's one way of looking at it. But good luck having a happy life with that attitude... Even in terms of game theory, you can derive a lot of moral norms from long-term successful strategies. Ken Binmore, Martin Nowak, and Oliver Scott Curry have done a lot of research in this area.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_iskflks wrote

Reply to comment by Bookswinters in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3

My pleasure! For Churchland I would obviously recommend my own interview ;) Oliver Scott Curry has some good youtube videos, just em out.

I'd love to get Tomasello on the show but haven't asked yet. Currently, I think the easiest entry is to check out Ricardo Lopes' interviews of him. You can watch the video on Youtube or just listen to the audio in podcast style (links below). But really, if you have the patience to read Natural History of Human Morality then do! It's relatively short, but super dense. So it's good to start with an interview, anyway. But a masterpiece.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yt9eS0pCsgo&ab_channel=TheDissenter

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https://anchor.fm/thedissenter/episodes/422-Michael-Tomasello-Interdependence--Shared-Intentionality--Culture--and-Morality-enmd65

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_isk6vrv wrote

Reply to comment by Daotar in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Yea it's a great book! My other favourite is Tomasello's Natural History of Human Morality, take a look ;)

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_isk6ifg wrote

Reply to comment by Bookswinters in Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3

I appreciate this take a lot! I actually have an episode with Patricia Churchland exploring this exact topic! I think she focuses to much on caring and altruism at the expense of the kinds of issues that you mentioned. But still very relevant.

https://on-humans.podcastpage.io/episode/1-origins-of-our-warm-blooded-morality-patricia-churchland

Also, do you know of the work of Oliver Scott Curry? his work is very relevant to your take. For him, morality is all about cooperation (non-zero-sum games). I would press against this extreme, too, and say that care and altruistic concern for others plays a role, too. But anyway, both are interesting scholars.

The best scholar who roots the evolution of morality to both care and sympathy (altruism), as well as mutualism and interdependence (cooperation), is Michael Tomasello. The Natural History of Human Morality is a masterpiece!

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_isjs5q1 wrote

Reply to Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Abstract: What is the point of morality? Why should Homo sapiens care about moral rules? Philip Kitcher presents a theory that answers these questions. According to Kitcher, morality stems from something “very deep within us”, namely our psychological dispositions to altruism and other kinds of responsiveness to others. These are biological traits that we evolved as social mammals. However, these traits are fragile. They fail too often to form the basis of human social living. Morality is a social technology that was created to solve these “altruism failures”. Initially, moral rules were very rudimentary, such as the rule not to grab food from others. With time, these rules became more complex. Two virtues of the theory should be noted. First, the theory allows objective evaluation of morality without assuming a realm of moral truths. Second, the theory allows morality to make sense within a naturalist and Darwinian view of life, without succumbing to social Darwinism.
[Note: The referenced theory is discussed in the first 21 minutes of the episode. You can also access the episode via Spotify, Apple Pod, Stitcher, Amazon etc.]

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irxwj85 wrote

Reply to comment by Krasmaniandevil in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

I will reply later with more thoughts, but I think two folks who are best at making this distinction (why humans can be moral agents, but lions cannot) are Michael Tomasello and Stephen Darwall. If you are interested.

And thanks for actually listening to the content, most people just read the abstract!

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irvnt73 wrote

Reply to comment by SilverGengar in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Well, I would disagree. I agree that there is a lot of crap evolutionary shoehorning. (You might resonate with this essay I published in the Skeptic, see below). But it doesn't mean that any attempt to think about human natural history is wasted.

https://psycho-philosophy.org/2022/05/19/distorting-darwinism/

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irvnkv8 wrote

Reply to comment by katander77 in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Hehe well, Darwinian biology was my own clickbait decision.. But what do you mean about being debunked?

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irvnhh4 wrote

Reply to comment by Krasmaniandevil in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

We are apes in suits, but apes differ. We live in huge groups and constantly deal with strangers. This requires different rules for our sociality (whether innate or enforced). Or what would you say?

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irvned8 wrote

Reply to comment by TMax01 in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Yes, I think it would be wrong to say that mammals are moral, period. The point is rather, I think, that something we might call "morality" is more likely to emerge in mammals or birds, rather than lizards, at this is because our neurobiology allows us (does not necessitate us) to feel deep care for others. Might be factually false (think of crocodile parenting), but the logic is a bit more nuanced.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irvn5k5 wrote

Reply to comment by Puzzleheaded_Gas_163 in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

The Euthyphro's dilemma I guess? A classic! I remember some philosopher, I think Colin McGinn, saying that Euthyphro's dilemma is to philosophers what climate change or evolutionary theory is for scientists: the one thing people actually have a consensus on.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irvmzj1 wrote

Reply to comment by tapirbackrider1 in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

I like that, thanks for sharing! But there is a third way: morality is rooted in traits that were selected for but is something built on top of it. Churchland hints at this, but someone who makes this very explicit is Philip Kitcher For him, morality is a "social technology" but it springs from something very deep within us. I have a full conversation about it with him:

https://on-humans.podcastpage.io/episode/2-humanistic-ethics-in-a-darwinian-world-philip-kitcher

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irvm73h wrote

Reply to comment by time_and_again in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

One of my favourite books in this regard is Tomasello's Natural History of Human Morality. It's a great read, and despite being by a scientist, it gives very high value to philosophers.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irryv3w wrote

Reply to comment by r0ndy in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

I don't think the argument would be quite that biological impulses "become" or "are" morality. Rather, certain biological impulses must be in place for there to be a "platform" for morality.

So the question is, why is it that there is a corner of the animal kingdom where anything vaguely resembling morality could have taken off? And Churchland argues that it is not a coincidence that it is this warm-blooded ape, instead of, say, salamanders, that does moral philosophy.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irry52e wrote

Reply to comment by [deleted] in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Yes, I agree that Conscience is a great book! This formed the basis of our conversation in this podcast episode. I must say that I actually like her newer work more than the traditional one on consciousness. I think it added a lot of fresh air into neurophilosophy. Anyway, did you get the chance to listen to any of it? It would be interesting to hear your thoughts. We discussed material that was not included in the book.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irrudq5 wrote

Reply to comment by r0ndy in Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Yes, and as said, her argument was that empathy etc. is a certain "platform for morality" on top of which we also learn social norms. But what I would like to hear people's perspectives on whether there is any value in rooting morality in biological impulses. Or does this undermine morality? I don't think so - but I think many would disagree.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irrq66m wrote

Reply to Patricia Churchland argues that morality is rooted in our Darwinian biology. She links morality to warm-bloodedness, which required an adaptation to care for others (originally, infants). This is the biological basis for unselfish concern, and later, moral intuitions. by Ma3Ke4Li3

Abstract: Is morality a social construct or rooted in biology? Patricia Churchland argues that the earliest origins of human morality emerged in mammals and birds due to some cascading effects of being warm-blooded. This cascade begins from the high calorific demands of endothermy. This forces warm-blooded animals to become more flexible in their hunting and foraging strategy, which in turn requires a large cortex. Having a large cortex requires, in turn, immature births, because the cortex is largely built in infancy. This was the first evolutionary pressure that allowed unselfish concerns to evolve (originally, for offspring). Later, the same neurobiology of care is used in a variety of circumstances and allows the kind of flexible and caring sociality that we observe in mammals and birds. In the case of humans, this “platform for morality” is supplemented by two other factors: social learning of moral norms, and social problem-solving within various constraints.

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[Note: this is a repost from yesterday. The original was removed as I forgot the abstract. However, it generated good discussion, so I thought it worthwhile to resubmit it.]

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[Another note: Patricia Churchland has been very generous with her time with me and has already answered questions that were raised in similar forums. If you have questions you would like her to answer directly, do drop one in and I will do my best to get a response.]

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