Submitted by greghickey5 t3_113ecst in philosophy
Comments
dmk_aus t1_j8qhoqo wrote
At each point in time, all your atoms, electrons bonds etc are in a given state of motion, energy, location, etc. So the next moment must either be determined already and/or varied by what we consider random quantum effects. And so on back to the big bang and forwards into the future.
Unless there is "a soul" or similar which would contain our will and can somehow interact with our body(including the brain) and change its state but also has never been detected by science... it is pretty hard to explain that their is free will.
However, it is clear that drugs/chemicals, brain damage, education, illness, weather, sleep deprivation, time of day, etc can affect what people think, how they think and how they act. Which means that a souls impact is minimal or the soul is impacted by the material world and is therefore starting to look deterministic...
Either quantum actions in the brain are soul/magic/unknown something or we are deterministic (Newtonian) and/or random (quantum) bio-automatons.
Or, of course, we are in a simulation, then a scientific understanding of the "world" doesn't help much as there could be a random "if statement".
pizzageek t1_j8qpj2h wrote
Even the soul or external force argument leads to determinism. Does a being with a soul get to choose that soul? If so, did they get to choose whatever it was that made that particular choice of soul? Any philosophical concept surrounding free will eventually leads back to there being an external determination made first. This original determination then effects all subsequent “choices” and negates any true free will.
[deleted] t1_j8rvd2d wrote
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Dirks_Knee t1_j8rucil wrote
Have you seen Devs? A great entertaining show debating this exact idea.
gashmol t1_j8qmc94 wrote
Trying to explain freewill in terms of a soul is begging the question. Appealing to randomness is replacing one kind of prison with another. Compatibilism, no matter how you define it, is another illusion.
Freewill is nonsensical.
dmk_aus t1_j8qp7op wrote
That is essentially what I said, I just provided reasoning and left the pathway to changing opinion without ridicule.
dbx999 t1_j8rt8bs wrote
Randomness should be considered as deterministic. The flip of a coin over time reveals the deterministic nature of randomness, falling in line with the elegant orderly pattern of 50% heads and 50% tails. Chaos and uncertainty turns into order and predictable over an aggregate.
Your life is one toss of one coin.
So when you land one way, you will feel as if you chose the side to land on. But it is all the forces acting on you from outside of you that determined that outcome. And if you pull back that perspective to a population of 8 billion other humans, the predictable order that humans follow the same rules as flipped coins and viruses becomes evident.
We may be sentient but we may only be witnesses to our own existence. Passenger of my soul, eyewitness of my fate. Not master or captain.
SpoddyCoder t1_j8t4l40 wrote
Another way to view randomness as the same as deterministic was posited by John Conway when developing the free-will theorem…
Imagine rolling all the random numbers you need for the universe’s lifetime in advance. Then simply pull them out in the order of their use… gives the illusion of total random outcomes for events - but they were still determined before the event.
dbx999 t1_j8t6kva wrote
Another simplistic demonstration I found neat is this distribution of balls which despite the random falling behavior of each individual ball, ultimately reveals an orderly outcome of an aggregate population of balls - and consistently behaves this way over and over when the process is repeated.
So if we imagine ourselves as being one single ball, then we will feel as though the paths we “choose” will be either random or even made by our free will to pick between a right or left direction at each collision and crossroads that we encounter - and where we end up may feel as though we chose our adventure. However, the fact we all together as a group behave in such a predictable way as to repeat the bell curved distribution contradicts the idea that individual choice is separate and independent from determinism.
Our choices are not only limited (we cannot for instance choose to violate physical laws of the universe - so we’re constrained to choices bracketed inside parameters) but our choices are ultimately following a grander deterministic set of rules. What you choose and what I choose may seem independent of one another - and independent of the choices of everyone in our population- yet we will fall within a bell curve and the bell curve will be established each time by our so called choices.
We have no more free will than each of those little falling balls. Randomness exists but randomness leads to both order and predictability and consistency. Randomness does not equal complete chaos. It is merely a process to carry one thing from one state to another state and there is nothing chaotic about that process, only that from the perspective of the individual in motion, the future is opaque until it becomes the present.
frnzprf t1_j8w270m wrote
It's like shuffling a deck of cards.
Auctorion t1_j8rwakg wrote
Except that there are aspects of quantum mechanics that, as far as we know, are totally random and non-deterministic, e.g. radioactive decay. Now you might say that these events don't percolate up to our scale, but bypassing discussion of whether they do, we can make them percolate up. If you defer decision making to a quantum random number generator you would have an event on our scale that could not have been predicted. A deterministic event horizon.
dbx999 t1_j8ta8sf wrote
I think we’re trying to shoehorn the concept that true chaos exists and “percolates” to disrupt a clean deterministic system. However I’m not convinced this is the case.
Let’s look at the ratio of pi. Its values consist of unpredictable seemingly random strings of digits. Randomness therefore exists?
Well - that’s in pure mathematics so does this even apply to a physical world? Not sure if these two can bridge the gap between the conceptual math to material reality.
Say some value of some phenomenon seems random. like your radioactive decay. I’m still not sure if that proves anything. What if the observed radioactive decay when aggregated forms a more cohesive pattern akin to the bell curves and distribution of other phenomena? My point was to say that seemingly random events such as the flip of a coin become not random when aggregated. And maybe that is also the case in your example.
Auctorion t1_j8tk86z wrote
>I think we’re trying to shoehorn the concept that true chaos exists and “percolates” to disrupt a clean deterministic system.
It's not shoehorning at all though, is it? Humans exist. Humans can leverage quantum probability. That is all that is needed because we act as a conduit for the micro, medium, and macro scales to interact in ways they may not absent the involvement of intelligence. Left alone, our Sun will become a white dwarf in about 5 billion years. If humans stick around long enough, it's likely we'll find a way to prevent that. If we decided whether to let the Sun burn itself out or to refuel it based on the roll of a quantum RNG, that would be a piece of quantum randomness affecting the lifecycle of stars. Scale it up. Even if you consider it to be shoehorning, it doesn't matter. It's still disruption to the supposedly clean deterministic system.
>Let’s look at the ratio of pi. Its values consist of unpredictable seemingly random strings of digits. Randomness therefore exists?
Pi isn't random. It's irrational. Its numbers don't change, it's properties aren't in flux- they just require discovery. Fun aside: we only need 40 digits of pi to calculate the circumference of the universe to within an error margin smaller than a hydrogen atom, but last summer we knew over 62.8 trillion digits of pi.
>What if the observed radioactive decay when aggregated forms a more cohesive pattern akin to the bell curves and distribution of other phenomena?
Then my beliefs will adjust based on the evidence because these are beliefs founded upon the evidence, not beliefs that cherry pick evidence in support of beliefs I intend to hold regardless.
SnapcasterWizard t1_j8sr3d8 wrote
>totally random and non-deterministic, e.g. radioactive decay
Its not totally random, from the perspective of an individual atom it appears to be. But if you have enough atoms then there is a clear non-randomness to the decay.
Look at it like this, if it were truly random, then different atoms couldn't have different half lives.
Auctorion t1_j8ss3va wrote
Totally random doesn’t mean 100% absolute maximum random, just as free will doesn’t mean the ability to ignore causality. It means that the specific moment of decay cannot, by any known means, be predicted even if you know the window.
frnzprf t1_j8w1zuv wrote
Randomness is a weird concept. I think you can replace it with "unpredictable".
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Predictability depends on an individual perspective. When physicists say that quants are random, they say that noone will ever be able to predict their behaviour.
bakmanthetitan329 t1_j8xm020 wrote
I try to use the term "causal determinism" in discussions of free will. The progression of the state of the universe is strictly caused by the state of the universe (and nothing else), although it may not be a priori determinable from the state.
Xenophon_jr t1_j8rkitj wrote
And you're nonsensical without it.
Aus_with_the_Sauce t1_j9016iy wrote
This is the only viewpoint that has ever made sense to me. Free will is only real in the sense that we “feel” like we’re in control.
DasAllerletzte t1_j8rcs7w wrote
>a random „if statement“
Then our world might be run by an AI
Fast_Philosophy1044 t1_j8wytzt wrote
I wonder why you said scientific understanding isn’t possible if there is a random if statement.
Science already tries to uncover those of statements as causality, isn’t it? If there is an if statement, that would be under the chain of causality since it always applies.
[deleted] t1_j8ym8qw wrote
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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rap2b wrote
>If all our decisions can be traced back to genetics, situational and nurture; aren’t those variables beyond our own control anyway?
You are your genetics and upbringing. There is no need for you to have control over what you are.
So free will is about being able to act in line with your desires. It isn't about having complete control of your desires.
HippyHitman t1_j8rbguv wrote
But what’s free about that? What’s the difference between you acting on your desires and a robot acting on its programming?
threedecisions t1_j8rpkg4 wrote
The belief in Free Will is like an algorythm sent to a robot because it is encourages social order. It puts parameters on the robot's behaviors by telling it nasty things will happen to it if it acts outside of them.
The limitations on the idea is when the robot is unable to comply with prescriptions given to it and is punished rather than assisted.
DasAllerletzte t1_j8rea3z wrote
I’d say, you can adapt.
And also consider non-measurable phenomena like other peoples feelings or reactions.
You can prioritize.
Recently I wanted to get §thing.
Then I started to weigh wether I truly need §thing and if I can afford it too.
Such decisions would require a ton of code engineering to implement.
HippyHitman t1_j8rf9hn wrote
>I’d say, you can adapt.
Sure, but what about a machine that can alter its own programming? If it’s not acting with free will when it adapts, then those adaptations aren’t free will.
>And also consider non-measurable phenomena like other peoples feelings or reactions.
They may not be measurable, but they can be observed and estimated. That’s how you do it, after all.
>You can prioritize.
This one machines are already great at. Probably better than us. The amount of prioritization that happens every microsecond in order to make modern computers run would fry our brains.
>Such decisions would require a ton of code engineering to implement.
Sure, and that’s my argument. We’re just extremely complex machines, so the reasoning is obfuscated to the point that it gives the illusion of free will. But if we could actually analyze our minds and thought mechanisms I don’t see why it would be any different from a computer program, and I don’t see where there’s room for free will.
frnzprf t1_j8w3ow1 wrote
> We’re just extremely complex machines, so the reasoning is obfuscated to the point that it gives the illusion of free will.
That's interesting. You say you have an illusion of free will, but you have seen through it. I don't even have the illusion of free will. I just have a will, which is inherently subjective, so it can't be an illusion.
Maybe historically free will meant something different then how I'd define it today. Maybe "someone is free to act according to their will". (Maybe not that though. I'm not sure.) A judge said "I'm punishing you, because you acted on free will, i.e. you weren't directly coerced by other peoples wills."
Then over time the meaning of free will evolved to something like "will, at least partially independent of everything", but people still claim to believe in it, because they are thinking of the older, pragmatic definition.
dbx999 t1_j8rw2b1 wrote
The more complex and nuanced the situation and decision making becomes the more convincing that the choice is the product of our inner self. We retcon our decisions as being products of free will. We ride a roller coaster of a life and think the whole time we’re steering the thing while it’s on a track.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rcoqq wrote
>But what’s free about that?
I'm sure there are other definitions, but I use something like free will is about "the ability to make voluntary actions in line with your desires free from external coercion/influence".
Free will is key in morality and justice, so I like to understand how the courts define and use it. Lets use a real life example of how the Supreme Court considers free will.
>It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do
In the case of R. v. Ruzic
>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.
The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent.
Compare that to the average case of smuggling where someone wants to make some money and isn't coerced into doing it. If they smuggle drugs then they did it of their own "free will" and would likely be found guilty.
So in one example the person had what the courts say is free will and not in the other.
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>What’s the difference between you acting on your desires and a robot acting on its programming?
Well I would say a person is just a really complicated robot, so there isn't anything fundamentally different apart from complexity.
HippyHitman t1_j8rd1xk wrote
Legality doesn’t imply truth.
Let’s compare two scenarios: in one you program a robot to kill someone, in the other you program a robot to cut people’s hair but it has a horrible malfunction and kills someone. In which of those is scenarios is the robot exercising free will?
If you agree that humans are essentially no different from robots, then it follows that we can’t have free will regardless of what any court or law says.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rf5pd wrote
>Legality doesn’t imply truth.
I just refer to the legal system since they have good high quality analysis of free will which matches up to most people's intuitions around free will. It also lines up with what most philosophers think.
>Let’s compare two scenarios: in one you program a robot to kill someone,
Not sure here, how do you define a robot's desires?
If we switch it out to be a person, and say they have the genetics and upbringing to make them a violent killer. If they had the desire to kill someone and voluntary acted on that then it would be of their own free will.
> in the other you program a robot to cut people’s hair but it has a horrible malfunction and kills someone.
Well that's not in line with their desires and isn't a voluntary action, so wouldn't be of it's free will.
>If you agree that humans are essentially no different from robots, then it follows that we can’t have free will regardless of what any court or law says.
Sounds like you are talking about libertarian free will, and sure people don't have libertarian free will, but that doesn't matter since most people are really talking about compatibilist intuitions, which we do have.
What people really mean by free will is the same thing the courts are talking about. They aren't talking about the libertarian free will you are using.
HippyHitman t1_j8rg9mj wrote
This doesn’t seem like a logical argument to me. It seems like you’re just saying humans tend to believe we have free will, and our society is based upon that assumption.
I’m arguing that the assumption is incorrect.
Where would we draw the line between free will and compulsion? It has to be arbitrary, just like you noted about a robot’s desires. An automaton desires nothing other than following its programming, so anything a robot does successfully would be an exercise of free will. But I don’t think anybody would actually argue that, they’d argue it’s an exercise of the programmer’s free will. Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rrx36 wrote
>This doesn’t seem like a logical argument to me. It seems like you’re just saying humans tend to believe we have free will, and our society is based upon that assumption.
I'm saying that humans use the compatibilist definition of free will. Hence it makes sense to talk about compatibilist free will rather than libertarian free will.
I'm saying it's illogical to use the incoherent concept of libertarian free will.
>Where would we draw the line between free will and compulsion?
It would depend on the facts and I like to look at the legal system, which does this all the time.
In cases like R. v. Ruzic, they looked at the facts and determined they were coerced and hence didn't have free will.
In the case of Powell v Texas, where they tried a defence that it wasn't of their own free will since they were an alcoholic. While this argument shows they didn't have libertarian freewill. The courts didn't accept this argument and it was found they did have free will. So they did distinguish between free will and compulsion in this case.
>It has to be arbitrary
Just like pretty much every high level concept. Even the concept of "life" is arbitrary with many blurred lines. But just because the concept of life is arbitrary doesn't mean it isn't useful or that we can't apply in the context of humans.
>, just like you noted about a robot’s desires. An automaton desires nothing other than following its programming, so anything a robot does successfully would be an exercise of free will. But I don’t think anybody would actually argue that, they’d argue it’s an exercise of the programmer’s free will. Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?
​
>Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?
Maybe that's the main difference. We aren't programmed with a clear simple goal of killing someone, whereas the robot was.
If you change the example of just making the angry and violent, then if the robot following these goals kills someone, I think it is fairly similar to the human case.
CruxCapacitors t1_j8t1c7h wrote
I dislike your focus on the legal use of "free will" because the legal system, particularly in the US (which is where you're citing cases from), has a very poor, punitive prison system that has terrible recidivism rates. I can't help but feel that if more people realized that compatibilism is flawed, we might be able to better rehabilitate people.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8t4336 wrote
>I dislike your focus on the legal use of "free will" because the legal system
If you read the legal judgements around free will you'll see that they have an amazing grasp and understanding of the subject. They are as good if not better than most stuff philosophers write on the subject.
I like looking at the legal approach since is a nice realistic approach and understanding of the world that makes sense rather than an incoherent idea that isn't applicable to the reality we live in.
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>I can't help but feel that if more people realized that compatibilism is flawed, we might be able to better rehabilitate people.
Having a more rehabilitative justice system has absolutely nothing to do with the fact the justice system is based on compatibilist free will. So that's just a non argument.
Any functioning justice system which focuses on rehabilitation needs to also use compatibilist free will to work.
In fact studies suggest the justice system would likely be even worse without compatibilist free will.
>These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0091572#s1>
>
>For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008) From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society. https://www.academia.edu/15691341/Free_to_punish_A_motivated_account_of_free_will_belief?utm_content=buffercd36e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>A study suggests that when people are encouraged to believe their behavior is predetermined by genes or by environment they may be more likely to cheat. The report, in the January issue of Psychological Science, describes two studies by Kathleen D. Vohs of the University of Minnesota and Jonathan W. Schooler of the University of British Columbia.
BroadShoulderedBeast t1_j8rks0a wrote
I think in the context of free will discussion, voluntary action isn’t the same as free will. Even a robot can have a goal to do a thing as a matter of its pre-programming, but if another thing interrupts that action and the robot is made to do something different, it is no longer totally voluntary. The robot had a plan of action but had to change that plan because of circumstances outside of its control. Free will is not required for voluntary action.
Someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of making money versus someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of surviving against the person who ordered them at gun point to kidnap have very different degrees of voluntary action. The causes of their doing the kidnapping say something about the person’s propensity for voluntarily engaging in anti-social behavior.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8roxdi wrote
>I think in the context of free will discussion, voluntary action isn’t the same as free will.
I didn't say it was the same.
>Someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of making money versus someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of surviving against the person who ordered them at gun point to kidnap have very different degrees of voluntary action. The causes of their doing the kidnapping say something about the person’s propensity for voluntarily engaging in anti-social behavior.
Even if you don't use the word "free will", you are using the concept to distinguish between these two situations. So I'm not really sure of your point.
You accept that there is a difference between the situations. Do you also accept the legal system and most people would use the term free will in that context?
BroadShoulderedBeast t1_j8uufed wrote
I worded that very poorly. What I should have said was, voluntary action doesn’t require libertarian free will. Then, as I kept trying to explain more, I realized I don’t even think ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ really make sense in a deterministic/random universe.
>So I’m not really sure of your point.
My point was that free will means you could have acted differently given the same exact set of circumstances, genetics, environment, so on, because of some force that can act on the universe without detection. Involuntary means the person wouldn’t normally do that action except for a very small set of circumstances, usually because of threat to safety or life.
>most people would use the term free will in that context?
I’m not sure what the conventional use of the term ‘free will’ has to do with metaphysics. See the conventional use of “begging the question” for why lay use of philosophy jargon is not always helpful.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8x2kpk wrote
>Then, as I kept trying to explain more, I realized I don’t even think ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ really make sense in a deterministic/random universe.
I use the word voluntary since it's also used by incompatibilists like Sam Harris.
So Harris gives the example of deliberately shaking your hand as a voluntary action and your hand shaking as a result of Parkinson's as an involuntary action.
In theory we could do brain scans to differentiate the kinds of actions which are voluntary and involuntary.
So lets just use the words as defined by medical science.
I assume you agree there is a manful different between someone hitting you on purpose vs having an epileptic fit. That difference is what people normally mean by voluntary and involuntary actions.
>My point was that free will means you could have acted differently given the same exact set of circumstances, genetics, environment, so on,
Libertarian free will would mean that, but I'm talking about compatibilist free which doesn't doesn't.
>I’m not sure what the conventional use of the term ‘free will’ has to do with metaphysics. See the conventional use of “begging the question” for why lay use of philosophy jargon is not always helpful.
My point is that most lay people have compatibilist intuitions, most professional philosophers are outright compatibilists, pretty much all moral, court and justice systems are based on compatibilist free will.
>Most professional philosophers are compatibilists https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all
Why on the earth would someone use some metaphysical definition of free will, "libertarian free will", which is only really used by some amateur philosophers? It has zero relevance to what most people actually mean by the term, and has zero relevance or impact on the world in which we live.
I want to talk about the definition of free will which most people really mean, the term used by most professional philosophers, the the definition used by moral systems, court and justice systems around the world. I want to use the definition which is relevant to the world in which we live.
So if you want to talk about metaphysics which has zero relevance to the world in which we live, then you should make it clear. Because when people say that free will doesn't exist it confuses lay people. When you confuse people then it leads to people being more racist, immoral, etc.
​
>These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0091572#s1>
>
>For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008)
>
>From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society. https://www.academia.edu/15691341/Free_to_punish_A_motivated_account_of_free_will_belief?utm_content=buffercd36e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
>
>From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>A study suggests that when people are encouraged to believe their behavior is predetermined by genes or by environment they may be more likely to cheat. The report, in the January issue of Psychological Science, describes two studies by Kathleen D. Vohs of the University of Minnesota and Jonathan W. Schooler of the University of British Columbia.
>
>From https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19beha.html?scp=5&sq=psychology%20jonathan%20schooler&st=cse
frnzprf t1_j8w5oy6 wrote
I agree that we should use words how they are used in daily life and not redefine them.
I think the judges shouldn't call that "free will" based on the usages of "free" and "will". Basically, I personally like the definition of libertarian free will better, because it's about a will that is free.
I'd call what the judge called "acting on free will", "acting based on your own will". If the judges definition is more common, it becomes the correct definition.
When it's hot in a room, then you don't have to fix the air-conditioning system, when there is a power failiure. The air-conditioniner wasn't "responsible". I think punishing criminals is like fixing or calibrating machines.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8x6vq0 wrote
>I agree that we should use words how they are used in daily life and not redefine them.
That's my main argument. Most people have compatibilist intuitions in respect to free will. Most professional philosophers are outright compatibilists. Moral, court and justice systems are all based on compatibilist free will.
So yes, we should use the definition of what most people/society really mean by the word free will.
>[https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all)
The only people redefining free will are the ones using libertarian free will, and incompatibilists.
Latera t1_j8zzhzd wrote
The ability to act based on reasons. No robot that has ever been produced has been able to act based on reasons and if, one day, we have AI that CAN reason, then it WILL be free.
LittleFoot_Path t1_j8q2cpk wrote
Only if you can pinpoint a certain spot at which you consider “life starting”
I’ve asked this question to many and most just become uncomfortable about it, but I still hold it,
“when do you consider your life starting, at which point did you say “I’m alive” and consider the other parts not alive”
I’m not sure this highlights the topic but it’s still in line with the underpinnings. Why do we look to science to deliver us when most can’t even simply awnser that for ourselves?
Quarter13 t1_j8qlgya wrote
I had this conversation with my lady one night. My question was a bit different, it was "when does consciousness start, and do we have 'soul' before that?" Was trying to recall my first memory and it really terrified me that I was alive, breathing, eating, walking etc. all before I had any recollection. Made me wonder if consciousness requires a certain amount of information be taken in by the brain first.
LittleFoot_Path t1_j8r5gqu wrote
Agreed that it’s kind of a mind fuck, and yes I’m using life and consciousness interchangeably here. reminds me of a song “death is only the end if you assume the story is about you”
Quarter13 t1_j8r9vs1 wrote
I like that quote a lot. Ima use that
DasAllerletzte t1_j8rd4rb wrote
Wasn’t there a saying along the lines of „we’re but the sum of our memories“?
[deleted] t1_j8ton8r wrote
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TheReal8symbols t1_j8sdm85 wrote
This is what has always bothered me about the multiverse idea that every choice you could have made is made in another dimension/universe. I made the decision for reasons and there's no reason I would have ever made a different decision under the same circumstances.
JeanVicquemare t1_j8tvibo wrote
>If all our decisions can be traced back to genetics, situational and nurture; aren’t those variables beyond our own control anyway?
This is in fact the thrust of Galen Strawson's major argument, which I find to be pretty compelling.
The article basically allows that we don't have freedom to do otherwise but says that free will is still a useful psychological concept, which is true. But it doesn't help proponents of libertarian free will.
VitriolicViolet t1_j8t1epz wrote
All of that is you though, that's the whole point.
If those things (your genes, neurons, environment, culture, memories etc) are not 'you' then 'you' don't exist
Johannes--Climacus t1_j8u1bez wrote
Are there events that occur which require me as an agent to affect them? If yes, then there is free will, if not, there is neither free will nor me
Jaltcoh t1_j8v04ra wrote
I don’t know what you mean by “that decision was made as soon as you are aware of the choice.” It’s not clear to me that that’s true, or that it would disprove free will if it were true.
Also, you seem to be assuming that “all our decisions can be traced back to genetics” and other things outside our control. Well, those things clearly contribute a lot to our actions, but that isn’t the issue. That just means we don’t have total freedom, which should be obvious even to believers in free will. When people argue against free will, it often seems like they’re setting up two extremes: either no freedom ever, or a magical, supernatural “ghost” roaming around our bodies. Framing it like that makes the second option sound so ridiculous as to suggest that the only serious answer for any educated person in the modern world is to deny free will in absolute terms. But I like the article’s suggestion to reconsider how we think about free will. We might not have all the relevant knowledge yet, and the debate doesn’t need to be constantly boiled down to two cartoonish extremes.
The article does a good job of subtly refuting the Libet experiment, after it was more bluntly debunked by John Searle in his book Rationality in Action over 20 years ago.
Fast_Philosophy1044 t1_j8wygyn wrote
This is exactly Schopenhauer’s position on free will.
Voidtoform t1_j8y3dd0 wrote
You are still your subconscious…. I don’t see how subconsciousness has anything at all to do with free will.
Insanity_Pills t1_j991m3q wrote
I would say that yes, those variables are beyond are control. I would personally go a bit past that and say that everything that happens is simply the inevitable result of what happened before it, a single line of events tracing back to the beginning of things.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WagdzxAH8EQ
this video really made me start thinking about this topic, I highly recommend anyone with an interest in free will watch this
SaltyShawarma t1_j8qoh8j wrote
I really appreciate this take and will exercise my free will to continue to assume the title actually read, "Free Willy is Only an Illusion if You are, too."
Willy and I are not illusions and I would challenge you to hypothesize some logical origin of this declared decision based on nuances contained within this rambling.
bumharmony t1_j8qy6jz wrote
If you keep your Willy free in the public, your will will not be free in the near future.
Nameless1995 t1_j8px505 wrote
> You may have debated it consciously, but if you really think about it, that decision was made as soon as you are aware of the choice. You are really spending the time trying to understand that choice.
I don't see why. That sounds like saying an artificial reinforcement learning agent is only evaluating a pre-made decision when it is computing the weight for each action in the action space and selecting (deciding) the maximum weighed action. That would be a very weird and confusing thing to say, even if the agent is completely determined by its inital seed, program, environment, history and etc. You can always create off-brand language games, and say such things as "because the decision is logically entailed by so and so, it's all pre-made" but I am not sure everyone would subscribe to that language game. Being logically entailed is different from actually causally executing a decision.
bread93096 t1_j8qubw2 wrote
The intuitive perception of the self which most Westerners have is illusory, as is free will. Ultimately, it’s part of our culture, in its modern incarnation, to view ourselves as free, rational agents. In other cultures, like the Ancient Greeks, it’s a given that our lives are ruled by fate.
Free will is an illusion, buts it’s not an illusion which is inherent to the mind. It’s an illusion which is maintained via culture. It’s entirely possible to subjectively perceive yourself to not have free will. Personally I don’t feel a strong sense of volition in the vast majority of things I do and say. 99% of the time I’m operating on instinct.
imdfantom t1_j8rj9es wrote
> It’s entirely possible to subjectively perceive yourself to not have free will.
How would that even work?
bread93096 t1_j8s8t3x wrote
If you pay attention in your day to day life, you’ll notice that most of the things you say and do don’t require any conscious reflection. Words and ideas pop into our heads from the subconscious, and we immediately act them out. This is why it’s possible to zone out while driving a familiar route, or having a routine conversation with your barrista. Most of what we do is following a routine - when our routine is disrupted in a significant way, it leads to confusion, and our response under such circumstances might surprise us.
For example, if I was walking down the street on my way to work, following my little routine, and a man leapt out of an alley to attack me, I can’t say with any confidence whether I would fight, flight, or freeze up. It would come down to whatever instinct was strongest in my subconscious at that moment. I simply wouldn’t have time to make a reasoned decision.
Even when I’m reflecting deeply on a difficult decision, it’s hard to explain exactly how I come to an outcome: usually I just ‘go with my gut’, that is, I follow whatever impulse is strongest within me. When we’re making a difficult decision, it’s like we’re being pulled in different directions by two different forces, and while it might feel like there’s a great struggle between them, in the end the victor is predetermined by whichever emotional force is strongest.
And if you make decisions based on reason instead of emotion - well reason is universal, so the more heavily you rely on rationality, the less ‘personal’ your decisions become. If someone asks me what’s 2+2, I can’t help but think 4 - I am compelled to by reason.
imdfantom t1_j8sa9nz wrote
You seem to believe that (and correct me if I am wrong here) if you thought or acted using "free will" you would somehow consciously decide what you think, say or do a priori to the thought, vocalisation, or action. However, here we would come to a problem.
Now, this a priori "conscious decision" has been done without a priori thought process.
So to have "real" free will we need to take an a priori decision about out a priori decision.
So on and so forth ad infinitum
At no point will you be satisfied since at the bottom of the rabbit hole there will always be thought/decision will come to you without an a priori decision is process.
You seem to be asking too much of what a reasonable definition of free will could provide. Essentially, your definition of free will seems intrinsically paradoxical, in which case, of course you don't think you have it.
Not that there is anything wrong with that.
bread93096 t1_j8sba7y wrote
The way I see it there’s 2 kinds of free will: 1st is the more traditional metaphysical version, essentially the question of whether it is possible for any mind to make truly free decisions in what appears to be a deterministic reality. The 2nd kind is specifically human free will, which depends on our own psychology, and the degree of conscious involvement we share in our actions.
I don’t believe in either kind of free will - but even if the 1st type of free will existed, if our decisions truly were self caused … we could still lack the 2nd type of free will, which is our subjective sense of conscious involvement in our decisions. It’s the 2nd type of free will I see as being absent from my personal experience, as I can never directly observe the 1st type.
imdfantom t1_j8sd8li wrote
An interesting and atypical perspective to be sure, but evolution tries all sorts of things, so it isn't too out there for some people to feel less ownership of their thoughts, decisions and actions.
Slightly higher than average levels of subclinical (so still within "normal" limits) depersonalisation (which exists on a spectrum in aus all) may explain what you feel, who knows.
bread93096 t1_j8suqqv wrote
My case is unusual, but within a culture where there’s a strong belief in fate, people would agree that their sense of free will is an illusion. they might perceive themselves to have volition, but on a deeper level they’d believe this volition is a kind of mirage - basically the point of the Oedipus myth.
VitriolicViolet t1_j8t3g30 wrote
As someone who has been attacked you do indeed have time to make a reasoned choice in response.
When I was attacked I literally reasoned through my choices, I could have allowed it to happen, I could have fled into traffic or I could defend myself.
Further more I had the option of either ramming my fingers into his eyes or hitting him in the throat, I chose the throat.
Some people do reason through as much as possible, I use my emotions to frame and guide my reasoning.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rpo60 wrote
Here are some links and studies around researchers effecting people's level of free will belief.
Turns out that convincing people that they don't have free will is bad.
​
>These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0091572#s1>
>
>
>
>For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008)
>
>From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
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>these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society. https://www.academia.edu/15691341/Free_to_punish_A_motivated_account_of_free_will_belief?utm_content=buffercd36e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
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>A study suggests that when people are encouraged to believe their behavior is predetermined by genes or by environment they may be more likely to cheat. The report, in the January issue of Psychological Science, describes two studies by Kathleen D. Vohs of the University of Minnesota and Jonathan W. Schooler of the University of British Columbia.
>
>From https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19beha.html?scp=5&sq=psychology%20jonathan%20schooler&st=cse
Rainbowoverderp t1_j8s1v5q wrote
>Turns out that convincing people that they don't have free will is bad.
Within our society/culture which desperately clings to the idea of free will. People grow up believing this and a lot of patterns, beliefs and thoughts are based on this assumption. You can't just tell people this assumption is wrong and expect them to magically adapt their whole way of thinking to that. It's no wonder accountability, morality, etc goes straight out the door if it was always based on the cultural myth of free will.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8s2pqw wrote
>You can't just tell people this assumption is wrong and expect them to magically adapt their whole way of thinking to that. It's no wonder accountability, morality, etc goes straight out the door if it was always based on the cultural myth of free will.
I see it another way, people really mean compatibilist free will which does exist, convincing people they don't have libertarian free will just confuses them and messes up their perfectly working moral system based on compatibilist free.
Rainbowoverderp t1_j8s6d3q wrote
I tend to agree with you, but I wouldn't say their moral system is based on compatabilism, but rather on libertarianism. Their moral system can be adapted to a compatibilist base, but as you say, this is a confusing and difficult process, which for a lot of people ends up in them throwing away parts of their moral system (thereby proving compatibilism, ironically).
Confident-Broccoli-5 t1_j8sbxwd wrote
>The intuitive perception of the self which most Westerners have is illusory
What perception do Westerners have of the self & why is it illusory?
bread93096 t1_j8suvqs wrote
The perception of the self as a free rational agent which makes decisions independent of fate. It’s essentially the product of Christian free will and enlightenment era rationalism.
Olderandolderagain t1_j9dopzj wrote
Do you meditate? The experience you describe is explicit in that state. The term "free will" seems useful in situations involving the law. Otherwise, everyone would get an insanity plea. But I do agree with you.
bildramer t1_j8r4kdb wrote
"Illusion" is such an annoying word. It carries so many connotations, many of them wrong in most contexts it's used in. Its meaning is anywhere between "false" and "real, but looks slightly different than it is".
To this day I still don't understand how proving "your thoughts have lag" is supposed to show anything about (not compatibilist, nor libertarian, but layman) free will, for or against.
Kalibos40 t1_j8rwf7c wrote
I think the whole idea about "thought lag" is that we're being subjected to our thoughts. We're not actually manifesting them consciously.
Zigs44_ t1_j8pqjl4 wrote
You can choose a ready guide in some celestial voice.
If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice!
You can choose from phantom fears and kindness that can kill.
I will choose a path that's clear, I will choose Freewill!
Hugo_El_Humano t1_j8qxfgn wrote
why the Rush to jump to conclusions there, eh buddy?
[deleted] t1_j8px8t8 wrote
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PaxNova t1_j8qfbpq wrote
Define "you."
[deleted] t1_j8qfvq0 wrote
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PaxNova t1_j8qjwup wrote
I mean to say, these "no free will" comments tend to revolve around you being solely the product of your genetics, experiences, etc. But if the brain and the self are the same thing, then that's still "you." If you are your brain, then you are your genetics. It's pointless to separate them.
[deleted] t1_j8qm311 wrote
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ThorHammerslacks t1_j8rwtgb wrote
Are those the printed lyrics, or the sung lyrics?
rejectednocomments t1_j8py716 wrote
There are those who think that life has nothing left to chance…
stevebradss t1_j8px0ac wrote
Futorama https://youtu.be/8Ge59iM2dS0
[deleted] t1_j8px19d wrote
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swissiws t1_j8r7al4 wrote
Each time you have to decide, you can leave it to A random (toss a coin) and you decided so. Or you can pick an option B or C, and you decided so. In both cases, the reasons you decided for A, B or C are dependant on the informations that you have about the choice you have to make. Those informations come from outside. Thus, there is no free will at all. If a computer knew exactly what value you give to each information you use to decide, it will be able to choose the exact same option you do.
DasAllerletzte t1_j8rfmqp wrote
Of course it will.
In the end, it was I who entered the information.
And if you’d enter yours, it would decide accordingly.
Nothing is perfect or unique.
It is (for what we know) impossible for two objects to carry the same information.
And through the even greater imperfection of human beings, two of them will neither receive nor evaluate data equally.
Thus, there are infinitely many combinations of presets for that computer.
swissiws t1_j8rr3rg wrote
I do not mean entering information by hand. I mean: if a computer knew "by magic" how I value each and everything, it could replicate my choices 100% of the time
DasAllerletzte t1_j8vssrr wrote
How would you express those values?
There is no language to describe such subjective concepts.
And that would be the requirement for a machine to try to evaluate the results.
Then, computers work in binary. Meaning, everything is discrete to them. There is no continuous spectrum.
For example, who do you love/value more: your parents? Your siblings? Your children? Your pets?
Is this allocation constant? Or might it change depending on the situation?
Also, what are those values anyway?
And finally, who designed that computer? Who programmed it?
Can a universal thought process even exist?
swissiws t1_j8w0nn2 wrote
the fact that those concepts are vague (because we are ignorant about ourselves) does not change the fact that we have values that drive our choices. whatever the way it's operated, it does not change the outcome
DasAllerletzte t1_j8wak73 wrote
What about those small little and „unimportant“ choices?
Will you treat yourself with a snack this evening? Is it a bar of chocolate, or rather a bunch of carrots?
swissiws t1_j8wtie5 wrote
well, what does your body want? sugars? then it's chocolate. is your fear of losing health a bit high due to news you have heard? maybe that fear is stronger than your need for sugar. then it's carrots. meybe you can eve feel your inner fight, because the 2 desires are almost identical. but the stronger prevails in the end
dankest_cucumber t1_j8qh9l4 wrote
>if
Yeah dawg, western philosophers been agreeing this is all an illusion for almost two centuries now
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8raysb wrote
>Yeah dawg, western philosophers been agreeing this is all an illusion for almost two centuries now
You've got it backwards most philosophers most are outright compatibilists. Only a very tiny percent think it's an illusion.
dankest_cucumber t1_j8rqnlr wrote
It depends on who you consider to a be a philosopher
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rss2y wrote
>It depends on who you consider to a be a philosopher
Someone once posted, most lay people have compatibilist intuitions, most professional philosophers are outright compatibilists, but amateur philosophers are incompatibilists.
dankest_cucumber t1_j8ru07n wrote
I bet they did
answermethis0816 t1_j8rukxr wrote
I agree, but I think the difference between the professional and amateur philosopher in that assessment is how they define free will. Professional philosophers who are compatibilists are using a more narrow, very specific definition of free will, while the amateur determinist is using the broader colloquial definition.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rx92e wrote
The way I see it is that professional philosophers are using the definition of what people "really" mean by the term. Amateur philosophers are using some weird incoherent definition that doesn't exist and hence isn't what people really mean by the term.
answermethis0816 t1_j8rxvja wrote
A determinist would agree that it’s incoherent… which is why they are determinist, no?
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8ryr8x wrote
>A determinist would agree that it’s incoherent… which is why they are determinist, no?
Nearly all compatibilists are determinists.
answermethis0816 t1_j8scjtu wrote
Sorry, I'm using determinist to mean hard determinist. I intentionally avoided incompatibilist since that also includes libertarianians.
Johannes--Climacus t1_j8u1ul9 wrote
What set of philosophers are you defining that leads you to your conclusion?
Not a gotcha, just trying to understand your position.
dankest_cucumber t1_j8u6q6a wrote
Basically, people who contribute to the philosophical “canon.” You could get a phd in Phil and study Plato until you’re the foremost expert, but you will only have learned philosophy, not become a philosopher. Kant put forth that all human experience is phenomenal, which would make “free will” a concept of phenomena. Since Kant, no refutation of this philosophy has stuck that wasn’t a rehashing of enlightenment rationalism. All lasting contributions to the canon have added onto Kant’s philosophy.
Johannes--Climacus t1_j8uq3uh wrote
Okay, I can work with that.
I think a problem here is that saying that free will is phenomenal is not the same as saying it’s “illusory” or not real. Phenomena is real, it’s just real as phenomena and not as noumena. Space, time, and causation are also “merely” phenomenal, but I don’t think we’re going to deny that they therefore don’t exist. If free will turned out to be “as real” as cause and effect, then I think almost just about any believer in free will would feel vindicated.
dankest_cucumber t1_j8ushly wrote
But if all experience is necessarily phenomenal, then free will is a moot point, is moreso what I’m trying to point at. Certainly decisions are made by freely acting entities, and if saying that makes me a “compatibilist,” then fine, but every “decision” made is a synthesis of opposed phenomena playing out their dialectical relationship through the mechanism of human perception. The “decision” is but a phenomenon we experience, which is pretty antithetical to the traditional understanding of free will.
Johannes--Climacus t1_j8uton7 wrote
What’s bothering me here is that the statement that “‘certainly decisions are made by freely acting entities’ but nonetheless, free will doesn’t exist” seems to imply as confusing a notion of free will as any.
I think you and I are actually pretty close in what we think is going on, we just disagree about what “free will” is. I do not think free will describes anything about the likelihood of a given decision, but rather the mechanism by which it came to be. If I make the decision to hug my mom instead of punching her 100% of the time, I would say I’m more free than a scenario where whether I give my mom a hug or a punch is not predictable (I say this because sometimes I hear free will libertarians say they are free because their behavior is unpredictable, which is strange to me).
So if an event occurs because my self existed (in whatever sense it does exist) to order things in that way, then I’m satisfied I made that decision freely. I believe this is a pretty mainstream position among compatibilists.
Perhaps you’re thinking “this is such a strange understanding of freedom”, but I think the stranger understanding is the one where freedom requires power over the movement of atoms in the Big Bang
dankest_cucumber t1_j8uvp4c wrote
I think my focus on freedom comes more from a perspective of trying to conceptualize decision-making from a timeless perspective. The notion of time being phenomenal, and its linearity being a human mental construct, is fundamental in understanding the odd state of free will that has it seemingly existing and not at once. If you don't consider time as necessarily linear, then the notion of a decision being an "experience" that a being cannot opt out of becomes more clear. I think "will" is a stratified concept, and the same way an aware entity, such as a dog, sees an insect or plant as less free, a layman sees a dog as less free, and a rich man sees a layman as less free, and an enlightened thinker sees the rich man as less free, and the man surrounded by supportive community sees the enlightened thinker as less free, and this implies a degree to which freedom is simultaneously relative to and a guarantee to any entity, but in a way that is fundamentally tied to its level of understanding. I find that the language of "free will vs. determinism" distracts from the more important metaphysical fact of the oneness of human-kind through our common thread of perception, since the highest known form of freedom is that afforded through social cohesion.
Johannes--Climacus t1_j8uxv9g wrote
You know I think we actually agree on a lot here, to the point that I’m not sure we disagree on much. I definitely agree that “free will vs determinism” reflects and promotes a confusion about the notion of freedom, the only thing I’m struggling how you’re not a compatibilist — “free will is real but not how you think” is still a way of believing free will is real!
dankest_cucumber t1_j8wcdbd wrote
I probably would be considered compatibilist, I was just being cheeky at first because free will vs. determinism vs. compatibilism is such a played out college philosophy debate that doesn’t hit on particularly presient issues.
Quarter13 t1_j8qlw3t wrote
They believe it, they don't know it. Still an "if" until proven to be one way or the other
dankest_cucumber t1_j8qmvaw wrote
That’s the thing about philosophy tho. It asks questions that get beneath the material fabric of reality. Even if it’s real, it can still be an illusion, just a real illusion, which is what everyone agrees on since Kant. So like yeah, it’s a if, but I make the subjective value judgement that rational beings can see the intuitive truth in that logic, when it’s laid out properly, since the underlying reason that I see reflected in all (perceived) entities around me informs my consciousness as well, and I see the reason Kant lies out as necessarily true.
Quarter13 t1_j8qngdj wrote
Right. So you agree it's an if? The other thing about philosophy is that as time goes on, a lot of it turns out to be wrong. Philosophers agreed about plenty of things in the past and were wrong. Yeah we can make judgements, but it was not wrong at all here to say "if" and saying it in any other way that didn't denote that this is not concrete would be irresponsible imo.
dankest_cucumber t1_j8qo7wy wrote
It both is and isn’t an if. It’s dialectical. Phenomenology and existentialism get at the nature of what it means to be and perceive. Sure that’s a subjective reality, which you need not pay attention to, but I similarly need not consider your skepticism to be well informed.
frogandbanjo t1_j8roa0v wrote
It's no more significant to me that the brain handles different "choices" in different ways than the fact that my fingers move differently depending on the task.
>“We” are our brain.
Okay, but what about global supervenience across both time and space? What are we not, if we focus on integrated systems of cause and effect? That's the more important question. "I am a very special cog" does not negate "I am part of a larger machine and my movements are dictated by all of those other parts, plus energy that originated long ago."
I hardly think we need to debate whether the concept of free will is useful. The overwhelming majority of our moral and legal systems depend on the premise that it exists, and anyone who tries to prod at that premise gets shut down very quickly by nervous, fearful, vengeful, and outraged people. It's certainly useful to some people and to some ends. The same could be said, however, for any opiate of the masses or tool of the oppressors.
Cinemiketography t1_j8s31ee wrote
Who can argue with that circular logic? XD
bassinlimbo t1_j8s2nxr wrote
I wrote a paper about this myself back in college, after reading Notes from the Underground and getting inspired. I didn't personally support determinism, rather thinking of things happening in the moment as they occur, almost like there was no future / past, just the reactions that are happening in the moment. Another aspect came to play was optimistic nihilism, and taking into account that even if true "free will" does not exist, the concept of it being true is enough to give life meaning. It doesn't have to be real to enjoy life, create meaning, experience things.
liquiddandruff t1_j8uu90k wrote
I subscribe to optimistic nihilism too.
> It doesn't have to be real to enjoy life, create meaning, experience things.
I'd just say here that those who say free ill is a lie, aren't saying to not enjoy life, create meaning, or experience things either.
The discourse around free will is orthogonal to all that. I tend to see a lot of people react defensively and unable to separate these concepts.
bassinlimbo t1_j8v1nte wrote
Yes exactly! It's really hard to explain to people who aren't as fluent in philosophy. They are very defensive over their "ability to choose" and can't separate the idea of true "free will" from what they really have. Most who disagree see it as a negative when I find it very neutral.
Quarter13 t1_j8qmg9z wrote
For me, environmental factors are too great. We can see it just in watching people who grow up in certain areas. Environment has a huge effect on our development and decision making. Beyond that our nature just comes from a long line of action and consequence all the way back to the big bang. Sure I can self-reflect and make changes or improvements to myself. I can decide to do something different and crazy, but did I? I can't know I need to change or should change or want to change unless I've encountered information to convince me of that. You cant know what you don't know and haven't been exposed too. Cause and effect are too great of factors in my reality to pick a side on free will. I lean toward no, though. The part I struggle with is the mind and the idea that all consciousness is God. Therefore God i.e. You and I have already predetermined this or are creating this reality as we go. It twists my mind.
MadScience_Gaming t1_j8qpnb3 wrote
Can confirm; am illusion.
Medullan t1_j8qyn2r wrote
Nah just because everything is an illusion doesn't mean my choices are predetermined. Reality doesn't have to be solid for me to choose chocolate instead of vanilla.
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[deleted] t1_j8rl0xx wrote
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Confident-Broccoli-5 t1_j8rpaxr wrote
> “We” are our brain.
Maybe not -
> Mereology is the logic of part/whole relations. The neuroscientists’ mistake of ascribing to the constituent parts of an animal attributes that logically apply only to the whole animal we shall call ‘the mereological fallacy’ in neuroscience.
> The principle that psychological predicates which apply only to human beings (or other animals) as wholes cannot intelligibly be applied to their parts, such as the brain, we shall call ‘the mereological principle’ in neuroscience.
> Human beings, but not their brains, can be said to be thoughtful or to be thoughtless; animals, but not their brains, let alone the hemispheres of their brains, can be said to see, hear, smell and taste things; people, but not their brains, can be said to make decisions or to be indecisive.
So the basic idea of the mereological fallacy (which is what the author may be committing) is claiming parts are responsible for something only the whole they are a part of can be responsible for. In neuroscience, the brain is the particular part that gets ascribed characteristics only the whole body or person can be responsible for.
I think it's easiest to deal with from the first person, since figuring out whether other people are doing things involves a variety of concerns about inferring mental activity from observed bodily behavior - though the issue is still pertinent there.
Let's just jump into some issues that just the basic first personal claim that "I think my brain is thinking" gives rise to. These are just questions to ask yourself for the sake of figuring out how to make sense of a person, a brain, and their status as either part or whole and how they can relate in a way that makes sense.
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Is my brain equivalent to my thinking, my activity in general, myself? How could it even still be just one part of a person's body if it's a whole person? Is it both a part and a whole, somehow? In what respects, such that this wouldn't be a contradiction?
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If I just were a brain, would I be part of a body that isn't my own? What of the other body parts, are they part of me or are they just sort of tools for me as a brain? How would sensation even work if that's all they are? My eyes and my brain are both important for a whole person to see colors on a theory that considers them parts, but if the brain is the whole person how does the affectation of the eye result in a brain's experience of color?
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What happens as a brain changes? If a brain is a body part of a whole person, that person can stay the same as experiencing subject as their brain develops, changes, etc. The person as a whole accounts for the unity of the body and the experiences resulting from its changes all being a process of a single subject. But if I am my brain, wouldn't I just cease to be when my brain changes, and some other brain-person would pop into being upon the instantiation of the new brain structure?
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What determines the limit of a body or body part? Why do we decide the brain material stops here, the eye material stops here, the whole person's body stops here, etc.? Why is it not just an arbitrarily selected aggregate of atomistic pieces of stuff any way you slice it?
Minimally, we can say the mereological fallacy is a criticism of a way of treating these kinds of questions that some philosophers believe does not make sense.
astralrig96 t1_j8ukaly wrote
Really enjoyed reading this! This finally puts to words why such a reductionistic approach in neurology is one sided.
I have one question, does the mereological fallacy mean the same thing as eliminative materialism or is there a difference between the two concepts?
I understand that these two form one position and their opposite is emergence/configurationism?
Confident-Broccoli-5 t1_j8vprmo wrote
No, philosophers who argue for the mereological fallacy (basically just a few Wittgenstein scholars, not many) aren't denying mental states/ consciousness, they're just saying it makes no sense to treat the brain as the organism/human being as a whole. Take the example of a clock — someone might be inclined to claim that it’s the hands that tell the time, others might claim it’s another part. But we know that it’s the entire clock that tells the time and that it only tells the time when it’s functionally integrated and correctly set.
It's the same for humans and their minds, etc. Psychological attributes are properties of people, it’s a person who thinks, not their brain. They might need a brain to think, but that doesn’t mean it’s the brain that thinks (and so on). This video by Peter Hacker nicely summarises the view - https://youtu.be/EMcmQPdi0Fs
astralrig96 t1_j8w3fac wrote
Thanks for the clarification! And so, concerning these other terms I mentioned what’s the exact relation of mereology to them?
Emergence would be the opposite right? Because it in fact indeed treats the brain as a whole and goes as far to say that it’s something even bigger than its singular parts.
Eliminative materialism sounds synonymous but not completely identical with mereology to me because it implies that parts give a whole just only the parts and not something else like in emergence.
I’m asking because I’ve seen these exact terms used on an older discussion on this sub concerning the same topic
itsgabrielsimao t1_j8sf22t wrote
The brain activity spiked so early before the decision was made because the person just wanted to continue browsing to make sure that truly was the pair of headphones they wanted.
ifoundit1 t1_j8skygo wrote
That would mean someone may be having it or attempting to have it for us instead of it being a gift to us.
Mikeoxard411 t1_j8t54uc wrote
there are many things in our life that we are unable to control, and our conscious or meaningful decisions are influenced by uncontrollable circumstances we find ourselves in. So finding the demarcation point for where free will vs arbitrary actions is almost impossible
lvl69warrior t1_j8t7286 wrote
wouldn't it be more simple to say that there is no demarcation point?
lvl69warrior t1_j8t7e32 wrote
A lot of anti-freewill comments in this thread, which is outside the norm for here. Usually see a lot of compatabalism.
SnooRadishes6544 t1_j8tr7wv wrote
I am free, therefore I am
FrankfurterWorscht t1_j8ts45p wrote
The question of free will boils down to if you think we live in a purely physical world or not. Considering that there is absolutely no evidence to the contrary, I believe we do. In this case, free will cannot exists, because it would imply that you ego could somehow override the laws of physics.
frank_prajna t1_j8tu66o wrote
I mean, what about you is persistent?
What about you is knowable without other?
For years I've been looking and I cannot find anything that is actually unique.
Even the inquiry is initiated due to outside influences.
Hobbs512 t1_j8v1i8q wrote
Speaking of the "readiness potential" described in the article where your brain unconciously prepares for a movement, what if I were to ask you to pick a random body part and move it? Let's say you picked your right hand. Why did you pick your right hand and not the left? Or your foot? You cannot say, you think it is literally random but it's of course not. It's caused by a combination of a massive amount of variables we have no control over or may not even be aware of.
I don't think you really have control over your thoughts, emotions or behaviours. We are influenced by our genes and the way we are raised, both of which we have no control of. Then we are influenced by our environment, which we don't always have good control of either. The pandemic quarantine affected me but there was nothing I could do to stop it.
The illusion of free will is a mechanism our brains developed to allow us to function as a species and survive. It may be an illusion but it is a necessary one often times.
[deleted] t1_j8vk529 wrote
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nineteenthly t1_j8vmrs4 wrote
The problem with this article is that it focusses on a single aspect of brain physiology without considering the determinism (or the acausality) of other events. The main problem with free will existing seems to be that our actions are either caused or uncaused. If they're caused, the classic determinism issue comes up. If they're uncaused, we can't influence them. The existence or otherwise, or the nature, of the readiness potential has no bearing on that.
compound-interest t1_j8wkhjj wrote
I’ve pretty much always suspected determinism is more likely, but Sam Harris’s book on free will was fairly convincing for me.
DocHickory t1_j90hn0n wrote
are, too...D2.
TransparentMastering t1_j913ovw wrote
Like most things, Free Will and Determinism are probably extremes of a spectrum and the true nature of any given behaviour is probably between those two points, and is different every time.
In other words, this debate has always felt like a bit of a false dichotomy to me. It continues perpetually because we are trying to force it to one side or the other while no situation is fully deterministic or free/random.
I am not sure why my perspective on this is uncommon. A brief survey of physics implies this pretty clearly to me.
LonelyWing t1_j92zejm wrote
Always been obsessed with realism and nihilism but free will is taking over now. Looking into this subreddit more and I can't believe I missed out so many articles and reading that link philosophy with science. Although, part me thinks it's all kind of bullshit because we all have our own thoughts about topics. If you can think, and argue for those thoughts - you're a philosopher. Not in the sense we're arguing against each other, but against ideas and in return we learn and expand our knowledge. :)
RGSchaffer t1_j97b8y5 wrote
I guess we have a free will of sorts. The arrticles begins with tasks that we do not challenge or provoke us. I would suggest that the will is present even in the task of walking or any menial task. Our will can be seen in how we walk, how we engage. There is no one style or approach to walking. that is what makes the task of an actor in a play or movie interesting-the life he or she brings to the part. We just do not normally reflect on these parts of ourself.
Jump to bigger decisions such as career or deciding which of the two charities to give to in the essay and we pause. We reflect. Different parts of the brain come to life and are brought into the process or conversation. And this process is neither purely nature nor nurture, but rather a negotiation between our bodies, our brains, and the world, leading ultimately to a complexity that we call consciousness. Again it just having a range of parts or modules of the brain engaged and us reflecting on what is offered by each.
Ultimately, that process is complex and involves a self, a body and brain engaged in the examination of the world and what is desired and what is possible and arriving at how to proceed, how to act. and then you add language and culture to this view, which may perhaps be implicit, it just becomes that much richer. Our Freedom at the social level is truly first based upon our mobility and how we move, and where we move to, but we are not talking of freedom but of free will. I think we can in our embodied minds have both.
superhoffy t1_j8s6hj4 wrote
It's simple: you believe in free will or you can feel "free" to give up on everything and everyone, including yourself.
I know what I'm choosing.
liquiddandruff t1_j8utw6l wrote
false dichotomy, but keep clinging to #1 if it helps you 🤷♀️
adurango t1_j8psxld wrote
This is pretty interesting and I appreciated the end of it (quick read). But I think the author skipped an important concept. If all our decisions can be traced back to genetics, situational and nurture; aren’t those variables beyond our own control anyway? We may feel that our choices are our own but think about a recent decision. You may have debated it consciously, but if you really think about it, that decision was made as soon as you are aware of the choice. You are really spending the time trying to understand that choice.
I think that was main theme The Matrix part II.