Thedeaththatlives
Thedeaththatlives t1_j04p002 wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Then valuing freedom on it's own should also go against valuing reason, right? Because it's arbitrary, and thus irrational.
Basically, both "I value freedom" and "I value my own freedom" are by your own admission arbitrary values. If the latter goes against valuing reason because it's arbitrary, why doesn't the former? If the former is acceptable because you need values to have morals, why isn't the latter?
Thedeaththatlives t1_j01nsww wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Then what's the problem with also arbitrarily valuing the freedom you have and not the freedom someone else has? Since clearly there is no inherent problem with arbitrarily valuing things.
Thedeaththatlives t1_j00pn7a wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
Wouldn't valuing reason also be arbitrary?
Thedeaththatlives t1_iwl5plb wrote
Reply to Utilitarianism is the only option — but you have to take conscious experience seriously first by Squark09
This whole thing really just seems like a big argument from incredulity. I can very easily imagine a moral system that doesn't care about suffering at all.
Thedeaththatlives t1_iwl4y7d wrote
Reply to comment by RelativeCheesecake10 in Utilitarianism is the only option — but you have to take conscious experience seriously first by Squark09
> We just have an abstract crusade against suffering qua suffering, but we don’t assign innate value to the people we want to bring out of suffering into bliss?
I don't really see any problem with that?
Thedeaththatlives t1_ived6fo wrote
Reply to comment by jiimmyyy in Michael Shermer argues that science can determine many of our moral values. Morality is aimed at protecting certain human desires, like avoidance of harm (e.g. torture, slavery). Science helps us determine what these desires are and how to best achieve them. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Well, yeah. You said the question was the opposite, so I'm asking what that is.
Thedeaththatlives t1_ivecpp6 wrote
Reply to comment by jiimmyyy in Michael Shermer argues that science can determine many of our moral values. Morality is aimed at protecting certain human desires, like avoidance of harm (e.g. torture, slavery). Science helps us determine what these desires are and how to best achieve them. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Then what is the question?
Thedeaththatlives t1_ivc3smv wrote
Reply to comment by jiimmyyy in Michael Shermer argues that science can determine many of our moral values. Morality is aimed at protecting certain human desires, like avoidance of harm (e.g. torture, slavery). Science helps us determine what these desires are and how to best achieve them. by Ma3Ke4Li3
Well, that's the question isn't it?
Thedeaththatlives t1_j060uyb wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
"But it’s because the skeptic values reason as well, that they would have to have a justification to value their own freedom. They would have to have a non-arbitrary difference between their freedom and others’ freedom for them to justify valuing only their own."
By your own admission, it's not that it's impossible to value ones own freedom (which wouldn't even make sense because people clearly do that all the time), but that it would be arbitrary and thus irrational to do so, which brings us back to my question.
I think the thing here is that you believe extrinsic properties are irrational to value, but intrinsic ones are not, and I don't see a meaningful difference. Is this accurate?