> In science, the endpoint at which truth is realized is when a theory is proven

A whole lot of people would argue against the notion of theories ever being “proven” in science. Meanwhile, a whole lot of people would raise the point that there’s a path to truth in politics—one that’s determined by evaluating historical evidence, making use of rational argument, and proposing policies that are in accordance with whatever latest research the social sciences, whatever latest developments political philosophy and ethics have to offer, and whatever the latest developments in history are. Or something like that.

However, we can easily imagine a political party that makes all the right decisions policy-wise, makes competent use of all the frameworks to analyze complex social phenomena in the right way, and still collapses into a corrupt entity suddenly determined by special interests because rather than opinion being central to politics, it is power structures. But in that sense, politics isn’t all that different from science. It’s just that in politics, there’s usually a whole lot more at stake than in science. So science can afford progressing “one funeral at a time” as Max Planck described:

“A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”

For politics, that’s usually not a desirable option.

Or rather, there’s a political and sociological aspect to science that requires our attention. The works of Kuhn and Feyerabend and I guess “continental” philosophy of science has demonstrated as much.

>In this way science and religion are quite similar and a future where the two are synthesized into one field is possible.

What does that mean concretely? Science and religion (or, I guess, “spirituality”) being thought of as “non-overlapping magisteria” is a rather recent development. Aristotle’s conception of the sciences included theology for example.

The tutorials I took covered what the lectures and readings already covered in more detail, with fewer students to tend to, and with a tutor who's there to answer questions, guide discussions, and do exam preparation. We only had tutorials for survey lectures, so having a dedicated class to actually discuss, say, Kant's First Critique in a bit more detail than two 90 minutes lectures allowed for was actually helpful (but hardly comparable to a seminar on it). And given that freshman students regularly have the weirdest ideas of what studying philosophy actually is like, having a dedicated time slot to practice skills like reading and analyzing isn't the worst idea either.

Peterson is basically suggesting self-reflection as a way to know oneself, which is a fair enough point. Humans have sophisticated capacities to self-reflect and be self-aware, which is a first step towards knowing ourselves. We can also enter in dialogue with others and integrate their perspectives on ourselves into the image we cultivated of ourselves. That way, we can try to counteract our perhaps natural and maybe even strong tendency towards having skewed perceptions of ourselves (on the other hand, we're ultimately the only ones with privileged access to our thoughts and will represent a black box to varying degrees to various people).

I don't know what argument Watts is making exactly here, but in general I'm quite skeptical of the notion that there's a true self somewhere hidden and unaccusable to us or that we're influenced or controlled by subconscious forces we're condemned to never fully understand or even be aware of (not that I'm ascribing this view to Watts).

I wouldn't recommend Russell's History of Philosophy. While it is certainly easy (and at times delightful) to read, it's dated and frequently reflects Russell's biases more than being a good introduction to philosophy (the chapters on Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche are atrocious, the one on Aquinas borderline slander). Russell is decent to understand certain attitudes that dominated 20th century British philosophy, but we now have better histories of philosophy, especially for beginners. Instead, I'd recommend this:

• Anthony Kenny's New History of Western Philosophy (four volumes). Probably the best historical overview available right now. Accessible and well written.

• The Routledge Contemporary Introductions series should cover the basics: epistemology, metaphysics, ethics. The series contains more than 30 volumes. Pick the ones that interest you/that you can find on the internet. None of those are exactly historical and pay little mind to historical context or the specific philosophers while Kenny's work is an actual history of philosophy.

• Russ Shafer Landau's The Fundamentals of Ethics is an accessible introduction to moral philosophy.

• For contemporary analytic metaphysics, Loux's Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (part of the Routledge series) seems to be standard. Alternatively, van Inwagen's Metaphysics. For a more historical approach, or for continental metaphysics, Grondin's Introduction to Metaphysics.

If you're just interested in a bunch of ideas, removed from their historical context, then the Routledge series might be the better pick (but imo not paying attention to the historical context deliberately is just intentionally depriving oneself of the "full picture" for no good reason).

Right, but you haven't provided anything resembling an argument for both the definition and your overall metaphysical point.

"Continental bullshit" as in continental philosophy? No, not really. I'm tired of vacuous, frequently politically motivated criticism of continental philosophy though.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postanalytic_philosophy

I agree it's a terrible name, but imo so is "analytic philosophy".

> In practice this shuts down debate.

The point of /r/askphilosophy isn't to foster debate; it's to provide a place where verified experts answer questions.

>As a result you'll get little to no analytic philosophy, as it has been understood post WW2.

/r/askphilosophy is chokful of people working on analytic and post-analytic philosophy.

> but with just this definition, how satisfactory do you find it?

Not satisfactory at all. The definition is fairly idiosyncratic (for no apparent reason), lacks intuitive appeal, and the complete lack of reasoning makes it nearly impossible to accept.

Suggests that "we" is an distinguishable entity from our body and consciousness and not just an emergent one from our body and/or consciousness. Why should we believe that?

> Lol, the mods here aren't decent people.

You managed to make that judgment in 15 hours?

> It seems to me like you're dismissing expert opinion.

How come the only experts that defend Rand are associated with the Ayn Rand Institute or are experts in an unrelated field?

Not cognitive science per se (but any critique of neuroscience will have ramifications for cognitive science too), but Bennett's and Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is a rather scathing review of the conceptual foundation of neuroscience.

PMS Hacker (one of the premier contemporary Wittgensteinians) isn't much of a fan of contemporary neuroscience in general, see for example here.

Because they're either falling for typical pseudo-history of philosophy nonsense or are making fun of those who do.

>Rousseau framed the house, Hegel finished it!

> I'm quite confused by your intentions, as you seem to be ranting against the article,

I'm not "ranting" against the article as much as I'm pointing out how vacuous it is.

>but only provided 1 instance on your position about Postmodernism, which is what my entire post is about?

Who cares about my position on postmodernism? What I'm really suggesting is that both you and the author of the article aren't informed enough on what postmodernism even is to adequately critique it.

> Im guessing you downvoted this also because you don't like the source? >

I don't up/downvote on reddit in general, so no.

> I encourage you to look at the beliefs of postmodernism, especially on Britannica, as they number the beliefs and explain them.

Why would I look at a generalist encyclopedia, or even worse, a wholly unrelated evolutionary biology blog that relies on unserious polemics against "postmodernism" like Sokal and Bricmont's work or the output of a known grifter like Helen Pluckrose?

If I really wanted to deep-dive into postmodernism (something I'd have to do before critiquing it), I'd start with the SEP article on it. Or some threads on /r/askphilosophy. Or selected chapters from Garry Gutting's French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, or Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition, or Cuck Philosophy's Postmodernism FAQ.

>I also would like to know your position on Postmodernism.

Postmodernism is a vacuous term that serves more as a bogey man for reactionary pundits than as a meaningful umbrella term for philosophical positions. Instead, why don't you pick out a "postmodern" philosopher -- either someone who embraced the term like Lyotard or, to a lesser degree, Richard Rorty) or one of those that get regularly accused of being postmodernists, like Derrida or Foucault -- and work through their output?

>And I also do not have any comment on Karl Marx, the Enlightenment period, how Postmodernism began, World War 2 technology, or anything other than Does Postmodernism make sense? Provide your explanation" I have already posted my answer, twice.

Why do you think it is wise to divorce a supposed set of assumptions and conclusions from the historical context out of which they arose?

> https://theappalachianonline.com/opinion-truth-objectivity-and-postmodernism/

Is that article a spillover from the late 2010’s 90s-style culture war remake? Stuff like:

>To solve these problems, among others, Karl Marx, began drifting away from Enlightenment principles in search of ideas to eliminate the inequalities brought on by Enlightenment principles. However, the disillusionment with the Enlightenment occurred post World War I and II, when the technological marvels produced by science led to the slaughter of millions.

Doesn’t strike me as particularly productive. Marx pretty much continued the sort of critical philosophy that Kant (perhaps the most important Enlightenment thinker….or at the very least one of the most important ones) pioneered, the post-Kantians systematized, and the German idealists and their successors critiqued sympathetically.

The critique of Enlightenment ideals and conceptions of reason we see after WWII (like, say, Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School, i.e., the eternal bogeyman of a subset of the political right) strike me as perfectly in line with the very spirit of the Enlightenment, which is always also self-critical. Also blaming the disillusionment exclusively on science strikes me as misleading. There was disillusionment with the culture that spawned out of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment at large.

>Consistent with postmodern doctrine is the belief that institutions, such as science and language, are oppressive institutes of control.

Who actually claims this and what is their actual argument here? And more importantly, what is the context of this argument? This is an often repeated claim that isn’t entirely wrong, but I worry that it has taken on a life on its own, i.e. separated from actual postmodernist thought.

>If both sides are right and wrong, does that not prove postmodernism’s point that truth is up to individual interpretation? Not exactly. Aristotle solved this philosophical problem in ancient Greece when he theorized that truth and ethical behavior bisect between two extremes, called the “Golden Mean.” Since both sides offer truth and falsehood, given their rejection of the other side’s perspective, then it stands to reason that the middle approach is true, since it formulates a solution based on complete information. To answer humankind’s biggest question pertaining to truth is to find the middle between Enlightenment and postmodern philosophy. To choose one over the other is to look at the world from an incomplete lens. We should strive to reach a reasonable approach toward human progress while acknowledging our personal bias and give those with dissenting beliefs a platform.

Disagree. A better solution would be to first actually understand what led to the disillusionment with Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment ideas and what those critiques of them (especially those that still conceive of themselves as continuing the Enlightenment project or at the very least as laboring in its spirit) say. Especially since this issue doesn’t really seem to be confined to the post-war era:

>Paradoxically, the crisis of the Enlightenment arose from within, and indeed from its most cherished principle. The problem is that this principle is self-reflexive. If reason must subject all beliefs to criticism, it must also subject its own tribunal to criticism. To exempt its tribunal from scrutiny would be nothing less than ‘dogmatism’, accepting beliefs on authority, which is the very opposite of reason. The criticism of reason therefore inevitably became the meta-criticism of reason. If the Enlightenment was the age of criticism, the 1790s were the age of meta-criticism. All the doubts about the authority of reason, which are so often said to be characteristic of our ‘post-modern’ age, were already apparent in late eighteenth-century Germany.

Frederick Beiser’s Hegel, p. 23

What do you mean by “science” here and why would it be “just” “science of philosophy”? Particularly so since, say, someone like Hegel — well-read on and responding to ancient philosophy — deemed it necessary for philosophy to become science.