1. This article is about a single author who does not self-identify as a TERF. Nowhere does it raise the claim that no one self identifies as a TERF. The term only even appears twice, once in the first paragraph and once in the last paragraph

2. The author does identify as a "radical feminist," (the RF of TERF) and merely states that they do not identify as trans exclusionary.

Importantly, they don't identify as cis, despite being a man who is biologically male and "identifies as having an XY chromosome." - which is what the term cis describes. The reason they reject this nomenclature is because they feel that a man identifying as male can only do so by adopting patriarchal attitudes about what masculinity is, and Feminism as a movement ought to be post-gender.

3. And TERF is a pretty weird-ass thing to identify as. It's a description of a person based upon the effects of their actions. People are welcome to disagree with that description - this person appears to do so - but whether or not you identify as a TERF does not determine whether you are, or are not, a TERF. Lots of characteristics are socially conferred upon individuals, like "being cool" or "being mean." Whether you are or are not cool is not up to you. It's up to literally everyone else. It isn't up to you whether or not you are respecting other people or their boundaries. It's up to them.

If everyone you know says that you aren't cool, you aren't, no matter how much you protest. Unlike "being cool," trans exclusionary politics has some very specific and objectively verifiable measures. "Are trans women women?" is a fairly easy litmus. And the rejection of the question with "identifying as a woman (under patriarchy) is to identify with patriarchy-determined social structures and therefore I identify as an individual with XX chromosomes" - as this author seems to be doing - is frankly such bullshit.

Just because you reframe the question so that it no longer mentions trans people, that doesn't mean it doesn't, practically speaking, exclude trans people, or put their civil and human rights in jeopardy.

4. This article lays out a very vague defense about how some unspecified other people like to criticize the author on unspecified points regarding policies and the author does not even state where they fall on a number of policy positions regarding trans people.

One might expect, in an article trying to argue that the author is not a TERF, an explanation of how the author's stances and actions don't in fact exclude trans people.

We don't get that. Instead we get a very "just asking questions" vibe and a list of topics that the author thinks is worthy of concern like bathroom use, gendered athletics, "publicly funded surgical removal of healthy tissue," etc. And then a vague and general complaint about how unspecified other people sometimes treat the author's viewpoints as not worthy of discussion or consideration.

Racists don't need to identify as racist to be one. And if I read a comment that said "No-one self-identifies as racist" I'd be inclined to agree, given the morally-laden weight of the accusation. For the same reason they don't identify as xenophobic; they disagree with the terminology, especially the superficial characteristics of the word (I'm not afraid of immigrants), not the behavior which the term describes.

But if that comment, to support the fact that no-one identifies as racist, linked an article about how one specific individual doesn't self-identify as racist for specific personal reasons, and then used that time not to argue why their position isn't racist, but instead to complain about how other people are using words inaccurately....well, I wouldn't take that poster very seriously either.

In any case, this publication doesn't appear to be an unbiased source. The founder and editor of Feminist Current "self-identifies" as exiled in Mexico , a move from Canada to what she describes as a move to "freer pastures" (Mexico!) in...wait for it... 2021.

The actual author, Robert Jenson, doesn't appear to be a TERF in the way that people mean it when they describe someone like Rowling as a TERF. So I can understand why the author is upset.

This is like far-right conservatives getting upset when they're called Nazis because there were actual Nazis at their rallies despite they fact that they don't, personally, identify as a Nazi.

It's a problem of association.

But please don't come on Reddit and try to launder one university professor's personal beliefs on gender as if it supports the claim that TERF is a slur, or that no one identifies as a TERF.

Of course they don't. It's not a good thing to be. That doesn't mean, however, that they don't exist.

The Princess Bride, The Never Ending Story, and of course, Hamlet.

> Then would you agree that pursuing what a good life is is also subjective?

No, I'm not saying pursuing the good life is subjective. You aren't listening very well. People can have a great many opinions about something and be wrong. There is a difference between opinion and knowledge. The fact that people disagree does not necessarily mean that the topic is subjective. It may also mean that one or both of them is wrong.

Saying that the good life is as objective as it is subjective nonsense, it's a contradiction in terms.

I'll also note that apparently we've moved the goal posts. We went from speaking about how philosophy, as a general thing, ought to be primarily focused on the acceptance and management of adversity, while I wanted to point out that even if this was true (I don't think it is) it doesn't make any kind of sense to say that philosophy has nothing to do with the ideal.

And now we've got this line that this is all based on the concept of yin and yang, which like, nothing you have said has much to do with that at all, and certainly doesn't help explain why you think philosophy does not deal with ideal and should be focused on the management and utility of adversity.

> I kind of agree with you that an ideal life is probably with the minimum suffering, but it is a slippery slope because without it, that could include also avoiding adversity. There is no growth and maturation for the individual and society if there is no adversity. It is as integral to life as happiness and pleasure. If there is no adversity, how could one know what the latter is, and vice versa?

You clearly stated that a life without adversity would be an impoverished one, resulting in no growth or maturity for the individual or society, and then stated it is as integral as happiness and pleasure.

Ergo a life insufficient in adversity is as affirmable as an unhappy life, and we ought to seek adversity in a similar manner to how we seek happiness when either is deficient.

I'm not "putting words into your mouth." I'm explaining what your position entails if we take it seriously.

If the good life requires adversity for maturity and and growth (and maturity and growth are goods) then anyone not enduring adversity, or enduring an insufficient amount of it, or enduring the wrong kinds of it, or in the wrong admixtures, will be lacking in those goods.

If we should be pursuing the good life (which we should, by definition) then we shall need to seek out adversity. And this is an incredible game of hazard, pregnant with all kinds of dangers that make the good life impossible.

> Some people think their answer to good and/or meaningful life is to have raise a family with children, others think they're happy being childless.

Then we have people who differ on what makes the ideal life objectively worth living. And if you're saying some people think the good life consists in raising a family for them, but they don't think doing so will result in the good life for others, we are talking about preferences, or something smaller than the good life, not the good life itself.

> philosophy in general teaches that whatever comes, be prepared for it with the knowledge and wisdom granted to us by experience and education.

This is a fine explanation of what philosophy is for (if we are to value it for its uses) but I'll note that it has nothing essentially to do with adversity.

Wisdom is also needed for correct judgment and action when dealing with boons and good fortune. If philosophy is for helping us deal with whatever comes it's primary importance cannot be in the managing of adversity.

> It's not necessarily objective nor subjective.

Then it's anything. What an empty sentence.

> But the approach on how to [achieve a good life that benefits everyone's well-being] is very much subjective.

I disagree. People can reasonably disagree about things that have objective value, and do so for a variety of reasons ranging from ignorance, to lack of clarity, to misplaced judgment, misunderstanding, or just plain disagreeing about philosophical priors.

The idea that general well-being is subjective is itself kind of silly, given that we are talking about something that is universal, or at least adheres equally to every human being. There's no good reason for thinking that something which is true of 100% of human beings is subjective.

And if it isn't true of 100% of human beings, well, we aren't really talking about a good life with a wide enough net that can describe benefiting everyone's well being, well are we?

> I kind of agree with you that an ideal life is probably with the minimum suffering, but it is a slippery slope because without it, that could include also avoiding adversity.

So, let's not define it that way. If we think that adversity is a necessary condition for the good life, then let's go from....

• The good life is the one with a minimum of suffering

To

• The good life is the one with a maximum amount of suffering that a given individual can overcome and be made useful to them.

And to that I would say: this is not a philosophy by which a human being can actually live because we do not and can not know what kinds of adversity, and in what amounts, would actually benefit us except in hindsight (if at all).

Which makes pursuing the good life an impossible task to do, short of seeking adversity for adversity's sake and hoping to not be overwhelmed.

This ends up defining the acquisition of that ultimate good, the good life, as something that can only happen by chance. And I disagree that the good life is basically equivalent to being lucky.

That's still fairly trivial.

Life isn't theoretical. It's just about the least theoretical, abstract, disinterested thing a person could possibly be involved with.

I think it follows pretty simply that a philosophy that isn't about living isn't going to be useful in informing us how to live.

> both Western and Eastern philosophies acknowledge the harsh reality of life and give prescription on how to live in harmony with that fact, while building a better life than at present.

Better in what sense? According to what standard? Do we mean improving our material conditions, or pursuing some notion of the good life?

My point is that admitting that it makes sense to speak of "better" and "worse" lives, then you already admit to the use of an ideal to guide action.

The thing that makes a better life better is exactly the fact that it more closely approximates some notion of an ideal life.

> Even then the notion is debatable because someone else has their own different definition and understanding on how to live life.

This is basically straight solipsism. Yes, people differ. Yes, people even differ reasonably.

But whether or not we agree on what the good life is, the fact of the matter is that both of us have some idea of the good which we are advocating for. If it's a disagreement over different definitions on what the ideal life is, then again, we are agreed: the ideal life is the one most with living.

I bet we also disagree on what to do about the economy. That doesn't cause me to doubt that the economy as a concept has any valid substance.

The fact that a notion is debatable only shows that the notion is suitable for contemplation and conversation, not that it doesn't exist, isn't worth our time, inherently contradictory etc. etc, or whatever you meant to perjoratively imply.

It's debatable? So what? I wasn't aware philosophy was a debate free zone... so I really don't know what to do with this criticism. I would be far more worried about the substance of an idea if it weren't debatable and open to rational discourse regarding differing definitions.

If the primary use of philosophy (even this is assuming that philosophy is for its uses, rather than an end in itself) is to deal with suffering, then by golly, I think we have to admit the ideal life is one with a minimum of suffering

Which 1) again shows that philosophy cannot even do this without focusing on what the ideal is and 2) presents a fairly low bar. This is a very thin, attenuated kind of philosophy if that is all it achieves.