Yeah. But it's also important not to stray too far into instrumentalism, the idea that none of the mathematics of physics needs to correspond to anything in physical reality, it's just an accurate prediction apparatus. Because the only reason a prediction apparatus can be consistently successful is if it is latching on to some elements of reality which follow constant, or at least very slowly changing, laws. There was a course I didn't have the time to attend covering the span of the history of physics from start to now, expounding the idea that while it has never been an entirely correct reflection of reality, it is an ever-evolving dialogue with reality. As we make new discoveries we refine our understanding of the world. Maybe at some point we will understand its true nature - maybe we already do, in the sense that there won't be any serious rewriting of the current mathematics, only the addition of new elements for e.g. new particles. There is a reality to the quantum realm as with everything else, and maybe one of the current interpretations will prove true, or maybe our dance with reality will give rise to new mathematics and new "interpretations". Because while physicists might call them interpretations due to the often sole dependence on the current mathematics, they are in fact hypotheses about the world, which ultimately have to prove true or false. We often forget that the theory of atoms used to just be an "interpretation" stemming from the mathematics of chemistry.

I read this laid back debate between Julian Baggini and Laurence Krauss a while back (https://amp.theguardian.com/science/2012/sep/09/science-philosophy-debate-julian-baggini-lawrence-krauss) where Baggini essentially concedes that metaphysics should be replaced by physics. At the time I wasn't really ready to make that concession, but know I see it differently. Other than that point the debate isn't great, with both participants mostly talking past each other, but that point always stuck with me.

Edit: I found it because at the time I was frustrated by so-called "scientism" which I was seeing everywhere, and was trying to find places where scientists had espoused it. I still think scientism is largely wrong and harmful, but I view it more sympatheticly. It's sad but ultimately unsurprising that physicists like Feynman subscribed to it. Only a few physicists like Sean Carroll are even willing to engage with philosophy. Which is annoying because while I don't care much for metaphysics, interpretations of quantum mechanics which imply nonsense like the moon isn't definitively there whilst you're not looking at it are just so nonsensical that I have to hope for theories like objective collapse to win out.

Yeah, you're probably right

Good questions, I think whenever anything starts approaching human level intelligence we need to ask them. I haven't got any answers for you though, as I would have to look into the literature and have more of a think to make up my mind

There's nothing in principle about machines that must forbid sentience and ethical value. Consider we are able to build a perfect mechanical reproduction of the brain utilising computer parts which are able to interact 3 dimensionally and in exactly the same manner as neurons. Also assume using this replica combined with necessary input sensors and output body movements we were able to create exactly to recreate the electrical activity that occurs within the brain. This artificial brain would therefore be doing exactly the same thing as a human brain, just using a substrate of silicone or another material rather than flesh. The use of flesh has nothing to do with sentience, so this artificial brain would exhibit exactly the same sentience and types of thoughts and feelings as ours. It seems obvious to me that it then should receive exactly the same ethical value as us.

The issue is that there are 86 billion neurons in the human brain, they interact 3 dimensionally, chemicals can flow throughout all of the brain via blood, and failing to give appropriate input sensors and output movements might cause insanity. So we may never be able to build this. Now in principle if we perfectly understood how everything worked and tied together, we could simulate the entire thing without building it using an incredibly powerful computer. But we are nowhere near that sort of understanding so again it's unclear if we ever can.

In sci-fi these real world concerns about feasibility of construction are pushed aside. But also we are often asked to deal with artificial intelligences which are conscious but different from our own, often radically. This is the same case as the inherently racist/speciesist term "sub-human". Here ethical comparison is now problematic, and may differ from case to case. I personally would value any intelligence considered sentient equally; other philosophers talk of "personhood". Importantly, just because a being is more or less intelligent shouldn't grant it more or less ethical value, just as humans with higher IQ are not of greater ethical value.

One of the reasons r/askphilosophy is a load of bullshit is because that answer would have probably been deleted

I take the view that "free will" is poorly defined, roughly echoing Strawson's compatibilist view (if you are interested in this you MUST read Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' [1962], one of the greatest philosophy lectures ever which changed the minds of many in the field; it's only 15 pages!). What matters to me is 'choice'. Now, seeing as I also hold a materialist view of the brain-mind issue, and a materialist view of metaphysics, I fully accept that all things we typically call 'choices' are causally (fully deterministically or partially randomly) determined by the material world, included both brain activity and everything else. We slide between different definitions of choice in everyday language, considering choices free-er when for example not taken under duress. But these definitions of choice are slid between precisely because we wish them to align with our understanding of ethics; specifically, what a moral choice is and when a choice should or shouldn't be punished. And this is all above board because even though there isn't some external presence disconnected from the material controlling the mind, nevertheless choices are being made within brains. Choices you make are yours because they stem from your brain's activity, and this activity IS you. Note that if you read Strawson's paper, he makes his arguments without appealing to materialism; it's just easier and quicker for me to use it because I believe it.

Wait are you ChatGPT?

I haven't read those comics, but I will say that anyone who reserves moral value strictly to humans is an idiot. Consider some alien species of equal intelligence and similar faculties to feel pain coming to visit us. It would be just as wrong to torture them as to torture humans, other concerns aside (like if there was some reason for torture such as gaining vital information). If some species here on Earth were to develop similar faculties to us, it would be wrong to deem them of lower ethical value just because they do not have the same biology as us. This is wrong for exactly the same reason that racism is wrong. It is not our biology that defines us, but our faculties. I have a problem with the term "humanism" for this reason, though seeing as there aren't currently any comparable species to us yet, it's not really an issue for now. In my opinion this means a good ethical theory must find something other than biology to base its ethical value on. For me the most viable option is sentience, though others look to the experience of pain and pleasure. Theists need to contort themselves around the musings of ancient books written and rewritten over time by many different people of questionable intelligence, motives and sanity, but I imagine they may run into trouble because the various authors didn't have the forethought to consider non-humans similar to humans in intelligence, because sci-fi hadn't been invented.

The answer to your question is obviously yes, indeterminism does not imply free will. Anyone who would have you believe otherwise is a fool.

Askphilosophy is a draconian mess of a subreddit, even moreso than here (and that's saying something!). Most posts with more than a few upvotes end up getting locked so only flaired users can post. In practice this shuts down debate. You'll get the same responses listing some views from the most famous classical and "modern" (i.e. before the 1950s) philosophers. As a result you'll get little to no analytic philosophy, as it has been understood post WW2.

All non-objective ethics positions have these sorts of problems. Typically relativism (theories where ethics is in some sense relative to a "group" of people) is favoured over outright individual subjectivism, but it's still fundamentally flawed. With all of these sorts of views it's hard to eliminate a "Hitler was right" type of statement. Jumps and backflips are performed, but I have never found any convincing. I will never be willing to concede any "Hitler was right" type of statement, so for me an acceptable ethical theory must satisfy some form of objectivity.

I don't entirely agree. It has often been the relatively young to drive social change. Emmiline Pankhurst formed the Women's Social and Political Union, later known as the Suffragettes, at age 47, with her daughters Adela (23), Christabel (23) and Sylvia (21). Gandhi starting civil rights campaigning at age 23. Martin Luther King led the Montgomery boycott at age 26. Older people are more likely to have conservative views. This may be due to ageing causing changing views, or generational differences (being brought up in times when homosexuality and abortion were illegal, and racist attitudes were widely accepted); scientists are still trying to pick those apart. But in both cases it is the young who are more likely to want to shift the status quo forward in the direction it has been travelling rather backwards to where it once was at some past point. In democratic countries, society is changed by voting and campaigning. A rational and ethical agent should vote and campaign based on their moral values and their understanding of the world. So moral values, especially about society, will and should always play a central role in people's political lives. Insisting that a person, young or old, stop spending time on the morality of society, is to insist they remove themselves from democracy.

Pretty cool

I haven't got any readings for you, sorry, but I can say that valuing one's time is fundamental to much of mainstream economics. Specifically, in many models an agents time is split up into working vs. non-working (leisure), and you assume an agent desires both leisure time and money to purchase things with. This very basic idea can be used to construct all sorts of interesting, explanative and predictive models. So it would make sense that you would want to get the most out of your time, seeing as that's one of the building blocks of your enjoyment of life

No particular fields. I knew a really nice and smart professor primarily working in logic who spent a while wasting time on some philosophy of language, many tedious and reinterpretations of modern philosophers (your Mills and Sartres etc., but also more obscure figures I can't remember the names of), a rather arrogant philosopher of economics who was doing things like taking models and assume they were intended as true descriptions of reality, and much more. There were still probably more people doing at least somewhat interesting and good work in the department than not, but when reading papers you'd find just so much that adds little value. As for students, the average level of ability was low.

I have a substantial amount of disrespect for metaphysics, but I don't think the philosophers in that field were better or worse than average, I just think the field itself is largely wrongheaded.

Does anyone else like philosophy but dislike (or find boring, annoying, stupid, what have you) many contemporary philosophers? I found in uni that while most philosophers were nice people (moreso than other disciplines), there was a fair amount of work going on which I thought was wrong, stupid or pointless. The same goes for reading contemporary papers, even of people well respected in their field (I'm looking at you Nick Bostrom).

This was deemed too spicy for a regular post so it has been relegated to the weekly thread. As a result it is a bit too long, sorry 😬

Supertasks by VSauce

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ffUnNaQTfZE

This is a good video by VSauce on supertasks. Fun, informative, accurate; just watch it!

I'm posting this because I think it shines a light on an area of philosophy which I think is seriously flawed: metaphysics (downvotes incoming!). My problem with metaphysics is that it tries to reach conclusions about what exists which are too strong using "armchair" reasoning, when this should be better left to scientists, especially physicists. While philosophy does utilise cold hard logic sometimes, especially to construct paradoxes to establish what isn't true, it often also requires other approaches to arrive at conclusions about what is true, such as coming up with different theories which fit, valuing parsimony, etc. But when it comes to establishing what exists, it's the scientists who should be left to come up with theories that fit, utilise parsimony as they see fit, do experiments to narrow things down, etc., and yes they can also be trusted with the cold hard logic when it comes up. They get to decide when a question is more concretely answered vs. when there isn't sufficient information and so there are only hypotheses.

So how does this relate to Michael's video on Supertasks? Supertasks originated as thought experiments, specifically paradoxes, thought up by philosophers. The two most famous are Zeno's paradox and Thomson's lamp. Michael explains the correct answer to both, which was stated firmly by Paul Benacerraf back in 1962: all these supertask thought experiments ultimately come down to a lack of information (like one of those logic puzzles where one of the options is "not enough information"). So they aren't really paradoxes at all and don't tell us anything about reality.

That doesn't mean that these thought experiments are useless. They should be better thought of as puzzles, which tell us something about reasoning, and open interest into what physicists may one day discover, or what mathematics might apply. Often puzzles have been the foundation on which beautiful and interesting maths is built. Indeed, it feels like metaphysicians are often pulling interesting ideas which belong in maths or physics into their department, because while they aren't qualified to tackle them properly they still need to publish papers.

Now, for some philosophers like Alexander Pruss this isn't enough: they want to use these thought experiments to reach conclusions about what exists. In Pruss's book 'Infinity, Causation, and Paradox' (2018) he uses supertasks and other reasoning to try and argue for his position of causal finitism, which roughly implies that none of these paradoxes could ever come about in reality.

But this is just not necessary and an overreach of philosophy. Let's take the example of the green and yellow cube at timestamp 10:57 in the video. If a cube like this did exist in reality, yes it's true that the colouring algorithm does not tell us the colour of the top. But maybe physicians would find out that the top colour must always be green, or always yellow, or always a quantum superposition of the two. All answers fit because the supposed paradox isn't a paradox: the colouring algorithm doesn't give enough information to determine what the top colour is. So the thought experiment is interesting and opens up questions about reality, but can never answer them. Zeno's paradox is much the same: all it tells us it that physicists must determine how motion works; maybe because motion is continuous (so the limit of the partial sums gives the answer, as expected), maybe because space is not infinitely divisible, or something else.

I've only been talking about a small slice of metaphysics, but it is my personal opinion that this a microcosm which correctly shows the sub-discipline's flaws (I can feel the downvotes running through my veins ❄️). This is of course my personal opinion, and seeing as I'm posting it anonymously on Reddit it's worth pretty much nothing, but I thought I'd voice it here anyway to give a little balance to this subreddit.

If you actually read this far, well done! Here's a cake 🎂

How does this apply to government actions which are not passing laws? Like regulations on planning permissions, budget for construction of infrastructure, support for industries like agriculture (ensuring farmers receive enough revenue so that farming always continues), and import and export tariffs and subsidies. It seems that this rather Libertarian view of law and ethics either sees all these activities as unjustly arbitrary or binding on freedom, or simply doesn't have anything to say on whether they should or shouldn't be implement and how.

I think concluding with things like "interest groups are bad" (to simply dramatically) is a little lackluster, seeing as most people would agree with that anyway. What more extreme things are implied by the ideas the article tries to support?

"Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried” - Winston Churchill

I have to assume most people upvoting this didn't read it? Because the title is interesting - it's attractive to believe in the power of philosophical ideas if you are into philosophy - but the actual article fails to really get into this other than just saying that Berlin said this.

I'm sure I'll be downvoted for this, but would it be unfair to assume some unconscious bias towards your husband based on gender?

Knowledge for knowledge's sake!