maritimelight
maritimelight t1_ja6c2tx wrote
Reply to Neuroscientist Gregory Berns argues that Thomas Nagel was wrong: neuroscience can give us knowledge about what it is like to be an animal. For example, his own fMRI studies on dogs have shown that they can feel genuine affection for their owners. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Scientists almost always betray complete misunderstanding--or a only shallow comprehension--of core philosophical issues when they make these claims. Like, who is that dude who built an entire public intellectual persona based on his ability to sell his inability to grasp the naturalistic fallacy? Sam Harris?
That and the replicability crisis have made me seriously sceptical about contemporary scientists' intelligence and integrity. These people do so much damage to philosophy and their respective field in the process of making these click-bait claims. Students in STEM should be required to take epistemology and philosophy of science classes in undergrad. Maybe that would help, I dunno. Probably not. Ignorance has shown itself these past few decades to be more influential and resilient a social force than education.
maritimelight t1_jblo9a9 wrote
Reply to comment by MonteChristo0321 in I just published an article in The Journal of Mind and Behavior arguing that free will is real. Here is the PhilPapers link with free PDF. Tell me what you think. by MonteChristo0321
While I think it's a slightly more complex issue than just semantics, another undefined term that will likely cause problems for your argument is the assumption of identity you use with "I". One of the more widely discussed issues of late is whether there is a coherent identity you can posit as "I", and if so, what its boundaries and qualities are. Is this something like the Kantian unity of apperception? Does it necessarily include my body and my consciousness? Personally I am sympathetic to the view that "I" is merely a kind of awareness of ourselves after the fact. But my point is, you can see that if I adopt this definition of "I", I am making a subterranean assumption that refutes your criteria, and vice versa. Discussions about free-will are downstream of discussions about consciousness and identity.