>The truth-statement that all truths can be empirically verified is itself empirically unverifiable.

To be fair, if this is stipulated as a definition rather than a truth-claim, then this issue disappears. This was the problem with the "yeah but can verificationism be verified?" objection to Ayer and the positivists: it only works if verificationism is taken as a proposition rather than a definition or criterion of meaning (which is precisely how it was posited, at least by Ayer).

But ironically enough, I think verificationism and this claim about truth fail empirically; it is a demonstrable matter of empirical fact concerning human linguistic practice that we use language to do things other than assert empirical truths, and there are truths and types of knowledge that are meaningful but cannot be empirically verified (truths about the self obtained via introspection, for instance, all truths that are generalizations, poetic/literary truth, etc).

Nonsense. Self-knowledge and introspection is a valid "way of knowing" that doesn't fall under the category of science in any meaningful way (introspection is essentially the opposite of observable empirical evidence). I also think its possible to encode or express truths about human experience in literature/poetry/art that isn't possible via the scientific method. Its also not clear that know-how (as opposed to know-that) is necessarily scientific.

That said, the accusation of "scientism" is almost always overblown and misapplied, and science certainly is our best and most reliable way of understanding the physical world. But it does have limitations, just like any other human intellectual activity, and there are methods of acquiring certain types of knowledge in areas where scientific methodology is less successful or even impossible.

>"Solving" things can only be done in deterministic problem spaces, like physics

I think its more a matter of "solving" things in one domain looking quite differently than in another domain. And solving a moral dilemma doesn't look at all like solving a problem in physics. But that doesn't mean it doesn't happen; oftentimes "solving" a moral problem or dilemma means deciding on a course of action. And we certainly do that all the time.

I'm skeptical about whether moral judgments are even truth-apt at all, but the strength of a line of reasoning or argument is equal to that of its weakest link, so your confidence in your conclusion- assuming your inference is logically valid- is going to boil down to your confidence in your (normative) premises. Which will obviously vary from person to person, and subjective confidence is no guarantor of objective certainty in any case.

So I'm fine with the idea that logic or mathematics could help solve moral dilemmas or problems, in at least some instances (e.g. utilitarian calculations/quantifications of pleasure/happiness vs pain/suffering) but it seems to me that some basic moral values or an ethical framework is a necessary prerequisite... which is usually the tricky part, so I'm somewhat dubious of the overall utility of such a strategy (it seems like it only helps solve what is already the easiest part of the problem).

>I don't disagree, but this seems a bit flawed - you've provided one example of a scenario where someone has done it, but this in no way proves that it must be done this way.

I don't think it must be done, I don't think logic or mathematics is going to be relevant to most forms of moral reasoning. But consequentialism is the most obvious case where it would work, since consequentialism often involves quantifying pleasure and pain and so would be a natural fit.

But if what you mean is that we could sometimes use logic or mathematics to answer moral questions without first presupposing a set of moral values or an ethical framework, I think it is close to self-evident that this is impossible: when it comes to reasoning or argument, you can't get out more than you put in, and so if you want to reach a normative conclusion, you need normative premises else your reasoning would necessarily be (logically) invalid.

The example I used earlier was a utilitarian, who can use basic arithmetic to resolve moral dilemmas (such as, for instance, the trolley problem).

But this only works because the utilitarian has already adopted a particular ethical framework. Math can't tell you what values or ethical framework you should adopt, but once you have adopted them maths and logic may well be used to resolve moral issues.

Once again, I'm not sure what that's supposed to mean.

>I think we are considering the situation very differently: I am proposing that if a highly detailed descriptive model of things was available to people, perhaps with some speculative "math" in it, this may be adequate enough to produce substantial positive change.

I don't disagree with this, what I am proposing is that a descriptive model and/or mathematics or logic can only be applied to a moral problem or dilemma after one has presupposed or established a particular ethical framework, moral philosophy, and/or particular moral norms and judgments. Descriptive models, non-normative facts, and math/logic alone can never solve a moral problem or dilemma, in order to arrive at a moral judgment or conclusion one must presuppose an ethical framework or particular norms/value-judgments.

>To me, this is the main point of contention

It may well be the angle that interests you, but its not the point of contention between us because I'm not taking any position on that question.

>My theory is that humans disagree with each other less than it seems, but there is no adequately powerful mechanism in existence (or well enough known) to distribute this knowledge (assuming I'm not wrong).

But we're not necessarily talking about resolving moral disputes between different people, but also of individual people having difficulty determining the correct moral course of action (i.e. "resolving a moral dilemma"), and this meme has nothing to say about the latter case (and that's assuming it says anything substantive or useful RE the former case, which I'm not sure it does).

The point is, once again, that mathematics or logic only enter into the question after one has decided or settled which ethical framework, moral philosophy, or particular moral values/judgments are right and correct, irrespective of how common or popular those ethical frameworks or moral values/judgments may be, or the extent to which people disagree about them.

>I think we're in agreement, except for this part: "the correct/right ethical framework or moral philosophy" - I do not believe that is necessarily necessary for a substantial (say, 50%++) increase in harmony.

Neither do I; determining or even demonstrating what is the right or correct thing is quite a separate matter from convincing others that it is the right or correct thing. It very may well may be (and in fact almost certainly is) that even if we could establish what ethical framework or moral values/judgments are right or correct (something I don't believe to be possible), many if not most people will persist in sticking with ethical frameworks or particular moral values/judgments other than the right or correct one. And it may well not "increase harmony", it could even lead to the opposite; sometimes the truth is bad, depressing, or even outright harmful, after all.

But these psychological and sociological questions are nevertheless separate questions from the meta-ethical question raised by the OP, i.e. whether and how maths or logic can help resolve moral problems or dilemmas.

>I'm thinking along these lines: "Perhaps certain conditions can be set and then things will resolve on their own."

I'm having trouble discerning what exactly you mean by this, and how it relates to what I'm saying.

>You seem to be appealing to flawless mathematical evaluation, whereas I am referring to the behavior of the illogical walking biological neural networks we refer to as humans.

What does "flawless" mean here exactly- does it just mean that you've done the math correctly? But yes, I'm certainly assuming that one is doing the math correctly- even if ones math is correct, it still can only enter into the picture after we've settled the question of what moral philosophy, ethical framework, or specific values/judgments are right or correct.

>I believe it does to some degree because you are making statements of fact, but you may not be able to care if your facts are actually correct. In a sense, this is the very exploit that my theory depends upon.

Again with these vague phrases. I said that "the tricky question" was what moral philosophy, ethical system, or moral values/judgments one should adopt, not how math or logic can help resolve moral dilemmas... but, as you note, there are more than one "tricky question", which I'm happy to concede, and so what I really meant (and what I more properly should have said) was that the question of the correct/right ethical framework or moral philosophy is trickier than the question of how math/logic can help us solve moral problems.

But keeping that in mind, there was no contradiction between your reply and my original assertion. And yes, for the record, I most definitely do care about which facts are correct, I'm having trouble thinking of anything I care about more than this (at least when it comes to intellectual matters), and drawing a blank.

>Perhaps it is, perhaps it is not

No, its definitely not. Neither mathematics nor logic can tell us the answer to any substantive question of fact or value. It can never tell you whether you should be a consequentialist or not. It can't tell you whether you should steal, murder, or even to swipe the last piece of pizza. Logic and mathematics can tell you all about logical or mathematical questions... but nothing substantive about ethics or moral philosophy. Logic and mathematics only become relevant once you've got that part figured out.

>In the virtual model within your mind that you are examining - I have a virtual model that is different than yours

If it differs wrt the fact that mathematics/logic are indifferent to substantive questions of fact or value, then I'm afraid to say that your model is incorrect on this point.

>There are many tricky parts - some known, some not, some "known" incorrectly, etc.

No doubt, but once again that doesn't contradict what I said: I'm saying that the ways in which mathematics/logic is useful is a less tricky matter than what moral philosophy, ethical framework, or particular moral values/judgments are right or correct or should be adopted in the first place. Once you have answered the latter question, the answer to the former follows fairly easily (in most instances, at any rate).

>Correct.

But then you can't resolve a moral problem or dilemma, the topic of this thread. When it comes to reasoning or logic, you can't get out more than you put in: if you want to come to a conclusion involving a moral judgment or moral obligation/prohibition, you need premises laying down the necessary moral presuppositions for the conclusion to follow. And mathematics or logic is of no avail here.

>Perhaps certain conditions can be set and then things will resolve on their own. Each agent in the system has onboard cognition, and agents are affected by their environment, their knowledge/belief, and the knowledge/belief of other agents in the system. Normalizing beliefs (ideally: a net decrease in delusion, but perhaps not even necessarily) could change things for the better (or the worse, to be fair).

Sure, and none of that is objectionable; but the OP is talking about using mathematics or logic to solve moral problems, and my point is simply that the point where mathematics or logic are useful is after the hard part has already been done, i.e. determining what sort of moral framework or what sorts of moral presuppositions are right or correct.

Like, if you're a utilitarian you can use simple arithmetic in many situations to decide what course of action maximizes happiness and minimizes unhappiness, but the tricky part is determining whether one should be a utilitarian or not in the first place.

>Right, don't do that either. Pure descriptive, zero prescriptive.

But then you can't conclude with a moral judgment. Presumably solving moral dilemmas involves being able to make correct moral judgments wrt the dilemma in question, right?

>And if you aren't making an argument?

But you're needing to make an inference, yes? In order to come to a conclusion as to the correct answer or correct course of action wrt a given moral problem or dilemma? You definitely don't need to be making an explicit or verbal argument, but if you're engaging in a line of reasoning or making an inference to a conclusion, then the same old and you need to assume a particular moral framework (or at least certain moral/normative premises).

If you don't assume any value judgment or normative statements, you cannot conclude with any value judgments or normative statements; any argument that did the latter without doing the former would necessarily be deductively invalid.

And it has nothing to do with the manner of your presentation, "steel-mannered" or otherwise you still run afoul of Hume's law if you attempt to conclude an argument with normative or morally evaluative language if you did not include any among your premises.

You can only "solve" moral problems with logic or mathematics once you've already assumed a particular moral philosophy or ethical framework- consequentialism, for instance.

But which moral philosophy/ethical framework is correct or superior is the crucial question; once you have an ethical framework the solution to most moral dilemmas follows fairly straightforwardly, and in the case of utilitarianism/consequentialism may even boil down to no more than simple arithmetic... whereas in other moral frameworks (e.g. deontic systems) quantities are irrelevant and so mathematics has nothing to say.

So this blog's thesis isn't all that objectionable, so far as it goes, but it seems to me that its just that its addressing the least tricky or difficult aspect of moral reasoning and so isn't telling us anything particularly useful or anything which we didn't already know or tend to agree on.

This is sort of impressive; literally every single sentence in your post is the opposite of what is the case.

The inductive PoE is evidently not "stupid", since hitherto not a single apologist or theologian has been able to refute or rebut it- you yourself failed to even attempt to raise a single substantive objection to it. If it were stupid, you would (hopefully) be able to at least attempt a substantive counter. If neither you nor any professional apologist are unable to rebut a "stupid" argument, what does that say about your intelligence (spoiler; nothing good)?

Nor did you manage to show that "there is a use for evil", in a relevant sense, as it pertains to a tri-omni deity. And indeed, the inductive version of the argument circumvents the single effective counterargument against the traditional deductive version- the logical possibility that God could have a sufficient justification for allowing gratuitous suffering, even if we can't imagine what it could be.

So indeed, this "stupid" argument remains undefeated, and succeeds in establishing the non-existence of a tri-omni deity to a high degree of probability. Oops, eh? Live and learn, I guess.

>and yes, it’s ridiculous on its face and throughout.

What exactly is "it" referring to here?

they definitely seem to be lacking in the self-awareness/sense of irony department

So in other words, the only version of the problem of evil you're familiar with/are attempting to resolve is the one that philosophers don't actually talk about anymore?

This makes your "not having read much more than their Hitchens book" comment rather unfortunate (and amusing).

That's certainly my impression as well. But it wasn't a self-evidently crazy idea or anything, and probably adds some value to the conversation even if it is a failed effort (nothing wrong with trial and error, after all).

>There are lots of different types of observations that dark matter explains.

Sure, and the entire purpose of MOND is to account for these observations without having to invoke dark matter. So being forced to accept "MOND + dark matter" would completely defeat the purpose of proposing MOND in the first place.

>I'm soo confused why they keep talking about the standard model in relation to gravity.

The standard model of cosmology (as opposed to particle physics) is the lambda-CDM model, where "CDM" stands for "cold dark matter" (and "lambda" denotes a positive cosmological constants, aka "dark energy").

>I think the main issues is that MOND by itself simply doesn't explain everything we see. So last I herd was that the only feasible MOND theories left were "MOND + dark matter" theories. I wasn't even aware that there were any major theories that didn't include dark matter of some kind.

From my own understanding (i.e. as a hobbyist with a background in philosophy, not physics), the entire purpose of MOND is to avoid having to invoke dark matter- the rough idea being that gravity works differently on the scale of galaxies/galaxy clusters, and that correcting for this explains the discrepancy between the observed rotational velocities of galaxies and galaxy clusters vs. their apparent mass without having to invoke a new type of matter.

And the especially relevant bit, for this topic, is the "CDM" part, where "CDM" stands for "cold dark matter".

("lambda" denotes a positive cosmological constant, i.e. "dark energy", so the standard model of cosmology = a hot big bang + dark energy + cold dark matter)

So I gather..

Nowhere to be found? Its everywhere we look- virtually every galaxy/galaxy cluster displays evidence of the gravitational influence of dark matter, same for the lensing of more distant galaxies and galaxy clusters. As the blog/essay admits in the second paragraph, what is absent are viable candidates for dark matter particles... but then we have no real idea whether its even constituted by a type of particle in the first place, this is only one proposal among many.

I don't think MOND should be categorically ruled out, for all time; new proposals add something to scientific inquiry even when they don't turn out to be correct, but MOND has a tough road ahead if its ever to be considered legitimately competitive with its rival theory.