> This is driven almost entirely by a large increase in violent crime and suicides during the pandemic

Suicides decreased during the pandemic.

From the article:
> "The number of people injured by gunfire was nearly 40% higher in 2020 and 2021, compared with 2019, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said in a study published Thursday. In 2022, gun injuries tapered off, but were still 20% higher than before the pandemic."

By contrast, suicides were lower in 2020 than 2019, and only modestly higher in 2021 (to 2018 levels).

Check out the data table for yourself; the changes in firearm injury rate don't look at all similar to the changes in suicide rate.

> we need to move away from lithium batteries.

Why?

The dominant lithium producer is Australia, which produces via standard hard-rock mining, so producing most lithium is no more harmful than any other developed-world mine.

Compared to the 7,500 Mt of coal mined per year and 4,200 Mt of oil extracted per year, mining 0.1Mt of lithium is not an urgent environmental or social issue.

(In case you were thinking about cobalt, LFP batteries use no cobalt and will reach 50% market share in the next few years.)

> Once we emit about 1000 gigatons of carbon, much of the massive ice sheet will melt irreversibly.

That is not an accurate summary of the paper.

From "Discussion":
> "We find two critical temperature anomaly thresholds above which the equilibrium volume of the GIS decreases non-linearly, at approximately 0.6 and 1.6°C. However, a temporary overshoot of these critical temperature thresholds does not inevitably cause long-term melt of the ice sheet (see Section 3.2). With transient experiments, we find that an equilibrium state of the GIS with smaller ice volume is approached only if the CO2 forcing is applied sufficiently long that the ice volume falls below the values of ΔVA = −0.26 m sle and ΔVC = −2.4 m sle, respectively."

The paper examines this in detail in Section 3.2; in particular, they say:
> "a temporal overshoot of a critical temperature does not necessarily lead to long-term ice loss"

So what does that mean?

What that means is if we reduce our emissions quickly enough, then net CO2 sequestration (from natural sources like silicate weathering as well as possibly from manmade sources such as direct air capture) will reduce the level of CO2 in the atmosphere, and hence the temperature, and hence potentially pull us back to the other side of the temperature tipping points before the ice loss tipping point is reached.

So what does that mean?

It means that even "tipping points" operate on geologic time scales, meaning they are generally not irreversible on human time scales. Passing one of the critical temperatures in the paper (1.6C) for 2,000 years would bring irreversible melt; passing it for 20 years would not. As a result, speed of decarbonization matters, regardless of where we are with regard to different tipping points.

> In P12 Box SPM.1.1, and P14 note 25 (explicitly), both state net zero for that date.

I believe you're misreading; from p.12 Box SPM.1.1:
>> "scenarios with very low and low GHG emissions and CO2 emissions declining to net zero around or after 2050, followed by varying levels of net negative CO2 emissions23 (SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6), as illustrated in Figure SPM.4."

Both are net zero around or after 2050.

Similarly for p.14 Note 25:
>> "SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6 are scenarios that start in 2015 and have very low and low GHG emissions, respectively, and CO2 emissions declining to net zero around or after 2050, followed by varying levels of net negative CO2 emissions."

Both locations clearly note that the scenario may reach net zero after 2050.

> I think you're looking at the CO2 output only graph, i suspect perhaps in aggregate they provide net zero for 2050.

None of the other GHG graphs reach net zero even by 2100, so net zero GHG emissions always occurs after net zero CO2 emissions.

> I would note though that SSP1-2.6 also describes a net zero by 2050

SSP1-2.6 doesn't reach net zero until 2075 (p.13), so it has significant net positive cumulative emissions between 2050 and 2090 (the 2041-2060 and 2081-2100 intervals).

> The (b) table doesn't seem to show a reduction in temperatures even under the most optimistic case.

The (b) table is looking at the change relative to the late 1800s.

For change relative to other periods, look at p.14, Table SPM.1, Scenario SSP1-1.9, Best Estimate:

• Near term (2021-2040): 1.5C
• Mid-term (2041-2060): 1.6C
• Long term (2081-2100): 1.4C
  i.e., 0.2C estimated temperature decrease between mid-term and long term intervals.

Note that SSP1-1.9 reaches net zero CO2 in ~2057 (p.13, Figure SPM.4), so the end of the mid-term interval. In other words, 20-40 years of increasingly net negative CO2 emissions are projected to result in 0.2C lower temperatures.

> > Changing home voltage from 120v to 240v is unlikely to do anything to help the grid, as the higher-voltage transmission lines would carry the same amount of energy (and current) either way.
>
> Higher voltage allows more wattage. It’s the amps that create the heat which makes things fry.

Sure, but changing homes from 120v to 240v does nothing to lessen the amperage being carried by the high-voltage transmission lines, and those are where the grid is constrained.

> Your link is not from the IPCC.

The link I directed you to is indeed from the IPCC. I'll repeat it for you with the link included a second time for your convenience:
>> The scientific consensus is that stopping emissions is enough to stop warming. The scenarios on p.13-14 of the IPCC report show clearly that warming stops shortly after net zero emissions are reached

Note the domain: www.ipcc.ch

If you click the link I've given you twice now, you will see that it is indeed the IPCC WGI report, and you will see that the chart on p.13 and table on p.14 demonstrate that warming is indeed predicted to stop (and reverse) after net emissions turn negative for SSP1-1.9.

> a 2021 article from carbon tracker.org which a financial think tank.

You appear to be confused, as the other net zero link I posted goes to carbonbrief.org, and not "carbontracker.org", whatever that is. carbonbrief.org/about-us/ shows that the link I actually gave has a ton of climate and environmental scientists on its staff.

Feel free to head directly to the scientific papers cited in that article if you prefer primary sources; for example this paper from 2008, this paper from 2010, or this paper from 2020 concluding that warming will stop at net zero emissions.

As a point of interest, I'd never heard of "carbontracker.org" before you mentioned it, but I agree with you that it seems like a probable misinformation source.

> You can find the evidence yourself

I have, and I've linked it for you.

> > The scenarios on p.13-14 of the IPCC report show clearly that warming stops shortly after net zero emissions are reached
>
> Warming WILL NOT STOP when emissions stop.

The climate scientists who wrote the IPCC report appear to disagree with you.

Do you have evidence that they are wrong? Or is that just your feeling on the matter?

> They will easily disrupt the [business] model with zero risk.

How often are grandiose statements like these made by anyone who is not woefully naive (or trying to con investors)?

Serving requests takes computers and electricity, which costs money. Even if chatGPT took over from Google search, OpenAI would still need to pay its bills. Just as Google didn't fundamentally change the search ecosystem when it took over from Yahoo et al., OpenAI would be almost certain to operate within the existing paradigm due to a need to pay its expenses.

> The problem with all of this is that the grid has to be transformed.

Yes, and that will be an enormous amount of effort, both to replace generation and to upgrade transmission.

At the same time, though, maintaining the existing grid is also an enormous amount of work. A large fraction of the power infrastructure will need to be upgraded or replaced by 2050 anyway, and the existing grid relies on enormous effort to extract hundreds of millions of tons of coal and gas every year.

"It will be a lot of effort" is true of anything to do with the overall grid, so it's not a useful argument against any particular proposal -- there is no easy option.

> To add in hundreds of millions of cars to the grid is going to break most of them.

“A future grid will absolutely be able to handle a future demand of transportation electrification.”

In fact, since EV charging has such flexible timing, it's a great option for easily integrating larger amounts of variable renewables such as wind and solar via time-of-use pricing (this article goes into more detail).

> I expect that many of the grids will require voltage changes. Going from 120 in the states to 220-240. Otherwise we will have to adapt millions of transformers for higher loads.

How would that help?

Changing home voltage from 120v to 240v is unlikely to do anything to help the grid, as the higher-voltage transmission lines would carry the same amount of energy (and current) either way. Running more transmission lines where needed is almost certainly a better option, and it's one the industry is already very familiar with deploying to address increased consumption.

> Unfortunately I brought a child into this world in 1990 before I learned of how serious the impending climate catastrophe was, and now I must accept that she could have children, and her children's children will have to bear this terrible burden as survival becomes nearly intolerable for most life on the planet.

You're carrying around way more guilt and anxiety about the situation than is supported by the science.

Take a look at the data in those links above. The world has changed. The consensus of science-based estimates is that the world will see about 2C of warming, leaving it far from the "intolerable for most life" scenario you fear.

Climate change is real, and will cause quite a lot of suffering for quite a lot of people, but the science-based projections for our future are very different than they were 20, 10, or even just 5 years ago, and for the better. If you tuned out in the past due to a lack of progress, now's a good time to tune back in and update your views in light of new and very different data.

> No tipping points under 4C?

None with a timescale under 200 years, according to this paper published in Science.

If you feel the editors of Science have made an error in publishing that paper, you are free to take it up with them.

> the effect of carbon in the atmosphere is expected to last 200 years.

Sure, but other feedback mechanisms will tend to sequester it, and as a result warming will stop shortly after emissions stop.

The scientific consensus is that stopping emissions is enough to stop warming. The scenarios on p.13-14 of the IPCC report show clearly that warming stops shortly after net zero emissions are reached, and temperatures will decline after a period of net negative emissions (as in SSP1-1.9).

I recognize that some of these findings may be counterintuitive to you, but that just highlights how complex science is and how important it is to pay attention to the experts rather than our gut feelings.

> The EIA LCOE 2022

EIA's projections have changed substantially since 2022.

Compare their projections to 2050 from 2022 (p.15) and 2023 (p.10) (reference case):

• Solar: up 50% (1,200-1,800TWh)
• Wind: up 50% (700-1,100TWh)
• Gas: down 40% (1,800-1,200TWh)
• Coal: down 40% (500-300TWh)

EIA projections for renewable energy have been consistently revised way up, year after year:

• 2018 AEO: 1,600TWh renewables, 3,100TWh gas+coal
• 2020 AEO: 2,100TWh renewables, 2,700TWh gas+coal
• 2022 AEO: 2,300TWh renewables, 2,300TWh gas+coal
• 2023 AEO: ~3,300TWh renewables, 1,500TWh gas+coal

5 years ago, the EIA was projecting fossil fuels would out-generate renewables 2:1 in 2050; now, that ratio is reversed in their projections. How likely is it they've finally caught up with changes in power generation and won't revise that again?

For reference, wind+solar+battery are 140% of net new capacity over the last 5 years, and are a similar fraction of net new kWh generated. New gas is indeed being added, but coal is being retired even faster, so net fossil capacity in the US has been declining for a decade.

> We have almost reached the first critical 1.5C increase in global average temp.

What makes it "critical"?

Per this paper in Science there are no tipping points under 200 years and 4C of warming, so there's no clear evidence that 1.5C is any more important of a threshold than 1.4C or 1.6C.

1.5C is important because humans like round numbers, not for any physical reasons.

> What you interpret as pessimistic is what us realists call "the world has hardly done shit,"

Up until 5-10 years ago, yes. If you haven't paid attention to recent changes, I can see how you might have an outdated view of the situation.

Let's look at the data:

First, the IEA WEO projects a 20% emissions decline by 2030. That's using the mid-range scenario ("APS"), since clean energy progressed much faster than even their most optimistic scenario from 5 years ago, and their mid-range scenarios have in general been the closest for fossil fuels.

Second, coal consumption has been flat for a decade; with renewables accounting for virtually all net new power generation and over 100% of additional power generation expected by 2030, coal use is highly likely to decline in the near future (IEA's scenario has a 20% reduction by 2030).

Third, oil-burning car sales peaked 5 years ago and are in permanent decline. Per their analysis, EVs will become a majority of light vehicle sales around 2030, resulting in a permanent decline in oil consumption (peaking around 2024 and declining 5-10% by 2030).

Fourth, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has pushed Europe hard away from gas, and as a result gas is projected to decline 10% by 2030. Gas use doesn't have the strong structural headwinds of cheap renewables and EVs that are basically guaranteeing coal and oil declines, though, so this decline is less locked-in.

Fifth, clean energy investment is 2x fossil fuel investment, meaning the energy industry has heavily shifted towards clean energy.

Fundamentally, the transition to a renewables-dominant electrical grid and an EV-dominant car market is already in progress. The logistics of those two transitions are already pretty much baked in, meaning the significant declines in fossil fuel use they will cause are also pretty much baked in. It will take time to see those declines, but only because the world's power generation system and light vehicle fleet are so large that replacing them will take decades.

> But I am still not buying it.

Fortunately, it doesn't matter if you do. The logistics of these transformations are already in place, and as a result they're pretty much unstoppable at this point.

> I really hate saying this, but...it's too late.

“too late” narratives are invariably based on a misunderstanding of science."

(That's a quote from one of the main authors of an earlier IPCC report.)

It's too late to avoid a 1C temperature increase (since that already happened a few years ago), but it's not too late to avoid 2C of warming. In fact, IEA projections are for emissions to fall 15-20% by 2030, putting us on the second-lowest IPCC pathway and in line for an estimated 1.8C of warming.

There's been enormous progress in the last 5 years; the most pessimistic science-based projection from today is lower than the most optimistic one from 5 years ago.

> > It only seems like an observer is necessary for "sound" because you're using the wrong definition of the word; you're trying to reason about physics using a definition meant for human psychology. It's no more valid than trying to reason about calculus using the wrong definition of the word "integral".
>
> Sound isnt sound until puffs of air meet our eardrum.

That is incorrect if you're trying to do physics.

I get that you like the idea of the presence of a mind being necessary for something to be "sound", but that is literally wrong in a physics context. It's not even a matter of opinion, that's just not how the word "sound" is defined for use in physics.

> The observer effect is a well documented phenomenon

From that link:
> "The observer in this experiment was not human. Instead, they used a tiny electron detector that could spot the presence of passing electrons. The quantum “observer’s” capacity to detect electrons could be altered by changing its electrical conductivity, or the strength of the current passing through it. Apart from “observing,” or detecting the electrons, the detector had no effect on the current."

i.e., the key is not "an observer" in the "conscious agent" sense, but rather detection or measurement in the "physically interacts with the system" sense. That article says exactly the same thing that I've been saying all along, which is that the difference is measurement, not a conscious observer.

Again, you're getting hung up on definitions of words that are not correct for a physics context. "Observer" does not imply that there is someone doing the observing; it just means measurement is occurring.

> I'm not sure how to respond to this because it doesn't disprove the findings of the double slit experiment.

It's an article explaining those experiments; of course it doesn't "disprove" them. The point is that it shows your understanding of them is flawed.

In particular, it clarifies that the difference is the measurement, not the observer. Note what you originally said:
> Conscious observer is the differentiating variable. Everything else is the same. The photon is always measured, it’s never not measured.

And note what you just quoted:
> "Indeed, the results of both Truscott and Aspect’s experiments shows that a particle’s wave or particle nature is most likely undefined until a measurement is made."

So the differentiating variable is the details of the measurement, either when/where it's measured (before/after passing through the slits) or how often it's measured (second beam splitter). There is no difference in the presence of the conscious observer; contrary to what you were saying, the article clarifies that that is not the differentiating variable.

> The presence of an observer is necessary to experience the world. If a tree falls in a forest, and there is no one to hear it, does it make a sound? > > No it doesn't. Sound is the result of the disturbance of a medium, usually air, oscillating between 40 and 40,000 hz striking our eardrum, which sends a signal to our brain that produces the sensation of sound.

You're essentially begging the question here by using a definition of "sound" that is not valid for physics:
> "In physics, sound is a vibration that propagates as an acoustic wave, through a transmission medium such as a gas, liquid or solid. In human physiology and psychology, sound is the reception of such waves and their perception by the brain."

It only seems like an observer is necessary for "sound" because you're using the wrong definition of the word; you're trying to reason about physics using a definition meant for human psychology. It's no more valid than trying to reason about calculus using the wrong definition of the word "integral".

> The photon is always measured, it’s never not measured.

That is not accurate:
> "In the famous double-slit experiment, single particles, such as photons, pass one at a time through a screen containing two slits. If either path is monitored, a photon seemingly passes through one slit or the other, and no interference will be seen. Conversely, if neither is checked, a photon will appear to have passed through both slits simultaneously before interfering with itself, acting like a wave."

The classical double-slit experiment -- as well as the beam-splitter and atomic variants discussed in the article -- have additional measurement in one condition vs. the other:
> "Truscott’s team found that when the second laser pulse was not applied, the probability of the atom being detected in each of the momentum states was 0.5, regardless of the phase lag between the two. However, application of the second pulse produced a distinct sine-wave interference pattern."

i.e., there is a human observer in both cases, but there is more manipulation of the photon in one case than the other case. As a result, the difference is the different manipulation, not the presence of an observer.

> It's also no secret within academic climate science circles that the IPCC has long been politically motivated to underestimate the scale of the problem. Which is why very few climate scientists actually believe that the Paris Accord is realistic. We all know there is no chance the world can avoid 1.5 C mean global warming and that we will likely see a potentially disastrous 2 C increase by 2050. Many already assume that there will be no remaining carbon budget even for the 2 C target

That's an enormous number claims regarding what climate scientists believe, but the only source presented for any of it is a non-peer-reviewed report from an Australian think tank whose previous reports were criticized as alarmist, misleading, and lacking scientific credibility by scientist reviewers

And looking at the report itself, it's easy to see why. Their number 1 "critical understanding" cherry-picks only the IPCC scenarios which support their narrative:
> "Current (CMIP6) climate models project on average a warming of 0.3°C for the decade to 2030 (across the SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 scenarios)."

By contrast, the IEA expects CO2 emissions to fall 15-20% by 2030, putting the world roughly in line with the IPCC's SSP1-2.6 pathway -- a pathway they totally ignore*.

It's reasonable that they would want to include higher-emission pathways as well to examine the danger of less likely scenarios, but to exclusively examine higher-emission scenarios and completely ignore lower-emission scenarios that are as or more plausible? It's clear cherry-picking of data to establish a chosen narrative.

On to their number 2 "critical understanding":
> "Due to model limitations, we will not know exactly how the climate crisis will unfold until it’s too late.6 One example is the failure to predict the intensity of extreme heat and flood events in Europe and North America in 2021."

i.e., they're conflating climate and weather.

One heat wave or one flood is weather; by contrast, climate is the broad long-term trend. Failing to predict a particular flood or heat wave no more "proves" the IPCC models wrong than a cold winter "proves" the climate is not warming. They're making an utterly unscientific argument here.

Not everything they say is wrong -- notably they're quite right that warming has already caused significant effects and even 1.5C (which is unlikely) will cause more -- but enough demonstrably biased and unscientific claims are thrown in that this report could never pass robust peer review and is not a scientific source.

> There is no evidence for projected warming <3-4C of any tipping points that significantly change the warming trajectory.

Just to back up this point, r/science discussed a paper in Science which examined known tipping points 5 months ago. I extracted a list of those tipping points, their thresholds, their effects, and their timescales.

As you say, none of the near-warming (<4C) near-term (<200-year timescale) tipping points had significant global effects on warming or sea level rise.

> I'm a bit dubious about this

What exactly are you dubious about? That the paper predicts lower sea level rise than previous models, or that either way the sea level rise will be enough to have serious consequences?

Your phrasing makes it seem like you're disagreeing with me, but I don't see which part you're disagreeing with.

> Now, it could be a matter of timing - it might take 1000 years or so for the full ice-sheet response - but it's not exactly reassuring.

There's a massive difference between "20m of sea level rise in 80 years" and "20m of sea level rise in 1,000 years".

In particular, my understanding is that paleographic studies are generally of the form "temperature went up 5C and sea level went up 20m over the course of 10ky", meaning sustained temperature increase led to large sea level rise. There's not really any hope of seeing temperatures 80 years from now back to pre-industrial levels, but IPCC scenarios like SSP1-2.6 see temperature starting to fall by then, meaning it could be back to pre-industrial levels within a century or two.

As a result, if a certain amount of sea level rise requires only 80 years of sustained temperature increase of 1.5-2C, we have little hope of avoiding that. By contrast, if that amount of sea level rise requires 1,000+ years of sustained temperature increase of 1.5-2C, there's quite good odds of avoiding some, most, or potentially even virtually all of that.

In general, the known ice melt tipping points take thousands of years. I extracted a list of those tipping points from a paper previously discussed on r/science, and the timescale for 10m+ of sea level rise looks to be about 2,000 years (mainly West Antarctic ice sheet and East Antarctic subglacial basins).

It's worth noting that this paper is actually good news, as it predicts lower global sea-level rise contributions from ice melt than previous models did; from the Abstract:
> "The combined effect is likely to decelerate global sea-level rise contributions from Antarctica relative to the uncoupled climate-forced ice-sheet model configuration."

In "Discussion" they call this out specifically for high-emission scenarios:
> "In our high-emission scenario model simulations that include parameterizations for hydrofracturing, ice-cliff instabilities, and capture sea-ice and atmospheric responses, the net impact of ice-sheet/climate feedbacks on SL rise is negative."

It looks to be a fairly marginal change, though; the projected amount of sea-level rise is still enough to be a serious problem, impacting where hundreds of millions of people currently live.

> > the International Energy Agency projects carbon emissions will fall 15-20% by 2030.
>
> I don't care why it's happening, I do care that it's not happening anywhere near fast enough...

...fast enough for what, exactly?

A 15-20% emissions reduction by 2030 puts us on the second-lowest IPCC pathway which is estimated to result in 1.8C of warming by 2100 (+0.6C above today), in line with Climate Action Tracker's estimate.

So we're certainly not on track for holding warming to 1.5C; however, we are on track for holding warming below 2C, which is a better outcome than I expected even just 5 years ago, and is far better than Climate Action Tracker's most optimistic projection from 5 years ago.

It's not perfect, but it's substantial progress, so I'll take that as a good starting point.

> Voters have shown they do not want change, so there will be none

Voters are not the only source of change -- change is happening because it's cheaper.

That's why the USA is closing fossil fuel power plants twice as fast as it's building them (7.5GW added vs. 16GW retired in 2023).

That's why Texas went from 6% wind+solar in 2012 to 17% in 2017 to 31% in 2022.

And that's also why the International Energy Agency projects carbon emissions will fall 15-20% by 2030.

Is that a morally satisfying reason for change to occur? No, not really -- it feels weird to have the right thing happen for the wrong reason. Climate change is important enough that we don't really get to be choosy about why the needed change is happening, only that the needed change is happening.

And, make no mistake, as the above data shows change is indeed happening. It may not be the kind of sweeping environmental awakening one might have hoped for, but it replaced coal and gas with wind+solar+storage, so for now that'll have to do.