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Thedeaththatlives t1_j04p002 wrote

Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist

Then valuing freedom on it's own should also go against valuing reason, right? Because it's arbitrary, and thus irrational.

Basically, both "I value freedom" and "I value my own freedom" are by your own admission arbitrary values. If the latter goes against valuing reason because it's arbitrary, why doesn't the former? If the former is acceptable because you need values to have morals, why isn't the latter?

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contractualist OP t1_j052bg3 wrote

The skeptic already values freedom, hence why he's asking. You can value both freedom and reason. However, freedom isn't agent-relative. Valuing freedom in one requires valuing it universally.

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Thedeaththatlives t1_j060uyb wrote

"But it’s because the skeptic values reason as well, that they would have to have a justification to value their own freedom. They would have to have a non-arbitrary difference between their freedom and others’ freedom for them to justify valuing only their own."

By your own admission, it's not that it's impossible to value ones own freedom (which wouldn't even make sense because people clearly do that all the time), but that it would be arbitrary and thus irrational to do so, which brings us back to my question.

I think the thing here is that you believe extrinsic properties are irrational to value, but intrinsic ones are not, and I don't see a meaningful difference. Is this accurate?

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