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angryshark t1_j5mn3n2 wrote

Perhaps a temporary, physical barrier / fence type of apparatus could be put in place when the engines are running to avoid inadvertent human ingestion? Lines on the pavement seem inadequate and can't take into account someone's possible distraction.

I think this alerts us to the need for a modification to the safety protocols.

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helium_farts t1_j5mvrlb wrote

She knew the engine was on, was warned to get away from it, and walked in front of it anyway.

All the warnings and protocols in the world won't work if people refuse to heed them.

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Arthur_Dent_42_121 t1_j5n5xkw wrote

I'm really happy to see a comment like this, because there are a lot of takes on here that seem just too simplistic. That kind of thinking will not prevent future incidents, and it is not in keeping with the human factors engineering principles that have allowed aviation to reach its current level of reliability.

Why did the person not heed the warnings?

  • They could be fatigued and did not properly process the warning.

Easily mitigated with regulation. Even pilots, who are extremely well trained, trusted with the lives of hundreds, have strict hours-of-work limits, because - like any piece of equipment operated beyond its specifications - you get totally erratic results.

  • They did did not adequately understand the nature of the danger. The airline did not invest sufficiently in their training.

  • The warning systems were inadequate.

This is far from the first time that an engine at above idle has posed danger to ground workers - some incidents involved trained airport firefighters trying to extinguish fires. Are there adequate and obvious indicators of when the risk is and is not present?

  • The interlock systems were inadequate.

It used to be common to power-back engines using the thrust reversers. This was found to be an unsafe practice and modern planes do not power back. Instead, they are towed where they need to go, to make it safer for the ground crew and the engines. A similar chamge could be made for, e.g. any non-idle operation of the engines.

  • They could even be suicidal. Once again, the system needs to be examined. Is there a mental health process in place? Do circumstances permit them to do their job properly - are the ramp workers compensated enough to thrive?

The Tenerife disaster, and the NASA CRM processes that it provoked, really cemented the importance of resisting the urge to blame stupidity for a failure of the system.

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midsprat123 t1_j5p5gp4 wrote

What would you suggest?

Most gates handle various aircraft so a permanent fence isn’t plausible.

A moveable fence might work but could get blown around by wind unless it’s weighted down sufficiently, then it’s harder to move quickly.

What happens if you don’t have enough crew to move the engine fences, you aren’t going to deboard the plane? Airlines already struggle to have sufficient crew for the ramp, this would exasperate the staffing issue.

But at the end of the day, if you just got knocked down by the exhaust, why the hell would you walk in front of the engine.

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oliverkloezoff OP t1_j5mp1iz wrote

"I think this alerts us to the need for a modification to the safety protocols."

Most every safety warning and label on tools, machinery or whatever was created because somebody did something like this.

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eeisner t1_j5nim5x wrote

Airplanes have very bright red beacon lights that are on from the moment the plane starts either engine start or pushback (whichever is first) until the moment engines have spooled down enough that the plane is safe to approach. Anyone who ever steps foot on a tarmac knows this. Theae lights are bright and you're not going to miss them.

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nitro316 t1_j5nbeat wrote

Hell yeah! Let's add an extruder to the liquidification process.

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