Submitted by ActivePersona t3_11b6wx9 in technology
hodor137 t1_j9x0ilo wrote
Reply to comment by 1wiseguy in Signal CEO: We “1,000% won’t participate” in UK law to weaken encryption by ActivePersona
Not true at all. Encryption that's not intended and actually implemented to be fully sender-to-receiver can easily be subverted and readable by 3rd parties. In the messaging/signal/Whatsapp context people refer to it as "end to end encryption" but that term doesn't really say anything.
I'm not sure how exactly Signal and these other messaging apps implement their encryption, but they could easily claim end to end encryption while offering governments a "back door" to decrypt and read everyone's messages. Signal is saying they won't do that.
I've never bothered to use Signal but you either have to trust their word, or they have to do a really good job proving to you that only the end users have control of their own private encryption keys. From everything I've heard, including this, they're great and trustworthy - but you still have to trust them.
duh374 t1_j9x1a2w wrote
The difference is that signal is open source, whatsapp is not. Signal you can verify their encryption, whatsapp you just have to blindly trust.
einmaldrin_alleshin t1_j9xkeqd wrote
You can actually read out the public key from Whatsapp and use that to verify the encryption scheme.
But that would be of little use if they could extract private keys or plaintext messages from the device.
Prestigious_Push_947 t1_j9zp767 wrote
Whatsapp doesn't encrypt metadata though, which is a massive security vulnerability. There's absolutely no excuse to be using whatsapp.
carlosvega t1_j9xnebx wrote
But where is the proof that the app code is the same as GitHub code? 🤔 do they provide some hash or something?
SirCB85 t1_j9xso2m wrote
They allow you to compile your own executable kf the app from the code visible on GitHub (for Systems that allow sideloading, sorry Apple fans).
carlosvega t1_j9y2aau wrote
Yeah, that I know, but I was wondering if they publish the md5 of the apk or compiled app so that you can test later on or something. Or if it’s possible to check the md5 of the downloaded apps from the store. I am not sure why I am downvoted, I think it is a legitimate question.
Some bad guys could fork the app, add some changes and publish it in third party stores.
Something similar to this: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/malicious-python-libraries-found/
And I am not the first one asking this question:
Edit: a colleague just shared this with me! https://signal.org/blog/reproducible-android/
hodor137 t1_j9x20xo wrote
Oh yea, it's absolutely more trustworthy than Whatsapp
drawkbox t1_j9x9cnn wrote
Being open source doesn't make it secure. You can just view the code. There are tons of other attack vectors past that, CI/build, dependencies, ghost users, suveillance masquerading as moderation/spam checking and so on.
Open source libraries have been owned right in front of everyone. OpenSSL had the Heartbleed hole for years, everyone owned. Log4j/Log4Shell owned every device with Java on it including all Android phones for over a decade...
kcabnazil t1_j9xf5jy wrote
I hope noone is downvoting this because they think it is inaccurate.
It is, however, missing the point.
Being open source means you can show to have security objectively, not through obscurity. It means others can not only analyze it for weaknesses, but contribute resolution to those weaknesses as well.
Whether or not that open source code is what's really used to build an application... is another matter. I wonder if that can be objectively proved for Signal. It definitely can't be for others ;)
drawkbox t1_j9xu5tw wrote
Agreed, security through obscurity is always a bad idea. Zero trust is the only way and less third parties helps you minimize the attack vectors.
My comment here addresses some of these points
While OSS is has code to review openly, that is a good company level trust, but that also is a potential weak area where people will overly trust and let in a bad dependency that not even the company knows got compromised. It can also let you target dependencies that the code uses without even needing to steal the code. You can trust that the company that open sources will make sure their code looks good and has less holes possibly, but not always.
It has happened in OSS for decades now to the largest toolkits with the most eyes and broadest use, because that is the best way to get into systems now, via the devs who are the weak link sadly. As a dev I am blown away at the lack of awareness of devs and these issues.
alsu2launda t1_j9x2dyf wrote
No need to trust signals words, the source code is open source. You can know how every bit of data is processed for the version you are using and in what format it leaves the device.
If you don't trust the Play Store app distribution (which ideally you should not trust), compile the app from source nd you have complete control of the app as if you yourself have made the app for yourself.
Even signal can't themselves do anything fishy. The can almost give government most basic information like which time my app connect to them nd my ip because I connected to their servers.
TLDR It's not based on propriety model where you need to trust the app for what it is doing.
With signal complete privacy is in users hands and the message are encrypted when leaving the app. It's not possible for signal servers to know message content by design.
drawkbox t1_j9x9o8o wrote
Being open source does not mean it is secure. If anything it means people will overly trust it.
Open source libraries have been owned right in front of everyone. OpenSSL had the Heartbleed hole for years, everyone owned. Log4j/Log4Shell owned every device with Java on it including all Android phones for over a decade...
Opening up private messages to a third party isn't a good idea. If you are on Apple, use iMessenger. Apple can already get your info. Same on Google. Using an additional third party client, as well as a desktop client, that opens you up to all sorts of attack vectors even it you trust the company, they can be hacked. Trust leads to intrusions.
kcabnazil t1_j9xi3m9 wrote
You make good points here. Multiple, actually. Using any software or hardware means putting your trust in whoever made it. Extrapolating that into something of a strawman argument/fallacy that is still completely true, using any device you didn't personally manufacture and write all the firmware/software for is opening yourself up to insecurity. The real question is, as you allude to, "who do you trust, and how far?"
However, I'd argue the semantics of, "if anything, it means people will overly trust it."
People will overly trust anything that sells them the message they want. That includes using products from big name companies. That also means believing their IT friend Bob who says anything open source is the way to go. Little do they know, Bob also happens to be making a dollar a day on their open source but rarely scrutinized app for dog memes using your phone for cryptomining.
Apple's image of privacy for the iPhone is a mirage built on believable efforts and misleading reports. People still gulp it down eagerly. Signal's image of privacy is built on throwing themselves to the lions by being well known and showing their code; anyone and everyone with the capacity to look will look if it matters to them. It doesn't mean Signal is perfect, but it does mean they're putting everything on the line to prove they're doing the best they and every other contributor can. Both teams have track records, but only one is willing to show you what happened along the way.
That said, I find it very surprising that Signal has not gone the way of Lavabit. How have they evaded U.S. government gag orders while honoring their commitments? I assume no big company has; that's rather perposterous, honestly. Several have canaries for these situations.
drawkbox t1_j9xtvb4 wrote
I am more zero trust but if you are going to trust, trust fewer third parties. Even if trustable. Third parties get sold. Third parties need to make money from that not other ways only (Apple/Google for instance don't need you using messaging to survive).
If you are already on a browser, a password store/generator is safer without a third party involved. The OS, browser and company already have you, why involve a third party?
Same with messaging... Trusting WhatsApp/Signal/Telegram is not only another level third party, it is your most private content... why trust a funded/private equity/questionable source system if you don't have to.
Signal does appear to be the best of them, however being open is not safer always.
The new trick is dependency/build attacks, so good sometimes the main company doesn't even know it is happening (see SolarWinds that was hacked via TeamCity CI, the bad bits were being put into the dependencies at build, code was fully independently verified). The problem is blanket trust. It is what led to the OpenSSL Heartbleed hole, the Log4j/Log4Shell hole and pretty much any bit hole in the last year was part of open source.
When a company gets their source code stolen (LastPass for instance) the point is to find dependencies they can manipulate, not even the code itself. Almost all closed code uses dependencies that are open or known, and have known holes, the key there is utilizing that when you know the code flow. Open source actually makes that part easier, no need to steal source code.
I am a big OSS fan, but I hate how devs are the weak link today. Devs today are so willing to trust a third party because they heard about it or it saves a day. Those are the MOST targeted dependencies...
uwu2420 t1_j9xl3a4 wrote
There’s two big issues with iMessage that Signal solves:
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iMessage only works with iOS devices
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iMessages are end to end encrypted, BUT, they are stored in readable format in iOS backups, and since most people tend to use iCloud backups, which by default are not end to end encrypted, this is used as a back door to defeat the protection. The option to encrypt iCloud backups, Advanced Data Protection, is new and only came out a couple months ago — prior to this, there was no way at all to encrypt iCloud backups. Importantly, as a sender, you have no idea if your recipient is taking the proper precautions, and no way to enforce it.
drawkbox t1_j9xtbji wrote
Though the iMessage/iCloud backups are linked to a user and everything it keyed on that. Now they can additionally encrypt but it was always encrypted under the user.
I see this same complaint with browser password managers in the browser (not extension), they do encrypt now but they used to just by the user. You'd have to login as the user to be able to decrypt everything or access it. Things like Signal, Telegram, LastPass, Bitwarden and other third party style systems that do not encrypt by user, it is encrypted but you can break it outside the context of the user, not possible with backups, iMessage, Chrome/Safari/Edge passwords etc.
> Importantly, as a sender, you have no idea if your recipient is taking the proper precautions, and no way to enforce it.
By default Signal/Telegram both use your number and if one participant of the chat (even a 'ghost' user) isn't, or even if they are, all that data is wide open. Telegram by default has encryption off. If one of your recipients is that way, well you are wide open.
uwu2420 t1_j9xugo6 wrote
No, iCloud backups up until a couple months ago were not end to end encrypted and it was explicitly used by governments as a backdoor to get around iMessage encryption. There’s a leaked law enforcement slide about it somewhere.
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
See under “data categories and encryption”, under “standard data protection” (which was the only option up until a couple months ago, and still the default option to this day), note how iCloud backups (including both the full contents of the device, and iMessages) are not end to end encrypted.
Telegram’s encryption is a homebuilt algorithm rather than a tried and true standard (never roll your own crypto…) and as you pointed out not on by default. So it was always inferior to Signal.
Signal by default doesn’t keep its data in device backups. You’d need to build a custom client to get it to do that. There’s no way to get Signal to not end-to-end encrypt it’s chats, it’s on by default and can’t be turned off.
Edit: some more links to back this up:
https://www.howtogeek.com/710509/apples-imessage-is-secure...-unless-you-have-icloud-enabled/
And the leaked slide as I mentioned earlier:
https://www.pcmag.com/news/fbi-document-shows-how-popular-secure-messaging-apps-stack-up
drawkbox t1_j9xvw64 wrote
Good info. The leaked screenshot I wish someone had a good version of it, so small.
The point with iCloud is that it is always under the users security context, that is encrypted. The backup files themselves weren't but across the board the OS and cloud level access requires the user context, if you were to take those outside the system you'd still need the auth context.
For law enforcement that is more accessible on iCloud, but for others it is more difficult like cyber criminals or ransomware and other things.
Phone backups also don't have to go to iCloud, it is wise to for not losing content, but you can still backup to desktop or other.
The point is, they aren't a third party, they don't make money only from messaging and they have a very vested interest in making sure their system is secure from third parties. If you add a third party into the mix like on messaging, you better trust it because your OS/device already can see that AND the third party. Adding more attack vectors is really security by obscurity, but with more obscurity.
> Signal by default doesn’t keep its data in device backups. You’d need to build a custom client to get it to do that. There’s no way to get Signal to not end-to-end encrypt it’s chats, it’s on by default and can’t be turned off.
This all falls apart when a participant is added (ghost or actual) that gets the entire convo. This is very common in messaging apps and a known issue on WhatsApp, Telegram, many other ones and Signal also has the ability to attach users to convos. The moment you have another participant all the end to end encryption is moot.
Focusing on just encrypted backups is probably what third parties want people to focus on, because they are third parties and want you to use them, but even if you trust them, how long can they be trusted. When it is bought out by private equity later that can get bad. Now they might sift everything. It is alot like those VPNs that say "we retain no logs" but they divert them to a third party and when it is reviewed the logs surely aren't there, but they are still out there.
uwu2420 t1_j9xwdgk wrote
The backup files not being encrypted is the whole point though. What good is everything else being encrypted if you can just subpoena or get a copy of the backup where all of that stuff that was encrypted is in plaintext lol
> Phone backups also don’t have to go to iCloud
Yes, but it’s on by default, and the majority of users have it turned on. Advanced Data Protection means you’re giving up a lot of account recovery options so most users don’t have that on, plus it’s only ~3 months old.
> This all falls apart when a participant is added
Well.. then just don’t add participants you don’t trust to your group chats…
> Focusing on just encrypted backups
But it’s a big issue lol. See above and refer to the slides I linked in the earlier comment. Again, what good is the encryption if there’s an easily available plaintext version too?
> When it is bought out by private equity
Signal is open source and you can run your own server if you want.
drawkbox t1_j9xxebn wrote
I mean pretty much anything in a cloud should be considered secure from everything but law enforcement.
The point is you still need the user context/auth. These files only work with the OS to access them. Like an iOS app or Windows Store data/settings in an app, that is specifically signature/encrypted to your user. Outside of that context it is useless. Third party ones are usually not tied to OS/browser/app for a reason.
I think most people are worried about hackers/ransomware/criminals over law enforcement so if you use the cloud that is why people are willing to make that tradeoff. The most insecure place is the local systems most likely, very easy to compromise a user compared to Apple/Google/Microsoft. It is possible but way more difficult. You almost have to be rogue state level funded for that.
> Well.. then just don’t add participants you don’t trust to your group chats…
Sure, but there is a 'ghost' user ability. In many messengers this is used to look for spam/moderation or other potentially nefarious reasons. Any chat system that has the ability to connect more than two people has the potential for you to not see the user. This is the most common use like in honeypot apps.
Encrypted messaging app used by criminals was actually an FBI honeypot
>> The encrypted messaging app in question was called ANOM, and was installed on special smartphones that couldn’t make calls or send emails. ANOM purported to be end-to-end encrypted, meaning only the sender and receiver could view messages. In reality, every single message was passed to police, who used them to make the arrests.
Ghost users is a major problem in "secure" messaging apps. There are plausible deniability reasons for them, spam detection, moderation etc, that is the rub.
> if there’s an easily available plaintext version too?
It is only plaintext in the context of the user... Taking it out of that context it is no longer. People make this claim about browser password managers but everything is tied at the system level to the user. Sure if the person gets the user context then they can get the files unencrypted, that is how it works. That would mean everything is compromised even your "secure" third party messenger like Signal.
> Signal is open source and you can run your own server if you want.
Yes. Still doesn't mean a third party that relies on messaging only is trustable.
Apple/Google/Microsoft have a vested interest in securing all your content, you don't have to worry about them stealing messages or siphon.
All of them will be open to law enforcement most likely because there are so many attack vectors in systems and especially third parties that don't have the sophistication at the cyber security level simply due to cost.
uwu2420 t1_j9xyhri wrote
> I mean pretty much anything in a cloud should be considered secure from everything but law enforcement
Again, nope. If a cloud service is truly end to end encrypted, and designed well, nobody but the end user should be able to access the data. Yes, even if there is a subpoena.
> The point is your still need the user context
Or if you have access to the files on Apple’s server, then no user auth is required.
> These files only work with the OS to access them
Again, no. There are many commercial and open source tools that are able to read the backup file for you. Elcomsoft, iMazing and the Citizen Lab Mobile Verification Toolkit are some examples.
> Most people are worried about hackers
It wouldn’t be the first time someone’s iCloud account was hacked into.
> there is a “ghost” user ability
Show me where in the Signal code there is this functionality. Again, it’s open source, so a honeypot would be quickly found. Also, if you’re worried about state level honeypots, note that retrieving an unencrypted iCloud backup is a lot easier.
> It is only plaintext in the context of the user…
…and anyone with access to the files on Apple’s servers, which aren’t only subpoenas but also hackers, governments that don’t respect human rights, etc. which is the whole point of having end to end encryption, even the service provider themselves should not have the ability to access the data on your account.
Do you not understand the point of end to end encryption? The whole point is that nobody, not even the service provider hosting the cloud service can access your data.
drawkbox t1_j9xzevz wrote
> If a cloud service is truly end to end encrypted, and designed well, nobody but the end user should be able to access the data.
I agree this is just not the case with so many holes and side channels out there. The cloud is good for securing content from others, oversight will always find a way. Anyone that thinks otherwise is a suka.
> Or if you have access to the files on Apple’s server, then no user auth is required.
User auth still required but yeah you could hack Apple I supposed and get it. Good luck though.
> There are many commercial and open source tools that are able to read the backup file for you. Elcomsoft, iMazing and the Citizen Lab Mobile Verification Toolkit are some examples.
If those apps are getting the user context then sure. If not then no.
Take Elcomsoft for instance with LastPass vs Password managers. That is why you don't install clients or extensions, like LastPass.
Read this closely:
>> Windows Data Protection API Not Used
>> One may argue that extracting passwords stored by the Google Chrome browser is similarly a one-click affair with third-party tools (e.g. Elcomsoft Internet Password Breaker). The difference between Chrome and LastPass password storage is that Chrome makes use of Microsoft’s Data Protection API, while LastPass does not.
>> Google Chrome does, indeed, store user’s passwords. Similar to third-party password managers, the Windows edition of the Chrome browser encrypts passwords when stored. By default, the encrypted database is not protected with a master password; instead, Chrome employs the Data Protection API (DPAPI) introduced way back in Windows 2000. DPAPI uses AES-256 to encrypt the password data. In order to access passwords, one must sign in with the user’s Windows credentials (authenticating with a login and password, PIN code, or Windows Hello). As a result, Google Chrome password storage has the same level of protection as the user’s Windows login.
>> This, effectively, enables someone who knows the user’s login and password or hijacks the current session to access the stored passwords. This is exactly what we implemented in Elcomsoft Internet Password Breaker.
>> However, in order to extract passwords from Web browsers such as Chrome or Microsoft Edge, one must possess the user’s Windows login and password or hijack an authenticated session. Analyzing a ‘cold’ disk image without knowing the user’s password will not provide access to Chrome or Edge cached passwords.
>> This is not the case for the LastPass Chrome extension (the desktop app is seemingly not affected). For the LastPass database, the attacker will not need the user’s Windows login credentials of macOS account password. All that’s actually required is the file containing the encrypted password database, which can be easily obtained from the forensic disk image. Neither Windows credentials nor master password are required.
>> macOS has a built-in secure storage, the so-called keychain. The Mac version of Chrome does not use the native keychain to store the user’s passwords; neither does the iOS version. However, Chrome does store the master password in the corresponding macOS or iOS keychain, effectively providing the same level of protection as the system keychain. Elcomsoft Password Digger can decrypt the macOS keychain provided that the user’s logon credentials (or the separate keychain password) are known.
Elcomsoft mentions the OS level protections on these.
> It wouldn’t be the first time someone’s iCloud account was hacked into.
If someone gets into iCloud they are most likely getting into the device and again, the point of a "secure" messenger or cloud falls apart because they have access to their user. Yes, people should be careful with their user, it opens up everything.
> not even the service provider hosting the cloud service can access your data.
If you believe this then you believe in magic. Even if a provider tried to do this, software has holes... See OpenSSL/Log4j/Log4Shell/on and on and on and on... The fact that you trusted it because they said they don't look, it was probably a lie, but even if it wasn't they can get in.
uwu2420 t1_j9y02jf wrote
Yeah I agree there are always vulnerabilities in software, but the thing is, as far as I know, there aren’t any known bugs that would leak data from Signal so far despite all the security research attention it gets, and plenty of evidence that it’s safe.
Meanwhile, I’ve already explained how it’s trivial to get around the end to end nature of iMessage for a large majority of users.
If you don’t care about your conversation being end to end encrypted, then yes, by all means, use iMessage or even just plain SMS. Much easier. But if you do care, I’m not sure why you’d shoot yourself in the foot with the option known to have a major workaround.
drawkbox t1_j9y2ig6 wrote
Signal definitely seems the best out of them if you are into using a third party messenger, for now.
I would still trust the OS level messaging on mobile over third parties because of the scale, future funding, incentives and trust. The OS already has access to your info. Other people getting access to your data is probably always easier on third party systems, even if the third party is trustable, not ever person or dependency is.
iMessage is secure, if you are going straight SMS yes that is more open. I also know what Apple wants and their goals fully, that is a secure platform that isn't just messaging.
The fact is though, every system has holes and security issues, so the best opsec is less third parties, big or small or open or closed...
Just ask Jeff Bezos after he got hacked via WhatsApp temp hole by something sent to him by freaking MBS.
uwu2420 t1_j9y3ix1 wrote
The thing you’re missing is, if you’re using Signal you specifically want an end to end encrypted chat service.
The OS doesn’t upload that data in unencrypted form. You can analyze for yourself with a MITM proxy.
iMessage is secure, as long as you don’t care for your messages remaining end to end encrypted, and you trust Apple to have a copy of your messages. Is that reasonable to you? Maybe, maybe not.
With Signal, the whole idea is you shouldn’t have to trust Signal with your messages, because they don’t have the ability to read them, even if they wanted to. Yes, it could have holes like any software, so this can really be simplified to: use the tool with a known issue for sure, vs use the tool that might have an issue in the future but for now is known to be safe.
drawkbox t1_j9y44d1 wrote
> end to end encrypted chat service
End to end means nothing though when a client isn't in your control and may have another user attached. Again, common in many messaging apps.
iMessage is end to end encryption to iMessage, just like Signal to Signal. If you use SMS it is not.
> We designed iMessage to use end-to-end encryption, so there's no way for Apple to decrypt the content of your conversations when they are in transit between devices. Attachments you send over iMessage (such as photos or videos) are encrypted so that no one but the sender and receiver(s) can access them
Apple can't magically make SMS secure, it is not secure by default as it was really from telephone diagnostics and repurposed for messaging. So when you message Android it goes SMS. SMS was from SS7 and really only for diagnostic or messages to customers for testing. MMS is better but still not that great. Apple should bring iMessage to Android and do better on messengers, it is leading many people to third parties that open up opsec issues.
> With Signal, the whole idea is you shouldn’t have to trust Signal with your messages, because they don’t have the ability to read them, even if they wanted to.
That is a bold statement. Yes, on the surface. Again, ghost users, compromised clients, endpoints can have problems. Also Signal does have a proprietary shim for monitoring, spam checking and other things, could easily be used to surveil or sift. There are probably a dozen ways or more to get around it currently at the dependency level or breaking their encryption as it is custom.
The best opsec is always less third parties.
uwu2420 t1_j9y4q7s wrote
We can assume the majority of people go with the default settings. iMessage conversations, by default, end up in a backup file on iCloud that is not end to end encrypted. Signal conversations, by default, do not.
> We designed iMessage to use end-to-end encryption
Which again is worthless when a plaintext version is also being uploaded in the form of iCloud backups, which are on by default. The same isn’t true for Signal.
You’ll have to provide a source for your claims about Signal’s ghost users. As far as a compromised client, that’s not something any messaging client can defend against, and if a service is end to end encrypted, it shouldn’t matter if the endpoint server is entirely compromised.
> breaking their encryption as it is custom
That’s the cool part, it’s not. It’s based on the same old algorithms that have been around for years. ECDSA, ECDH, AES, etc. if I remember correctly
It depends on your definition of opsec but just a reminder that we’re in a thread about Signal and end to end encryption specifically.
drawkbox t1_j9y5gri wrote
You dismiss user level auth/encryption like it is nothing. If anyone had access to user level auth why go to the backup file, just go to the device, load up Signal and scrape their messages.
All other messaging apps have the "ghost user" problem confirmed.
Signal has a shim for spam that is very unclear, I'll just say that. There are other things around Signal that make is sus in my opinion.
> The source code for spam detection is not public.
So there is a plausible deniability reason to hide some code... you have to trussssst. Here's the kicker, you can't check for spam if you aren't seeing the message.
Even on the self installed versions...
> Signal's servers are partially open source, but the server software's anti-spam component is proprietary and closed source due to security concerns
Signal does handle users being added better, but this could just be theater as well.
> The real problem with the GCHQ proposal is that it targets a weakness in messaging/calling systems that’s already well-known to providers, and moreover, a weakness that providers have been working to close — perhaps because they’re worried that someone just like GCHQ (or probably, much worse) will try to exploit it. By making this proposal, the folks at GCHQ have virtually guaranteed that those providers will move much, much faster on this.
> And they have quite a few options at their disposal. Over the past several years researchers have proposed several designs that offer transparency to users regarding which keys they’re obtaining from a provider’s identity service. These systems operate by having the identity service commit to the keys that are associated with individual users, such that it’s very hard for the provider to change a user’s keys (or to add a device) without everyone in the world noticing.
> As mentioned above, advanced messengers like Signal have “submerged” the group chat management into the encrypted communications flow, so that the server cannot add new users without the digitally authenticated approval of one of the existing participants. This design, if ported to in more popular services like WhatsApp, would seem to kill the GCHQ proposal dead.
I personally don't trust Signal for a few reasons beyond these items, but if you trust them then rock on.
uwu2420 t1_j9y65ub wrote
> You dismiss user level auth
To scrape my Signal messages, you need access to my physical device, and you need my passcode. To get access to iMessage messages, all you need to do is get my latest backup, or the backup of the person I talked to, off of Apple’s servers, for example, with a legal request, which completely bypasses the need for any user level auth/encryption.
Agree to disagree
drawkbox t1_j9y8ajk wrote
> To scrape my Signal messages, you need access to my physical device, and you need my passcode.
Same with getting access to your iCloud/Apple account.
> To get access to iMessage messages, all you need to do is get my latest backup, or the backup of the person I talked to, off of Apple’s servers, for example, with a legal request, which completely bypasses the need for any user level auth/encryption.
As I said, anything stored in a cloud will have some oversight. Anyone that thinks storing something in a cloud is secure from oversight is dim.
If you think anyone from enforcement can just get your iCloud/Apple account, that would also mean they are able to access your device and everything on it including your "encrypted end to end" Signal messages that are plaintext on your client.
Messaging apps also get cam/mic/location/contacts permissions, Signal is no different, one more entity with your face/voice/place/friends.
You can trust Signal, a third party, rock on. Acton is involved in both, from WhatsApp, went to Facebook, and then when people stopped trusting Facebook he made Signal to catch those leaving. The story is he didn't trust Facebook, no one should, but can you trust Signal/Acton or is it a front. You decide. Problem is you trust them so much they got ya. I mean Elon Musk and Edward Snowden recommend it... is must be safe /s. Signal is maybe safe, maybe safe from some five eyes, but not all eyes not in the five. Even then, there are always ways to get in via dependencies and devs (mainly devops) are the weak link today sadly.
Agree to disagree, good discussion though.
uwu2420 t1_j9y8y3c wrote
> Same with getting access to your iCloud/Apple account
No you don’t, because it is stored unencrypted on Apple servers and Apple themselves will give it to you (for example, with a legal request). If you go this route, you don’t need the physical device or any of the user’s passwords. The user won’t even know it’s happened until they are told.
The difference is in one case, my password and my physical device is needed. If you want that, you’ll have to physically get my device from me, and then get me to tell you my passcode. The other is just stored on Apple’s servers. If you don’t see how one is much harder than the other, I dunno what to tell you lol
Edit: no need to believe me, believe American law enforcement instead and refer to the leaked slide I posted earlier.
drawkbox t1_j9y9geb wrote
Unencrypted behind being encrypted by the user context... so yes, not double encrypted. You can encrypt it though.
Messaging apps also get cam/mic/location/contacts permissions, Signal is no different, one more entity with your face/voice/place/friends.
We definitely agreed to disagree.
hodor137 t1_j9x2p2w wrote
But you DO need to trust what they're doing, unless you take the steps you mentioned.
alsu2launda t1_j9x47q2 wrote
You are not forced to trust them. You can if you want to do things conveniently.
If you truly want it use its value then you must do it the correct way it should be done. Ideally you must compile your apps if you don't want to trust the distributor. There is no other option.
Propriety apps don't have their source code public so they could be collecting God knows what data and sending to the servers back at the company.
It shows the flaw in Google Play Store way of distribution of apps rather than signals.
Heijoshinn t1_j9xn8e9 wrote
Bruh.. Lol
You clearly don't understand how encryption works to be commenting on the subject matter. Especially when you openly admitted:
> I'm not sure how exactly Signal and these other messaging apps implement their encryption
For starters, both Signal and WhatsApp use the Signal Protocol: an encryption standard that was engineered by Signal in-house. Also, Signal is open source meaning that anyone can verify their source code on how the app was constructed. Signal wouldn't tamper with their code and even if they did, Signal is set up in such a way that any adversary that wanted to snoop would need the device itself to discover the messages.
Do more research my friend.
happyscrappy t1_j9x2it3 wrote
You can't offer a back door without risk that others will use it.
If you produce messages that can be read by two keys, the recipient or key XYZ which is held by the UK government then anyone who gets that XYZ key can decrypt every message.
On top of that, the politics of back doors are just too problematic. If you give the UK a back door then Russia can come to you and demand one too. Any government, by establishing a precedent that they get a back door opens up to services giving access to their enemies too.
1wiseguy t1_j9x9z7v wrote
There's no such thing as a secure back door.
A back door is code for "other people can read your message that you thought was secure".
hodor137 t1_j9xcga4 wrote
I didn't say it was secure, or good. My point was that just because "encryption" is used doesn't mean there can't be a back door that prevents a 3rd party from reading your messages.
1wiseguy t1_j9xiysd wrote
A back door literally means a third party can read your message.
In theory, it's a good third party, but there's no way to be sure of that.
Heijoshinn t1_j9xom8a wrote
I replied to another comment of yours regarding encryption. But this statement you made gives much more clarity on your issue of "trust" in [insert company here].
Encryption works depending on it's implementation. Take AES for example. It's a standard that's wisely recognized and widely used by virtually everyone on the encryption scene. As a result, it's been tested, used in multitude of ways and is regularly attempted to be broken. That's because AES is the standard. Since this is the case, it's less likely to have side channel attack weakness due to it's wide spread application and audit.
Compare that to something like TwoFish. It's strong like AES and is built differently. You could use this method of encryption and likely be safe. However, it's not widely used. This means it's likely not audited or scrutinized as much as AES and since it's not used as much, it's implementation is also at higher risk of side channel attacks. Without players routinely executing TwoFish encryption, it's level of progress is much lower than AES by comparison. This doesn't mean TwoFish is necessarily inferior but that it doesn't have the "run time" that AES has.
FriendlyDespot t1_j9xcpel wrote
> I'm not sure how exactly Signal and these other messaging apps implement their encryption, but they could easily claim end to end encryption while offering governments a "back door" to decrypt and read everyone's messages.
You should have stopped at "I'm not sure how exactly Signal and these other messaging apps implement their encryption," because you go on to say something that's completely wrong. Signal can't decrypt anyone's messages. The devices that are talking to each other across Signal's infrastructure use local public and private keys that Signal as a company doesn't possess.
The most that Signal could do is make the Signal software take the cleartext messages after decryption and send them somewhere, but the Signal applications are open and auditable, and something like that would be discovered, and would mean the death of the company.
hodor137 t1_j9xdcqg wrote
Or they could simply have the app upload your keys to their server.
But as others have pointed out, they open source their code so they can't do this without everyone finding out.
My point was really that the comment I was replying to was dumb - just because you have "encryption" doesn't mean no one will ever read your messages. The keys that can decrypt those encrypted messages must also be kept safe.
FriendlyDespot t1_j9xdldu wrote
> Or they could simply have the app upload your keys to their server.
That wouldn't make much sense, because the keys are ephemeral, so you'd have to upload about as many keys as there'd be messages.
Amazing-Cicada5536 t1_j9xkuhw wrote
If it’s e2e encrypted then by definition no middle man can access the unencrypted data, only the two ends. No matter how much the server/government/anyone listens in. Of course they can still get the data after the decryption on one end, so the sending device has to be trusted itself.
drawkbox t1_j9x90wo wrote
They have the ability to attach ghost users, the reason they say is moderation/spam, but no backdoor needed with that. The ghost user is able to decrypt like a regular user and syphon out the info.
This was proven with WhatsApp not too long ago and Signal also has the ability to attach users.
Any "secure" encrypted messenger that allows more than 1 to 1 connections will always have the potential for the "ghost user" problem.
System level some use additional connections/recipients for spam/moderation and the moment you allow any invisible/visible group users in, there is a massive potential for an exploit.
Additionally you have the potential for forking off messaging to other users at the system level for either oversight or spam/moderation/other. Some of the compromised systems out there use this very well.
A sneaky way some of these "secure" messaging apps are also doing this is ghost participants in the chat that can essentially syphon off the messages even without a compromised client. The ghost participant is always under the guise of moderation or anti-spam or telemetry or some other proprietary shim.
Lots of "secure" messaging apps do this for intel and surveillance and not just the white hats.
Other areas that "secure" messaging apps have holes in is the anti-spam/moderation systems that need to view messages and in the clients themselves who have access to the unencrypted content. This is also taking place in other client apps as well: VPN, password managers, extensions, wallets, even build systems and more. Many like VPNs have logs sent elsewhere but deleted locally -- access to entire machine and all network access. People are way too trusting of "secure" systems/apps that are very common today based on trust.
All of these apps/systems would pass code checks, reviews, security inspections and essentially be encrypted/"secure" though a copy is sent off to another area for review. At runtime the leak is in the direction of the data.
Then you also have governmental oversight that opens up holes that can be exploited.
On Ghost Users and Messaging Backdoors
> to add a “ghost user” (or in some cases, a “ghost device”) to an existing group chat or calling session. In systems where group membership can be modified by the provider infrastructure, this could mostly be done via changes to the server-side components of the provider’s system.
> I say that it could mostly be done server-side, because there’s a wrinkle. Even if you modify the provider infrastructure to add unauthorized users to a conversation, most existing E2E systems do notify users when a new participant (or device) joins a conversation. Generally speaking, having a stranger wander into your conversation is a great way to notify criminals that the game’s afoot or what have you, so you’ll absolutely want to block this warning.
> While the GCHQ proposal doesn’t go into great detail, it seems to follow that any workable proposal will require providers to suppress those warning messages at the target’s device. This means the proposal will also require changes to the client application as well as the server-side infrastructure.
> (Certain apps like Signal are already somewhat hardened against these changes, because group chat setup is handled in an end-to-end encrypted/authenticated fashion by clients. This prevents the server from inserting new users without the collaboration of at least one group participant. At the moment, however, both WhatsApp and iMessage seem vulnerable to GCHQ’s proposed approach.)
Other messengers also have issues.
Signal + Telegram
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Default settings in Telegram aren’t encrypted, same with Signal
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Both sides of a Signal or Telegram conversation have to both have the encryption on
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Anti-spam filter has to check actual content (proprietary and third party in some cases)
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Shrouded spectator connections to your chat that may not be visible to you -- part of moderation/spam proprietary hooks. You could have a perfectly clean secure software platform that can still be exposed via normal usage to get data on client or with someone that has access to your comms unencrypted.
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Connected through your phone number and also your location which narrows it down to exactly you, this is more damning than using ADID, UDID or MAC as this WILL follow you across everything.
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Users have to be identity validated before they use the app beyond ID bridging.
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They might be bought someday by someone more unscrupulous with data, all that history going to a private equity firm.
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Clients have full access to unencrypted data, as well as the server with private keys
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Even if you trust them now they may not be trustable in the future, see LastPass for an example or Auth0 or ad blockers/extensions or VPNs or even password managers that you trust. All of those need a client on your machine that will have access to elevated permissions and your unencrypted data as they are clients.
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Source code is delayed after builds. Open doesn't mean much to the end binary if they are putting in proprietary areas and the hash/checksum will be different all the time. Who knows what is in it.
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Signal gets location, number, identity and more and where you are at. Extreme example: if they know when you shit, they can stage a robbery from third party actors and craigslist style contractors while you’re taking a dump, technically. They know when you’re out for the evening.
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Also if you have location tracking off they still have IP and device identifier as well as geofenced notifications that don't need the location permission always on. Geofenced location can wake up the app at any time.
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Signal is recommended by Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, Jack Dorsey and Elon Musk as well as many other potentially sketchy people. Originally these guys were played nice but the people behind them are sketch (Elon being authoritarian funded for instance). Edward Snowden is in Russia and Glenn Greenwald can't say a bad word about Putin. Sketchy that they are the featured testimonials as well as people connected to them.
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Telegram is funded by Pavel Durov who is essentially Russia's Zuckerberg who is also authoritarian funded. Durov made VK (Russia's Facebook from same MailRU/DST Global funding) and then made their "secure" messenger. Brian Acton ran WhatsApp, bought by Zuckerberg, then made Signal a "secure" messenger. Similar story, same sketchiness even if Signal is less sketchy than Facebook/WhatsApp/Telegram. If someone from Facebook/Meta broke off now and created a "secure" messenger would you believe it and use it now? nah. You think the guys that build social media surveillance aren't just better at it with messengers, a big risk. Alarm bells should be going off if you have good opsec.
There are NO secure messaging apps, none, unless you wrote your own encryption and shared it with the third party and encrypted before sending outside of that system entirely. If you send an email, that had like PGP that would have worked for a while until the backdoor (Phil Zimmerman was in decades long cases relate to this). But if you make your own encryption and are sending messages in the clear you will get visits so really only military/intel are allowed that. Spy/intel agencies do that all the time but they shroud the messages in content like in the Illegals Program
There is a reason why these "secure" messengers all exploded in the 2010s...
If you think that there are any secure messengers, you are naive. There is always a way to get access to the input, side channel or through a temporary/targeted hole like how Russia/Saudis/MBS/Trump did with Bezos and WhatsApp. That is another area where these "secure" messengers are compromised, in targeted attacks or temporary holes which just happened recently where 1900 people were compromised and they were targeting 3 numbers in it. There is also the social hole where any member of that chat would also have copies.
> Among the 1,900 phone numbers, the attacker explicitly searched for three numbers, and we’ve received a report from one of those three users that their account was re-registered.
veritanuda t1_ja0jogp wrote
> This was proven with WhatsApp not too long ago and Signal also has the ability to attach users.
That maybe true for Whatsapp but Signal has worked hard to tackle that.
Adding users to groups is not possible unless they are already in your contacts in the first place, as Signal pull contacts from your local contacts. But they never share the number, and only if other people have that same number already in their contacts will it be show to both parties.
edit:
> Default settings in Telegram aren’t encrypted, same with Signal
That is plain wrong. Telegram does not encrypt by default and not at all in channels. Signal ALWAYS encrypts for one to one and for group chats.
I am not going to go through picking apart all you said, suffice to say not all of it is accurate.
drawkbox t1_ja27hqu wrote
The content is accurate, the opinion is based on the findings and additional inputs.
The less third parties you have the better the opsec.
Messaging apps also get cam/mic/location/contacts permissions, Signal is no different, one more entity with your face/voice/place/friends.
You are free to keep using Signal, but trusting a third party messenger is really, really risky.
Agree to disagree.
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