Arthur_Dent_42_121
Arthur_Dent_42_121 t1_iwsqllx wrote
Reply to Ask research questions in plain language and get answers directly from the full text of research articles by JoshN1986
Scientist here (completely unaffiliated with scite). I haven't tried this feature, but use scite.ai occasionally - though I haven't bothered to get a subscription. It's a fairly helpful tool; finding dissenting opinions is tedious to do manually, and it does a pretty good job of exposing any controversy about a certain result.
I hope they get some traction.
Arthur_Dent_42_121 t1_j5n5xkw wrote
Reply to comment by angryshark in NTSB details deadly accident involving airport ground worker | AP News by oliverkloezoff
I'm really happy to see a comment like this, because there are a lot of takes on here that seem just too simplistic. That kind of thinking will not prevent future incidents, and it is not in keeping with the human factors engineering principles that have allowed aviation to reach its current level of reliability.
Why did the person not heed the warnings?
Easily mitigated with regulation. Even pilots, who are extremely well trained, trusted with the lives of hundreds, have strict hours-of-work limits, because - like any piece of equipment operated beyond its specifications - you get totally erratic results.
They did did not adequately understand the nature of the danger. The airline did not invest sufficiently in their training.
The warning systems were inadequate.
This is far from the first time that an engine at above idle has posed danger to ground workers - some incidents involved trained airport firefighters trying to extinguish fires. Are there adequate and obvious indicators of when the risk is and is not present?
It used to be common to power-back engines using the thrust reversers. This was found to be an unsafe practice and modern planes do not power back. Instead, they are towed where they need to go, to make it safer for the ground crew and the engines. A similar chamge could be made for, e.g. any non-idle operation of the engines.
The Tenerife disaster, and the NASA CRM processes that it provoked, really cemented the importance of resisting the urge to blame stupidity for a failure of the system.