Germany lost in every sense, even technically - as said, it's just a lie spread by those who couldn't accept defeat and sought an excuse.

The Wars of the Diadochi (323-275 BCE)... absolute pandemonium.

One of the most blatant simplifications Caesar entered into his accounts was the Germanic-Celtic divide along the Rhine. Going by his writings, the Celtic & Germanic world were separated by this river. Caesar's motivation here was political. All his actions in Gaul were justified by the alliances with Roman proxies, by it being 'in' Gaul. The Germanic tribes were the 'others', whom he had to keep out of Gaul, but he had no goals beyond the Rhine. Convenient.

In reality, this divide didn't follow a river but was more of a patchwork. Some Germanic tribes most probably did live on the canonically Gallic side of the Rhine and vice versa. What is notably hard here. Is that we can only base ourselves on archeology, and artifacts sadly don't talk. So we are quite certain Caesar is lying/twisting facts here, but it is very hard to get the real picture.

Because the Jacobins in control absolutely believed the Austrians (and co.) were out to get the Revolution following the Declaration of Pillnitz (1791). While this was never the idea behind the Habsburg declaration (it was an empty gesture to somehow protect the royal family), it served as a red flag to the hawks in the Convention. One of the better examples of a self-fulfilling prophecy: everyone is out to get us > let's go out and get everyone!! > mon dieu: everyone is out to get us!!!

Daylamis and Buyids, too. The Safavids, however, were those who'd push for the active conversion, which was somewhat of a novelty.

Consider one saw the widespread collapse of a larger number of settled civilizations for centuries to come, whereas the other - while basking in societal/systemic collapse & a massive deathtoll - saw the reformation of the medieval world socioeconomically and politically over the span of a few generations.

There were a few, but most revolts were about taxation/power struggles. The Fatimids were not to heavy on the proselytizing.

Canonically, Western Rome 'falling' in 476 (end of Antiquity) and the shift of Latin to Greek as the administrative language of the Eastern Roman Empire by the end of the 7th century, following the Arab conquests & the loss of their eastern provinces (end of Late Antiquity). All in all, these are arbitrary pickings. They don't necessarily correspond to major events in reality. More significant than Odoacar deposing the last Western Roman Emperor is, for example, the establishment of the Carolingian Empire, or prior to this the Renovatio Imperii of Justinian and the ensuing Justinian Plague.

Gotta love those!

Who knows, that varies from person to person, not really something you can make blanket statements on.

Röhm presented a rival faction within the party, a pillar for rivals to gather around. To quote some random Kurgan immortal challenging this kilt wearing bloke: "There can be only one". Hitler didn't want to share the light.

In broad lines, it will define socioeconomic conditions, which in turn will influence the sociopolitical superstructure. Think, for example, how you won't have a land of plenty up on the slopes of the Alps with early agriculture.

More niche perhaps, take medieval Flanders, the prevalence of flooding in the coastal areas prompted the formation of large-scale land holdings, directed towards commercial exploitation, creating a proto-capitalist dynamic & in part underpinning the wealth of this region. Once you move a little inland, you see a drastic change in the structure of landownership, with widespread subsistence farming being the norm, and the land being divided in a multitude of smaller holdings.

Why? He is one of the foremost academics on the period, what makes them ludicrous?

Out of curiosity, why do you need Henry II's records? The battle saw no involvement of English forces, are you hoping to find correspondence about it?

Very uncommon from the late Carolingian era onward. One of the more notable ones that survived until around 1500 is that of Ditmarshen at the border of Denmark and the HRE.

With a massive workforce of (off-)seasonal labourers, performing tasks for the state in an effort that saw a massive amount of the state's resources thrown into the fray. Calculations cited by Toby Wilkinson in "The Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt", show that the effort of Cheops' (Khufu) pyramid could have been done by two crews of about 4000 men could have completed the job (to quarry, to haul & set in place 2.000.000+ blocks) + an equal number of men to construct and maintain the logistics of construction (ramps, scaffolding, etc) & other small army of workers for specific tasks (carpentry, pottery, cooking, etc) - all in all suggesting an estimated workforce of around 10.000 people. Most of these would only have been there according to the seasons (farmers off duty), with a small dedicated core tending to the site all-year round.

The shape of the pyramid is simple in conception, but the whole planning of the work (like the specific alignment of the building ) is nothing but impressive.

Check out Robin Lane Fox for Graeco-Roman history, he is a reknown historian on this era. Adrian Goldsworthy wrote some good works too (Fall of Rome) and particularly on the fall of Rome side, check out Peter Heather & Chris Wickham. I loved the Hellenistic World by Tarn & Griffith (ed.), but it is by now in some fields somewhat outdated, a more modern work on the Hellenistic world is Age of Conquests by Angelos Chianotis.

Geography. Turkic tribes were converted by the Persian part of the islamic world. In terms of culture and civilization, the Persian world endured in the bosom of the Arab conquests, somewhat comparable to how Rome conquered the Hellenistic world & absorbed its culture. Consider that prior to being absorbed into the islamic world, the Turkic groups lived in tribal (semi)nomadic societies that had little to offer in terms of civilization in light of running an empire. All of this, from higher culture to administrative trappings, the Turkic groups learned from the Persian world. As the Seljuqs burst out from behind the Oxus and into the islamic world, they took that all the way to the gates of Jerusalem & into Anatolia.

Those groups were the ones leaving all the written records, so yeah, not the easiest field of research regardless.

Pretty sure you could find this kind of stuff on academic journals/libraries. I would try those in your area to see if they could yield anything. If you're asking popular history (non-academic) it'll need more kabooms.

But considering the social position of the French protestants and then consider the implications of forced deportation, that would definitely be the Religious and Civil Wars cranked up to the max.

What if's are overall quite pointless, but consider how in very few cases emigration truly solved everything. Ireland was never pacified, the emigration of puritans did not stop them from being pivotal in the English Civil War, etc. So, most probably, it would have mattered little. Remember that the Huguenots in France were also often well-off groups with vested interests and not necessarily with much incentives to abandon all that.

Italy was actually quite populated, and Rome had managed to integrate central Italy quite thoroughly, particularly during the 4th century (for example, see the Latin Wars). This demographic advantage coupled with the thorough political integration wrought over the centuries ensured Rome could survive Hannibal's onslaught. But make no mistake, the toll was hard. In that sense, it was the payoff of Rome's policies of integration in generations prior. Those who abandoned Rome mostly were recent conquests.

The Allies mostly remained as such, later on leading to the Social Wars (91-87 BCE).

Darn you bot, learn to read the dates!!!

A lot of good answers have been given pertaining to this not being an absolute concept. Still, there was a traditional order that, by and large, remained accepted in many regions. If we stick with, for example, medieval Europe , the example of Henry II before Toulouse may be instructive.

The Angevin king Henry II ruled one of the most powerful kingdoms of 12th century Europe, and this created a fair amount of tension in the complicated diplomatic web that was feudal Europe. So in 1159, the king of England had set his sights on conquering Toulouse, a piece of territory disputed between him and count Raymond. Now Raymond was the brother-in-law to the king of France, Louis VII. Louis was worried since Henry - also his vassal on the continent, as he was only king in England - was already so darn powerful, acquiring Toulouse would only strengthen his position. Yet ultimately, he made a genius move. As Henry II arrived before Toulouse at the head of one of the largests contemporary armies, his heart sank when he saw the banner hoisted over the city: Louis VII had taken up quarters inside before his army arrived...

The game was up, and Henry knew it. He ordered his army to ransack the countryside and went back home, failing his ultimate objective. So, what happened? Why did Henry hold back & why is this instructive for your question?

Because Henry had sworn fealty to Louis (for those lands for which he was beholden to him). Henry himself had more than enough rebellious lords under him, keen to resist his royal authority. To attack Toulouse with Louis inside was to break all his oaths he had sworn (under his god), making him that thing medieval society as an honour-culture despised so hard: the honourless oathbreaker. So Henry knew that if here and now he pressed his claim on Toulouse and violated the person of Louis VII, he would enable each and every lord who held a grudge towards him from Scotland to the Pyrenees, to safely renounce their allegiance and rebel.

Medieval society, like many, was structured on concepts of honour, typically expressed through oaths and the like. People took these seriously, for breaking the social contract - then as much as now - renders one open to the fallout.

So many things underpinned royal authority, from the more raw aspects of money and power (soft or hard) to the those of concepts of legitimacy.