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EleanorStroustrup t1_j8r3lir wrote

Reply to comment by Devinology in “The principle of protecting our own thinking from eavesdroppers is fundamental to autonomy.” – Daniel Dennett debates the sort of free will it’s worth wanting with neuroscientists Patrick Haggard and philosopher Helen Steward by IAI_Admin

> Experiencing free will is all free will is. It would be nothing if not experienced. A god-like figure dictating reality without perceiving itself as doing so wouldn’t have free will because it wouldn’t experience itself as such.

The experience is necessary, but not sufficient. A god-like figure who doesn’t think they have free will wouldn’t meaningfully have free will, but neither would a non-god who thinks they have free will, because they’d still have to actually have free will in order to have free will.

I’m sure you’ve seen a lot of demonstrations that thinking oneself admirable is not sufficient to actually be admirable. Free will isn’t qualitatively different from that.

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liquiddandruff t1_j8uwg7s wrote

A lot of free will proponents seem unable to distinguish between the concepts of a subjective experience of free will and the ontological existence of free will. They think subjective experience is sufficient to automatically prove the latter. They see them both as one concept. So strange.

It's like a mind block. Kind of shocking to see, really.

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