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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rf5pd wrote

Reply to comment by HippyHitman in Free Will Is Only an Illusion if You Are, Too by greghickey5

>Legality doesn’t imply truth.

I just refer to the legal system since they have good high quality analysis of free will which matches up to most people's intuitions around free will. It also lines up with what most philosophers think.

>Let’s compare two scenarios: in one you program a robot to kill someone,

Not sure here, how do you define a robot's desires?

If we switch it out to be a person, and say they have the genetics and upbringing to make them a violent killer. If they had the desire to kill someone and voluntary acted on that then it would be of their own free will.

> in the other you program a robot to cut people’s hair but it has a horrible malfunction and kills someone.

Well that's not in line with their desires and isn't a voluntary action, so wouldn't be of it's free will.

>If you agree that humans are essentially no different from robots, then it follows that we can’t have free will regardless of what any court or law says.

Sounds like you are talking about libertarian free will, and sure people don't have libertarian free will, but that doesn't matter since most people are really talking about compatibilist intuitions, which we do have.

What people really mean by free will is the same thing the courts are talking about. They aren't talking about the libertarian free will you are using.

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HippyHitman t1_j8rg9mj wrote

This doesn’t seem like a logical argument to me. It seems like you’re just saying humans tend to believe we have free will, and our society is based upon that assumption.

I’m arguing that the assumption is incorrect.

Where would we draw the line between free will and compulsion? It has to be arbitrary, just like you noted about a robot’s desires. An automaton desires nothing other than following its programming, so anything a robot does successfully would be an exercise of free will. But I don’t think anybody would actually argue that, they’d argue it’s an exercise of the programmer’s free will. Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?

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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rrx36 wrote

>This doesn’t seem like a logical argument to me. It seems like you’re just saying humans tend to believe we have free will, and our society is based upon that assumption.

I'm saying that humans use the compatibilist definition of free will. Hence it makes sense to talk about compatibilist free will rather than libertarian free will.

I'm saying it's illogical to use the incoherent concept of libertarian free will.

>Where would we draw the line between free will and compulsion?

It would depend on the facts and I like to look at the legal system, which does this all the time.

In cases like R. v. Ruzic, they looked at the facts and determined they were coerced and hence didn't have free will.

In the case of Powell v Texas, where they tried a defence that it wasn't of their own free will since they were an alcoholic. While this argument shows they didn't have libertarian freewill. The courts didn't accept this argument and it was found they did have free will. So they did distinguish between free will and compulsion in this case.

>It has to be arbitrary

Just like pretty much every high level concept. Even the concept of "life" is arbitrary with many blurred lines. But just because the concept of life is arbitrary doesn't mean it isn't useful or that we can't apply in the context of humans.

>, just like you noted about a robot’s desires. An automaton desires nothing other than following its programming, so anything a robot does successfully would be an exercise of free will. But I don’t think anybody would actually argue that, they’d argue it’s an exercise of the programmer’s free will. Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?

​

>Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?

Maybe that's the main difference. We aren't programmed with a clear simple goal of killing someone, whereas the robot was.

If you change the example of just making the angry and violent, then if the robot following these goals kills someone, I think it is fairly similar to the human case.

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CruxCapacitors t1_j8t1c7h wrote

I dislike your focus on the legal use of "free will" because the legal system, particularly in the US (which is where you're citing cases from), has a very poor, punitive prison system that has terrible recidivism rates. I can't help but feel that if more people realized that compatibilism is flawed, we might be able to better rehabilitate people.

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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8t4336 wrote

>I dislike your focus on the legal use of "free will" because the legal system

If you read the legal judgements around free will you'll see that they have an amazing grasp and understanding of the subject. They are as good if not better than most stuff philosophers write on the subject.

I like looking at the legal approach since is a nice realistic approach and understanding of the world that makes sense rather than an incoherent idea that isn't applicable to the reality we live in.

​

>I can't help but feel that if more people realized that compatibilism is flawed, we might be able to better rehabilitate people.

Having a more rehabilitative justice system has absolutely nothing to do with the fact the justice system is based on compatibilist free will. So that's just a non argument.

Any functioning justice system which focuses on rehabilitation needs to also use compatibilist free will to work.

In fact studies suggest the justice system would likely be even worse without compatibilist free will.

>These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0091572#s1>
>
>For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008) From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society. https://www.academia.edu/15691341/Free_to_punish_A_motivated_account_of_free_will_belief?utm_content=buffercd36e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>A study suggests that when people are encouraged to believe their behavior is predetermined — by genes or by environment — they may be more likely to cheat. The report, in the January issue of Psychological Science, describes two studies by Kathleen D. Vohs of the University of Minnesota and Jonathan W. Schooler of the University of British Columbia.

From https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19beha.html?scp=5&sq=psychology%20jonathan%20schooler&st=cse

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BroadShoulderedBeast t1_j8rks0a wrote

I think in the context of free will discussion, voluntary action isn’t the same as free will. Even a robot can have a goal to do a thing as a matter of its pre-programming, but if another thing interrupts that action and the robot is made to do something different, it is no longer totally voluntary. The robot had a plan of action but had to change that plan because of circumstances outside of its control. Free will is not required for voluntary action.

Someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of making money versus someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of surviving against the person who ordered them at gun point to kidnap have very different degrees of voluntary action. The causes of their doing the kidnapping say something about the person’s propensity for voluntarily engaging in anti-social behavior.

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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8roxdi wrote

>I think in the context of free will discussion, voluntary action isn’t the same as free will.

I didn't say it was the same.

>Someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of making money versus someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of surviving against the person who ordered them at gun point to kidnap have very different degrees of voluntary action. The causes of their doing the kidnapping say something about the person’s propensity for voluntarily engaging in anti-social behavior.

Even if you don't use the word "free will", you are using the concept to distinguish between these two situations. So I'm not really sure of your point.

You accept that there is a difference between the situations. Do you also accept the legal system and most people would use the term free will in that context?

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BroadShoulderedBeast t1_j8uufed wrote

I worded that very poorly. What I should have said was, voluntary action doesn’t require libertarian free will. Then, as I kept trying to explain more, I realized I don’t even think ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ really make sense in a deterministic/random universe.

>So I’m not really sure of your point.

My point was that free will means you could have acted differently given the same exact set of circumstances, genetics, environment, so on, because of some force that can act on the universe without detection. Involuntary means the person wouldn’t normally do that action except for a very small set of circumstances, usually because of threat to safety or life.

>most people would use the term free will in that context?

I’m not sure what the conventional use of the term ‘free will’ has to do with metaphysics. See the conventional use of “begging the question” for why lay use of philosophy jargon is not always helpful.

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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8x2kpk wrote

>Then, as I kept trying to explain more, I realized I don’t even think ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ really make sense in a deterministic/random universe.

I use the word voluntary since it's also used by incompatibilists like Sam Harris.

So Harris gives the example of deliberately shaking your hand as a voluntary action and your hand shaking as a result of Parkinson's as an involuntary action.

In theory we could do brain scans to differentiate the kinds of actions which are voluntary and involuntary.

So lets just use the words as defined by medical science.

I assume you agree there is a manful different between someone hitting you on purpose vs having an epileptic fit. That difference is what people normally mean by voluntary and involuntary actions.

>My point was that free will means you could have acted differently given the same exact set of circumstances, genetics, environment, so on,

Libertarian free will would mean that, but I'm talking about compatibilist free which doesn't doesn't.

>I’m not sure what the conventional use of the term ‘free will’ has to do with metaphysics. See the conventional use of “begging the question” for why lay use of philosophy jargon is not always helpful.

My point is that most lay people have compatibilist intuitions, most professional philosophers are outright compatibilists, pretty much all moral, court and justice systems are based on compatibilist free will.

>Most professional philosophers are compatibilists https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all

Why on the earth would someone use some metaphysical definition of free will, "libertarian free will", which is only really used by some amateur philosophers? It has zero relevance to what most people actually mean by the term, and has zero relevance or impact on the world in which we live.

I want to talk about the definition of free will which most people really mean, the term used by most professional philosophers, the the definition used by moral systems, court and justice systems around the world. I want to use the definition which is relevant to the world in which we live.

So if you want to talk about metaphysics which has zero relevance to the world in which we live, then you should make it clear. Because when people say that free will doesn't exist it confuses lay people. When you confuse people then it leads to people being more racist, immoral, etc.

​

>These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0091572#s1>
>
>For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008)
>
>From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society. https://www.academia.edu/15691341/Free_to_punish_A_motivated_account_of_free_will_belief?utm_content=buffercd36e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
>
>From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>A study suggests that when people are encouraged to believe their behavior is predetermined — by genes or by environment — they may be more likely to cheat. The report, in the January issue of Psychological Science, describes two studies by Kathleen D. Vohs of the University of Minnesota and Jonathan W. Schooler of the University of British Columbia.
>
>From https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19beha.html?scp=5&sq=psychology%20jonathan%20schooler&st=cse

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