You’re not predicting the shape of the terrain based on the map anymore than you’re predicting what someone’s face looks like based on a photo.

Someone else already created the map and took the photo, it requires no prediction on the reader’s part, and a map itself cannot predict because it is an inanimate objects.

A map is not predicting anything, it is a graphic representation of the earth’s surface. A map is a record of the terrain. A map is not created by getting to the edge of a known territory and then extrapolating what might exist in the unknown regions. That’s just not how maps are created. It’s not.

The person holding the map can use the map to understand what the earth will look like when they get to the portion of the terrain the map is meant to represent. Sure, as roads move, buildings change, and construction continues, maps become out of date, but at that point, the map is no longer a representation of the terrain. It doesn’t predict where the roads might move to, what the buildings will look like in ten years, or how a new hill might form. Once the terrain is no longer described by the map, the map ceases to be a map of the terrain and is a historical document of what it used to be.

The analogy works to describe the difference between perception of reality (the map) and reality (the terrain) as a metaphor for a useful representation of an underlying fact of reality without literally being the reality. Beyond that, different analogies are needed.

So.. the results of experiments depend on how you define the terms used in the experiment? I’m other news…

>Prediction of the unknown is the only worthwhile property of a map.

Not according to the original commenter. If it’s any purpose of a map, predicting the unknown might literally be the last objective of a map. Maps are straightforwardly and primarily about recording what has already been discovered.

The analogy basically works, until you use it to say the opposite of what the objects in the analogy are really for.

Yeah, ole Chrissy Columbus, and countless others, tried that.

The map analogy really doesn’t hold up when you bring up “prediction of the unknown.” A map only gets its lines and colors from what’s observed in the territory.

I worded that very poorly. What I should have said was, voluntary action doesn’t require libertarian free will. Then, as I kept trying to explain more, I realized I don’t even think ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ really make sense in a deterministic/random universe.

>So I’m not really sure of your point.

My point was that free will means you could have acted differently given the same exact set of circumstances, genetics, environment, so on, because of some force that can act on the universe without detection. Involuntary means the person wouldn’t normally do that action except for a very small set of circumstances, usually because of threat to safety or life.

>most people would use the term free will in that context?

I’m not sure what the conventional use of the term ‘free will’ has to do with metaphysics. See the conventional use of “begging the question” for why lay use of philosophy jargon is not always helpful.

I think in the context of free will discussion, voluntary action isn’t the same as free will. Even a robot can have a goal to do a thing as a matter of its pre-programming, but if another thing interrupts that action and the robot is made to do something different, it is no longer totally voluntary. The robot had a plan of action but had to change that plan because of circumstances outside of its control. Free will is not required for voluntary action.

Someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of making money versus someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of surviving against the person who ordered them at gun point to kidnap have very different degrees of voluntary action. The causes of their doing the kidnapping say something about the person’s propensity for voluntarily engaging in anti-social behavior.

If someone publishes, their work is suspect. All work is suspect, no matter who says it or why - that's the whole point of the scientific method.

The only way to verify suspect information is using the scientific method, not through an interrogation of the author. The scientific method works just the same for true and false information and for claims made by good and bad people.

When a paper is published announcing a discovery or it happens to be the first confirmation of some theory, it isn't then touted as fact because the author has a track-record or does charity work and passes the vibe/integrity check.

>The identification of integrity as essential to information's validity is quite telling.

But is it? The information is either true or false, no matter who communicates the information.

>Science relies on accurate information to make actual advances.

That's true, but is the author's integrity important to whether the information is true or false? Is there a real difference between a bad actor reporting that 1+1=3 and a good-natured scientist accidentally reporting the same falsehood? From either source, anyone can run their own experiment to test the hypothesis. Information is the material of science, not the people making the claims.

From the article:

>"This important role of trust in science, however, is not new. Ever since the emergence of science, scientists had to rely on the work and the testimony of their peers and others in order to make progress... The production of scientific knowledge is not, and never has been, an individual, but a collaborative affair.

Equivocating 'trusting that a fellow scientist isn't fabricating data' to 'trust in science' is so infuriating. Those are two totally different things. The reason I trust in the scientific method is because it tests hypothesis, gathers data, conducts experiments, and reproduces results. I don't "trust in science" because Richard Dawkins is just a great guy who could never tell a lie, I trust in science because any Joe Six Pack could pick up the journal article, recreate the experiment, test the hypothesis, and confirm or deny the results. After so many confirmations or denials, who am I to distrust the science?

>While I agree on the popularity of these terms, I'm not particularly fond of relying on popularity as an argument for or against something of this nature.

I'm not either. I'm commenting on your question of "Why do you assume we live in a reality of "is" and not a reality of "ought?" I am not the person you asked that to, but I figured I'd answer anyways. I am assuming, as I'm sure the other person does, too, that there definitely is an "is" to the world. If I'm making assumptions, I'll assume away the thing that seems the most obvious until I hear something that makes it questionable.

>"the fulfillment of desires" sounds very much like an "ought" to me, not an "is"

When I say desires, I mean it in the broadest, evolutionary sense possible, something like "material, emotions, and stimulation the organism wants/needs/desires for survival, health, and happiness." It's hard to call those things an "ought" because dogs obviously want things, they even need things to survive, but to say the dog "ought" to seek out the game of fetch seems weird, just as it seems weird to say a dog ought to eat to survive, unless you just mean an if/then if it wants to survive, then it should eat. The dog just "is" wanting to play fetch, in the same way my want for equal treatment under the law is a chain of conclusions stemming from my desire to be happy and healthy in the world, and that desire to be happy and healthy just "is" what I desire.

>You talk about the physical reality of "is" being something tangible that we can perceive through our senses... Yet you're also labeling Sally's desires as an "is", which seems to undermine your initial point about "is".

"Ought" arises when one questions what they should be desiring, as in what is a "good" thing to desire. The question pretends that a person is able to control what makes them happy and healthy. People just desire to be happy and healthy, and the nature of what makes someone happy is not under their control, just as the desire to be fulfilled/happy/healthy/survive isn't under their control. It just is a truth or a false that one desires this or that, that ABC leads to XYZ. The "ought" is if one should desire this or that, but that assumes one can control their desires, and I have yet to see a convincing argument for free will.

>While I tend to agree that "ought" cannot really come from "is"

If one means "ought" to mean "if you want this, then you ought to do that", then I think you can craft an "is" from "ought." If you want to solve world hunger, then you ought to do things that further that goal.

>I wonder why everyone assumes that the starting point is "is" and not "ought".

As I said, the reality of the universe seems to really be really real, and there really seems to be some kind of real set of rules that really determines how things play out in this reality. There is no equivalent overwhelmingly obvious set of rules for the "ought reality."

>Because I think "is" can come from "ought". And I also don't think it's terribly challenging to imagine a world originating from "ought" not "is".

I think it's very hard to imagine an "is" that derives from "ought" because if there is no "is" to begin, then there is no "is" to behave how it "ought" to behave. If there is an "ought," which I don't believe really exists, it must be proceeded by an "is" that can do what it ought. Edit: Re-reading this, I guess if we can imagine that "ought" exists somewhere, that there is a 'Higgs boson field of morality' that we just haven't discovered yet, then I supposed it could exist before, after, or come to exist exactly at the same time as everything else.

Because there is a physical reality of “is” that we have access to through our senses (being a brain in a vat notwithstanding). In general, many people agree on what “is” about the world.

There is no similar sense perception for “ought,” and in general, people do not agree on what they call an “ought.”

It seems an easy assumption that there “is” something about reality, but maybe not an “ought” considering the imbalance of assurance.

I also think desires are an “is” about the world, and to maximize the fulfillment of desires is a question of “is.” Sally desires justice, happiness, comfort, and other things. It’s a question of, if Sally does ABC and maybe convinces others to do ABC, then the world will be XYZ, where XYZ is a world that fulfills Sally’s desires. Pragmatically, XYZ should fulfill most other people’s desires because other people won’t want to do ABC if it doesn’t meet their desires.