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DeusAxeMachina t1_j76out6 wrote

Reply to comment by contractualist in There Are No Natural Rights (without Natural Law): Addressing what rights are, how we create rights, and where rights come from by contractualist

Again, since your "social contract" isn't really a contract at all, and basically collapses into "rationality," you inadvertently end up with a Lockean view. Having the words "social contract" in your article isn't enough to disprove this point when you do nothing to show the presence of an actual social contract. All it is is terminology salad.

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contractualist OP t1_j76pnoy wrote

>Again, since your "social contract" isn't really a contract at all, and basically collapses into "rationality,"

"The social contract is a metaphor for the exchange of freedom for reason-based duties." This is what I say in the piece I linked. If you mean a material written contract binding on all, then no, that doesn't exist. If you mean principles that people would reasonably agree to, then yes, those exist and have moral weight, as the linked pieces discuss.

But I argue in the piece why a Lockean conception of rights fail to address the specification, prioritization, and genealogy problems, and how a social contract analysis does (again, its only a metaphor).

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j76rhyt wrote

If your "social" "contract" (which is, as it seems, neither social nor a contract) is a metaphor, then I'm sorry but you've literally got a Lockean view with an extra, unnecessary step. Let me demonstrate:

Here is a classic Lockean view:

  1. The laws of morality are imposed on us.
  2. Those laws include rights and duties.
  3. We have rights and duties.

Here is an actual social contract based view:

  1. We agree (implicitly or explicitly, but actually) to a social contract.
  2. This social contract includes rights and duties.
  3. We have rights and duties.

Lastly, here is your view:

  1. The laws of rationality are imposed on us.
  2. Those laws require us to exist under a "social contract".
  3. This "social contract" includes rights and duties.
  4. We have rights and duties.

It is immediately apparent that your view is just an extended take on the first, Lockean view. The "social contract" in your view doesn't actually do any explanatory work, and so can't address the problems of justification and source. Your proposed solution is simply taking the solution that would be applicable in an actual social contract driven view, and trying to apply it in a view that, when examined closely, does not feature a social contract at all. When you start talking about "principles that people would reasonably agree to" rather than "principles that people actually (though perhaps implicitly) agree to", you've completely removed the consent element and thus removed your argument from being applicable for consent-based justifications. This isn't to mean that this position is unjustifiable, but the justification will need to be a Lockean one, as you're arguing for a Lockean view.

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contractualist OP t1_j76sq2w wrote

Not all views of an objective morality pre-existing the state are Lockean. There are many different schools of thought in meta-ethics. Mine is metaethical constructivism linked here if you would like to read it. You will find references to Kant, not Locke.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j76u798 wrote

>Not all views of an objective morality pre-existing the state are Lockean

This is certainly true, and it is not my intention to discuss all views of objective morality existing before the state, just yours. Which I insist, is Lockean in its conception and justification, as it sees rights as a natural component of reality that is imposed on agents. It is not surprising, considering (as I'm sure you know), Kant's philosophy was largely a response to the Empiricist school Locke belonged to, and he operated from largely the same groundwork as they did. Kant's view is, in the way that matters for this discussion, Lockean, and it is definitely (even more so than your view) not a social contract based view. Thus, my previous argument, that your justifications are not applicable to your view, still stands regardless of whether you personally trace your inspiration to Kant or Locke.

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contractualist OP t1_j76x6oe wrote

I argue that there are no moral facts outside of a hypothetical contractual procedure, Locke argues that there are. That is how I am not a Lockean.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j76yz57 wrote

If your contractual procedure is hypothetical - a thought experiment for the philosopher to discover rights, then your position is simply that moral rights exist in nature, the same as Locke.

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contractualist OP t1_j7713h7 wrote

Not discover, create. And there would not be rights outside of this procedure. This is discussed in the article: " it’s reason that leads us to develop the universal moral principles which make up the social contract." And these moral principles are the basis of our rights.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j772hgc wrote

For a procedure to create something it must be actual, not hypothetical. If what you call a "social contract" is nothing but an expression of reason, then, again, that's just a Lockean view and the term "social contract" is misappropriated.

Like I said before, your position is self-inconsistent as it tries to use social contract based justifications without including an actual social contract, but simply "something else" (rationality) that you use the words "social contract" for.

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contractualist OP t1_j773kk0 wrote

I've addressed hypothetical consent here. Summary: You can't have moral principles of actual consent without reference to the social contract, which relies on hypothetical consent. Actual consent depends on hypothetical consent.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j774byz wrote

This does not answer the problem. Noting that consent is based on underlying principles doesn't do anything to give authority to hypothetical consent, nor is hypothetical consent the only possible value to base actual consent on.

All you've done is to (again) reduce yourself to a Lockean position in more steps, as the law that you base rights on is agent-independent. And so, the social contract based justifications you give in the article still aren't applicable, and the terminology used is still misappropriated.

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contractualist OP t1_j775718 wrote

I've already addressed why the social contract has moral authority in the above-linked pieces, as well as why I am not a Lockean.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j775ott wrote

You've done neither in regards to this specific understanding (or rather, simply changing the meaning of a term) of "social contracts".

Your arguments do not fit the position you're arguing for, as they imply an actual contract and not Lockean rights in a poor disguise.

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contractualist OP t1_j77h10a wrote

Social contract theory has never referred to an actual, material, morally binding agreement. No social contract theorist has argued this. Rather, it is a very common misconception and mischaracterization of the argument. I'd recommend reading the above posted articles that develop this contractualist view. Keep in mind that you're addressing a strawman.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77j9tw wrote

Of course it has. Implicit consent (and other less popular "consent replacements") has been an argued position since Rousseau's time.

I've skimmed over the articles you posted and haven't seen anything to suggest that the view I ascribed to you is inaccurate.

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contractualist OP t1_j77l766 wrote

Implicit consent is not actual consent as you refer to above. Only Locke has made a serious argument for implicit consent, which contractualists have not adopted. Social contract theory takes after Kant and Rawls. Again, why this social contract theory is not Lockean but Kantian.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77mwpr wrote

This is outright false. Locke saw rights as God given natural facts, not based on any kind of consent, implicit or otherwise. You are talking nonsense.

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contractualist OP t1_j77ng5a wrote

See here for Locke on tacit consent. Again, contractualists don't take either an actual or implicit consent view. This is a misunderstanding of the philosophy.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77nwun wrote

This is Locke's argument for Political Authority, not natural rights.

There is no misunderstanding, the view is internally inconsistent

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contractualist OP t1_j77p45i wrote

Yes, this is the only argument made for implicit consent and its not even applied to moral philosophy (I'm not even sure how implicit consent would apply in that case). Again, contractualists have never used either actual or implicit consent, and their failure to do so isn't Lockean. To attribute this view onto them is a blatant misunderstanding. But if you know of any social contract theorists that rely on those ideas of consent, I'd be curious to know.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77po2j wrote

Try Hobbes.

Contractualists don't rely on either type of consent. They try to make rights do things only an argument from consent could jusify. The conception of rights and justifications don't fit each other. Thus, internally inconsistent.

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contractualist OP t1_j77qjhw wrote

Hobbes never relied on actual consent either. And yes they do, because you can't declare rights that impose duties onto others without a reasonable justification that others can reasonably accept. And this is not Locke's view of rights.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77r0jo wrote

It's not a Lockean justification for rights, yet contractualists use is to justify a Lockean conception of what natural rights are (moral facts). You are either not properly distinguishing between Lockean arguments and Lockean conclusions, or you really do not see the incoherency between the justification and the idea that it is meant to support. Either way, the inconsistency remains.

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LobYonder t1_j77kikb wrote

You can argue the "social contract" is the willing acceptance of a group's rules in order to obtain in-group or social benefits. It is a valid "contract" to the extent that you can leave the group and it's rules and join another (or live as Robinson Crusoe).

There is no a-priori reason to suppose a group's rules would be fair or maximize benefits over restrictions, however as long as there are multiple groups and individuals or families can migrate between them or influence the rules, then there is a selection effect towards the most beneficial, fair and effective rules. The fact that other primates also have strong concepts of "fairness" suggests that this group selection on rights and duties has been affecting our ancestors for millions of years. Thus you can argue that modern societies have reached a near-optimal and thus pretty "moral" set of rules for maximum personal net benefit with minimal restrictions and unfairness. It is therefore probably unreasonable for someone to reject modern social norms. I don't know if this is considered a Lockean view.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77lzlp wrote

>You can argue the "social contract" is the willing acceptance of a group's rules in order to obtain in-group or social benefits

You can, that would be implicit (or explicit) consent, which is not the view argued in the article (theoretical consent - the idea that people would consent if they were rational).

You can certainly support a view of rights that is based in implicit or explicit consent to a(n actual) social contract, but then you'd run into the problem of not being able to apply those rules and restrictions to people who explicitly do not consent to the social contract.

As for whether modern social contracts maximize personal wellbeing, and whether the survival of such contracts or the apparent mass consent to them is indication of such is an entire discussion to have, and one that I'll not participate in for now, if you can forgive me for that. However, as for the question of whether that Lockean view, it isn't. I'd say your view (and this depends on how you view "benefit" and "unfairness") is closer to Utilitarianism. I'm not familiar with J.S Mill's theory of rights, but I'd guess his position is somewhat similar.

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LobYonder t1_j77p1p1 wrote

> not being able to apply those rules and restrictions to people who explicitly do not consent to the social contract.

If someone I don't have a "social contract" agreement with attacks me I will certainly defend myself and perhaps kill them if necessary, and that would be morally justified. I don't need their agreement to do that. Similarly if someone who doesn't agree to my town's social contract regarding property rights breaks into my home and steals my stuff why should I need their agreement to apply the law? If you don't agree with the town rules you should not enter the town.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77qegd wrote

If you source moral and legal authority from a social contract, then no, you can't apply the law to people who are not part of that contract. That is what "willing agreement" means.

To prevent people who do not agree with the town rules from entering the town, you need a moral law that allows limiting their freedom in that way. And of course, that law can't be the town rules, because they're not part of the town, and because if that were the case you'd fall into infinite regress.

So if you want to justify applying legal codes outside of willing participants, you need something beyond consent to justify that.

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LobYonder t1_j77qw5a wrote

That's why the option to leave is important. If they chose to stay they are subject to the rules. That is their choice.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77rid7 wrote

What of people who do not have a reasonable option to leave? Can the law not be applied to them?

And more importantly, what of people who decide to stay but explicitly confirm that they do not want to be a part of the social contract, benefits or otherwise? The option to leave is important because people staying when they could leave is an indication that they accept the town rules, and that indication could be overruled by an even stronger indication (explicit statement) to the contrary.

If you argue that people should be forced between leaving the state or accepting its laws regardless of their personal consent, then you need a moral justification for that, and we run into the same problem from before.

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