Waylah

Waylah t1_ivejo7f wrote

Why can't morality be a useful concept if it turns out that its fundamental root is people's subjective preferences?

'Subjective' doesn't need to be a pejorative word. Experience matters, and experience is subjective.

It's possible that when people speak of morality, they are speaking of a coherent concept, that, whether they know it or not, turns out to be subjective preferences (or idealised preferences, which is the preferences someone would have if they had idealised conditions, like full relevant knowledge)

Like it literally is preferences, the way water is H2O. People didn't need to know water is H2O to be able to discuss water or do useful things with it.

Yeah, it doesn't solve the problem of how to aggregate opposing preferences. (I do wonder though how opposing idealised preferences could be, if that gets us anywhere.) But that doesn't mean it's not true. It could be possible that it is unsolvable.

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