free will in its most classical sense means "the possibility to have done otherwise". I may have a mind and consciousness, but I will have certain inclinations towards certain actions, based on my brain chemistry and as a reaction to other actions etc. to say that I could've done otherwise in the past would mean that the state of my mind or the circumstances would have had to be different, which is simply not possible and therefore I couldn't have done otherwise. it would be preposterous to say that a drug addict has control over his volition. in my opinion the best argument for free will/moral responsibility (that I know about) is that of the Frankfurt cases. these cases proposed by Harry Frankfurt are counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) which I personally think are quite strong. but this still does not try to prove free will in a classical libertarian sense because it still denies being able to have done otherwise. so I don't think we can reduce the concept of free will to having a conscious mind still might not have complete agency.
I don't know if this was very cogent or not sorry I'm not rly the most knowledgeable on this I only know a few things I've heard of so far
NukePlayo t1_izrstev wrote
Reply to comment by ridgecoyote in /r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | December 05, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt
free will in its most classical sense means "the possibility to have done otherwise". I may have a mind and consciousness, but I will have certain inclinations towards certain actions, based on my brain chemistry and as a reaction to other actions etc. to say that I could've done otherwise in the past would mean that the state of my mind or the circumstances would have had to be different, which is simply not possible and therefore I couldn't have done otherwise. it would be preposterous to say that a drug addict has control over his volition. in my opinion the best argument for free will/moral responsibility (that I know about) is that of the Frankfurt cases. these cases proposed by Harry Frankfurt are counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) which I personally think are quite strong. but this still does not try to prove free will in a classical libertarian sense because it still denies being able to have done otherwise. so I don't think we can reduce the concept of free will to having a conscious mind still might not have complete agency.
I don't know if this was very cogent or not sorry I'm not rly the most knowledgeable on this I only know a few things I've heard of so far