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[deleted] t1_j3yfqsn wrote

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DJacobAP OP t1_j3yoir0 wrote

So in 12th century Syria you would've come across Turks more than Arabs. And secondly Jihad as the main motivation against the crusader states didn't become a major thing until the zengids took power in the region so that take seems off by a few decades on either side

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[deleted] t1_j3ypm95 wrote

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Hpstorian t1_j436t07 wrote

"Not given much choice in strategy, because you're supposed to follow the Sunnah in everything"... what does this mean?

How is "the Sunnah" a strategy?

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opolomoneima t1_j43enyg wrote

It's the example set by the initial holy wars fought by the Prophet and his companions. The tradition in Islam is to as closely imitate these and other little details of the lives of the earliest Muslims. It's stupid from a Christian perspective but it was and very much still is a thing in the Muslim world. Everything has to be referenced back to the way the Prophet did things, or it is illegitimate.

I know it's not fashionable in the West to make any generalizations at all, and this is why my analysis was being dunked on, but living in an Islamic culture, I have firsthand experience of this

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Hpstorian t1_j43klkl wrote

It is a true generalisation that the idea of the Prophetic example has had an ongoing importance for religious observance amongst Muslims, however your characterisation comes across as an ideological narrative rather than a reflection of the historical reality. Even if we assume that the beliefs/practices of the majority of Muslims are accurately shown by fiqh/aqidah texts: and were universally and prescriptively followed even such discussions vary widely in their understanding of the Sunnah itself.

Your analysis is being dunked on because it seems uninformed. If you read many texts of this period in the region you will find them arguing for the submission to a singular authority in the form of the Caliph, yet even a cursory survey of Muslim history shows that this was rarely even close to the case. That alone shows that it took more than an Alim to make a ruling to define something so complex as strategies of governance.

Living amongst Muslims doesn't equate to historiographical training. If this is a topic that interests you I would suggest reading scholarly works more widely.

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opolomoneima t1_j43ol7t wrote

Reality is messy and complicated. It is true that individual Muslims, especially in the modern world are not quite as observant of the prophetic example because of practical reasons and social change. And you'll find variations where people in the heartland of the Muslim World (Arabia, Persia, Pakistan) tend to be more observant than those in the peripheries (Indonesia, Turkestan).

However, all I implied was that the ideological framework of Sharia law greatly affected the actual political, military and social structure of the Caliphates and Sultanates. How could it not be? In practice, it's true that it was impossible to follow rulings to the dot, and rulers had leeway, but to deny that there weren't any commonalities in how kingdoms of this specific period in this specific area operated is missing the forest for the trees. The commonalities I pointed out were quite universal in the Middle East from the late Abbasid period until the 18th century. Even the far away Moroccans were using Slave-Soldiers from the Sahel. There was always at least a nominal Caliph present until WW1, so there's that. Battle strategy could be different but recruitment strategy could not, free tribesmen HAD to be recruited as whole tribes, while slave-soldiers could be better organized. Peasant conscription was rare, as elsewhere in medieval times.

I'm no professional historian. I don't know precise dates and the names of many dynasties. But you can't deny these common strands of history.

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Hpstorian t1_j44193m wrote

You say "not quite as observant of the Prophetic example" yet that implies that the "Prophetic example" was understood in a monolithic manner. This is not the case, for even within a single "sect" you find a huge variety of understandings of both the example in question and what it meant for believers. While it is true that there was consensus on a few things (few would deny for example that the Prophet existed) outside of that there was a lot of diversity in interpretation and practice.

The most obvious example is that those we would now think of as "Sunni" and "Shia" sects began as trends in the conceptualisation of legitimate authority. That such a fundamental difference could exist is a pretty clear refutation of what you're saying here.

What in the Sunnah makes it necessary for tribesmen to be recruited that way? When in the life of the Prophet did he use enslaved soldiers from the steppes?

I know you're not a professional historian (and this isn't relevant to the truth or otherwise of my claims but I'm saying it anyway), but I am.

And your approach to this is not informed.

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opolomoneima t1_j444fie wrote

The answer lies in the methodology of how Sharia is compiled and interpreted. Islamic law is extremely path dependent, so that theoretical inferences are drawn from what is clearly referenced from the Prophet's life and applied to new situations, which leads to new institutions, like. slave-soldier recruitment. Inferences drawn from these are applied to newer situations and so on.

This is how it went: The earliest Holy Wars were fought by people organized as clearly segmented tribes under the leadership of their chiefs. Alongside them fought believing slaves from places such as Ethiopia and Persia. There was a requirement for every able believer to fight. This much is recorded in the Sunnah.

Now, from this it can be inferred that there are 3 legitimate ways of recruitment: slaves brought along by their masters, allied tribes recruited as a whole and those who are bound as Muslims to a religious duty.

Apply this to the practical situation existing in the 9th century and you get the answer. Out of these 3 options, tribes were difficult to manage and you didn't want to empower the common folk Fellahin too much. So slave-soldiers directly owned by the Sultan became most convenient.

Yes, there are sects. The Shia-Sunni split is the result of a fracture among the very earliest companions right after his death. But within the Sunnis (who are and always were the vast majority) doctrine is pretty much the same. Only minute details of ritual vary, not enough to profoundly affect political structure. Even Iran wasn't Shia majority until very late and Egypt remained Sunni through decades of Shia rule.

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omaca t1_j3ywwu3 wrote

I'm pretty sure that at various times the Caliphate(s) did indeed maintain professional armies. Cities like Giza were founded to host muslim armies away from "conquered" locals to avoid provoking rebellions etc.

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janbx t1_j3yxj14 wrote

Yes they were called ‘Amsars’. The parent comment is historically inaccurate

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[deleted] t1_j3ylw5s wrote

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vrenak t1_j3ymlhg wrote

Yes, this super decentralised attitude is also a large part of why arab armies are so bad today.

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FreeNoahface t1_j42r1iv wrote

It's the exact opposite, things are over-centralized and far too top-down. Everyone from sergeants to NCOs to generals are given much less operational freedom and need to ask permission for things that they'd be expected to just do on their own in the US military.

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vrenak t1_j42torg wrote

You're confusing the attitude for the command structure, they're reverse of each other.

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IDontTrustGod t1_j3yoza2 wrote

To add to this, to my knowledge, they would often travel “with the whole tribe” quite literally. So many times the male soldiers wives, children etc would be close by, traveling with the army in a second camp. This could lead to more relaxed and fraternal atmosphere within each tribe, while still allowing hostilities between the tribes as another commenter pointed out

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