liquiddandruff

liquiddandruff t1_j98v6ko wrote

it's an open question and lots of interesting work is happening at a frenetic pace here

A favourite discussed recently:

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liquiddandruff t1_j989luo wrote

the stochastic parrot argument is a weak one; we are stochastic parrots

the phenomenon of "reasoning ability" may be an emergent one that arises out of the recursive identification of structural patterns in input data--which chatgpt is shown to do.

prove that "understanding" is not and cannot ever be reducible to "statistical modelling" and only then is your null position intellectually defensible

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liquiddandruff t1_j984iw5 wrote

Reply to comment by Ulfgardleo in [D] Please stop by [deleted]

the point you're missing is we're seeing surprising emergent behaviour from LLMs

ToM is not sentience but it is a necessary condition of sentience

> it is also not clear whether what we measured here is theory of mind

crucially, since we can define ToM, definitionally this is infact what is being observed

none of the premises you've used are sufficiently strong to preclude LLMs attaining sentience

  • it is not known if interaction with the real world is necessary for the development of sentience

  • memory is important to sentience but LLMs do have a form of working memory as part of its attention architecture and inference process. is this sufficient though? no one knows

  • sentience if it has it at all may be fleeting and strictly limited during inference stage of the LLM

mind you i agree it's exceedingly unlikely that current LLMs are sentient

but to arrive to "LLMs cannot ever achieve sentience" from these weak premises combined with our of lack of understanding of sentience, a confident conclusion like that is just unwarranted.

the intellectually defensible position is to say you don't know.

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liquiddandruff t1_j8uwg7s wrote

A lot of free will proponents seem unable to distinguish between the concepts of a subjective experience of free will and the ontological existence of free will. They think subjective experience is sufficient to automatically prove the latter. They see them both as one concept. So strange.

It's like a mind block. Kind of shocking to see, really.

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liquiddandruff t1_j8uw979 wrote

> A determined reality would dictate that we wouldn't bother pretending to have free will if we didn't have it.

False. You seem to be under the assumption a determined reality cannot give rise to the illusion of free will. This is an grounded, baseless assumption you're standing on.

We are experiencing "free will" but our subjective experience of such does not automatically impart to the universe that then free will as a concept is true. If you don't see this, simply come up with any other subjective experience as example and you should reach the same conclusion.

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liquiddandruff t1_j8uu90k wrote

I subscribe to optimistic nihilism too.

> It doesn't have to be real to enjoy life, create meaning, experience things.

I'd just say here that those who say free ill is a lie, aren't saying to not enjoy life, create meaning, or experience things either.

The discourse around free will is orthogonal to all that. I tend to see a lot of people react defensively and unable to separate these concepts.

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