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PaulSnow t1_itziv5a wrote

Reply to comment by Natanael_L in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM

Through testing, architecture, and audited manufacturing.

Auditable manufacturing processes at every level.

Altering chips requires massive changes in workflow and processes.

Certification of manufactures (Not having your hardware manufactured in suspect countries like china).

Hardware design that separates keys and security from general computing. Embedded hardware testing and verification.

Hardware can be architected to be self checking, such that changes or alterations do not produce the same timing and values as the proper hardware.

https://www.securityweek.com/closer-look-intels-hardware-enabled-threat-detection-push

I can't find any reference for detecting hardware modifications with x-rays.

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Natanael_L t1_itzm4n5 wrote

Did you not look at the link I provided above?

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PaulSnow t1_iu0g3ko wrote

I don't remember a link to talking about x-rays, and a review of the history didn't reveal a link from you I didn't read.

So what am I looking for?

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Natanael_L t1_iu0m81m wrote

https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/yd7qp6/i_am_the_coauthor_behind_acms_techbrief_on/ittyuja/

https://www.infona.pl/resource/bwmeta1.element.springer-147a2312-2fe6-3a08-9954-a904e950f9bb

> Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against “golden chips”.

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PaulSnow t1_iu23xnr wrote

Your first link is just your post, and it doesn't mention x-raying anything.

The second mentions optical inspection and checking against "golden chips" isn't x-ray, and there is no reference to x-raying hardware here in the abstract. And I don't have a subscription to read the paper.

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Natanael_L t1_iu2a0dm wrote

https://spectrum.ieee.org/chip-x-ray

And optical inspection is common - and less capable in detecting attacks like manipulated silicon doping

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PaulSnow t1_iu2kxqj wrote

The article does not say they can detect doping. Their test was a flaw in a interconnect layer.

But great. You would do a statistical examination of batches of chips. Done. Their process is destructive.

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